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Abstract of Thesis
This is a study of an incident that took place in North 
China when the Japanese Army decided to institute a blockade 
around the British and French Concessions at Tientsin on 15 
June 1939. This precipitated a serious international crisis 
between Japan, Britain and China, although other countries, 
in particular the United States and France, were also 
involved. The crisis was in large part defused by the middle 
of September 1939, although the blockade of the British and 
French areas would not be lifted until June 1940.
This was one of many incidents between Japan, China and 
the western imperial powers in Asia that occurred in the 
wake of Japan's invasion into China, particularly from July 
1937. The object of this study is to determine why, unlike 
many of these other events, the Tientsin Incident escalated 
into a crisis and how it could be defused almost nine months 
before the blockade of the British and French Concessions 
would eventually be raised.
This is a multi-archival work. But particular emphasis 
has been put upon the analysis of Japanese primary materials 
in order to discover the light this Incident can shed upon 
the nature and problems of Japanese imperial expansion into 
Asia, and how this affected the course of Anglo-Japanese 
relations. We examine the extent to which the political 
dynamics of this conflict were decided by the situation in
Tientsin as opposed to the conflict in China as a whole and 
the tensions that it was putting on Japan's body-politic. We 
also examine to what extent the Incident acted as a catalyst 
in promoting a more confrontational relationship between 
Japan and the Western Powers. Finally, we try to make an 
assessment of the implications of this event both for China 
and other Asian countries that would later follow China's 
lead in seeking to deal with their foreign imperial 
conquerors —  Japanese or Western —  upon a more equal 
footing.
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Preface
This is a study of the process by which an 
insignificant administrative dispute between Japan and 
Britain in North China escalated into a sufficiently serious 
international crisis for the British Foreign Secretary to 
admit that it was "causing him more anxiety than the 
(British) position in any other part of the world."1 Why and 
how did this happen? To what extent can it be seen as part 
of an international crisis that led, with Japan's attack on
M
Pearl Harbour in December 1941, to the globalization of^ 
Second World War? What can be learnt from this Incident 
about the relationships between Japan and the Western 
Powers, and the latter's relations between themselves? What 
was the implication of their activities for China?
Many of these questions have been addressed by Western 
historians. But in contrast to the starting point of many of 
their studies, which have been primarily or exclusively 
written from a British or Anglo-American viewpoint, I have 
been interested in approaching this incident as a case study 
of Japanese imperial rule. While in Japan, I was able to 
examine extensive Japanese military and Foreign Ministry 
archival material, in particular thousands of pages of 
Foreign Ministry diplomatic and consular communications, 
surveys, police reports and press articles.2 With the aid of 
these and other sources, I have attempted to place this
event within the context of Japan's occupation of China, its 
relations with other foreign states and its domestic 
political situation. What light can the ■Tientsin Incident 
shed on these other areas of Japanese political life, and to 
what extent was the Tientsin Incident affected by them?
The Tientsin Incident was one of many stand-offs 
between Japan and the Western Powers as its military forces 
expanded into China between 1937 and 1939. These incidents 
included the killin-g J of an ambassador in battle, the 
bombardment of naval vessels and numerous smaller acts of 
provocation directed against missionaries and other 
foreigners resident in China. In May 1939, Japanese troops 
invaded an international settlement in an island (Kulangsu) 
off a port city in southern China. Yet .these disputes were 
usually settled locally, with the Japanese sometimes 
offering formal apologies and reparations. In Kulangsu, the 
situation was resolved by a joint-British-French-United 
States military landing which caused Japanese troops to beat 
a retreat and come to an agreement —  a textbook example of 
the time-honoured formula of gunboat, flag and Caucasian 
fortitude carrying the day, even when Western Empires were 
supposed to be in their twilight.
As a local incident, the Tientsin affair was not 
notably different from some of these other problems. Yet, 
unlike them, it was not solved locally, but erupted into an
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international crisis after the imposition on 15 June 1939 of 
a blockade of the British and .French Concessions by Japan's 
North China Army. Although the crisis has generally been 
considered to have come to an end by the beginning of 
September, the blockade was not actually lifted until June 
1940. In other words, a problem that was not intrinsically 
insoluble escalated into a political crisis that was then 
'defused' months before the event was actually 'resolved'. 
For this to happen, the course of the Incident had to be 
determined largely by factors that were not sui generis to 
the situation at Tientsin.
One of these factors was the expansion of the Fifteen 
Years War. The blockade of the Concessions at Tientsin 
occurred almost two years after Japanese troops initiated 
the "China Incident," the second phase of their invasion of 
China that extended their reach from Manchuria, which was 
taken over in 1931, to lafge areas in the North, Middle and 
South of the country. Initial Japanese expectations were 
that "China would soon throw up its hands and quit": in the 
words of the War Minister, "we'll send large forces, smash 
them in a hurry and get the whole thing over with quickly"; 
all that would be required was "three divisions at first" 
and, "if the fighting spread, two more divisions would be 
enough."3
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By the end of 1938, there were 23 Japanese divisions in 
China (about one million men) , ^ a— figtrre that- would- expand by 
— 5-8- (1, 850, 6-09— so-teH-’gr-s-} .4 Initial Japanese success 
against Chinese armies in North and Central China 
including some particularly savage campaigns in Shanghai, 
Nanking and points west on the Yangtze River with appalling 
Chinese civilian as well as military losses —  gave way to 
an explosion of guerrilla-led, anti-Japanese resistance, 
especially in the North. With hundreds of thousands either 
directly involved in or sympathetic to Chinese partisan 
activity, an enterprise that Japanese leaders did not expect 
would last more than a year had by 1939 cost hundreds of 
thousands of Japanese casualties5 and "a staggering 40 to 
50% of Japan's entire national budget" that was being 
appropriated for the war effort.6 Yet, as the invasion 
expanded, Japanese occupying troops saw their real power 
reduced to a tenuous control over "points" (cities) and 
"lines" (railways, roads and canals linking them) , with 
their own personal safety increasingly at risk.
About forty miles from the sea and 120 miles from 
Peking, Tientsin was one such "point" of attenuated Japanese 
control (see map one). Tientsin was a city of about one-and- 
a-half million located not far from the mouth of the Hai-Ho 
River in Hopei Province at a junction where the Peking, 
Manchuria and Shanghai railway lines converged. In the years
up to 1937, it had developed into an important regional 
commercial and trading centre, containing in particular a 
thriving Chinese textile industry that, at its height, 
processed perhaps as much as 50% of all Chinese raw cotton. 
But with huge increases in Japanese-sponsored smuggling 
activities, especially from July 1937, these enterprises 
were put out of business and taken over (at knock-down 
prices) by Japanese competition, which benefited from the 
illegal entry of Japanese cotton piece goods into other 
areas of East Hopei.7 As the city became subject to Japanese 
military control, Tientsin's officially sanctioned trade, as 
well as the tariff revenues it produced, dried up.
Apart from its importance as a regional centre, 
Tientsin was also a Treaty Port, one of the seaboard 
locations designated by Britain to be an area of foreign 
commerce and trade after its victory in the Opium wars of 
the mid-nineteenth century. As a result, the city became 
peopled by communities of foreigners residing in special 
areas, which were called "Concessions," where they could 
live, do business and engage in foreign trade according to 
the laws of their own countries. For the western powers, 
these privileges never resulted in Tientsin becoming an 
important trading area. Countries such as Britain shifted 
their focus from trade to finance, investment and the export 
of capital goods —  with financial and government interests
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at Shanghai the main source of attention. Partly as a 
consequence of this, the number of Concession holders at 
Tientsin had by 1939 declined to Britain,- France, Japan and 
Italy (see map two). Augmented, however, by relatively large 
numbers of White Russians, some Americans and many thousands 
from the Japanese colonies of Korea and "Manchukuo," the 
entire expatriate community still amounted to a significant 
presence (at least 15,000).
While the Western powers generally failed at Tientsin 
to convert extra-territorial privilege into substantial 
economic gain, for Japan this was not the case. Even before 
North China had been invaded, the Japanese Concession at 
Tientsin had been crucial in the build-up of a major 
underground narcotics economy. Aided, abetted, monopolised 
and taxed by the Japanese military, its Special Services and 
the "Manchukuo" government, poppies from Manchuria, Jehol 
and increasingly North China, together with heroin from the 
Japanese-controlled leased territories at Dairen, were 
smuggled into the Japanese Concession at Tientsin for 
processing, sale and reexport. Opium was estimated in 1933 
to have been "one of the three largest sources of government 
revenue" in "Manchukuo"; by 1940, largely as a result of 
Japanese smuggling, the destruction of the Chinese Maritime 
Customs administration, the military invasion of North China 
and the rescinding of the anti-narcotics laws by the Japan-
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controlled Provisional Government, as much as "35% of all 
capital invested in new business in Tientsin went towards 
setting up new opium shops and dens."8
This had ramifications for Japan's relations with the 
other foreign powers at Tientsin. The explosion of anti- 
Japanese guerrilla activity as a result of the Japanese 
occupation had resulted in Japanese soldiers and their 
Chinese puppets being killed all over Tientsin, including in 
some of the foreign enclaves. It was therefore easy for 
Japanese officials to suspect that the foreign concessions 
had become 'havens' for anti-Japanese 'terrorists' and blame 
the declining security situation on the absence of 
appropriate anti-terrorist procedures in the foreign areas. 
But with the Japanese Army's involvement in the narcotics' 
trade, it was arguably Japan's actions that were primarily 
instrumental in increasing the disorder, pandemonium, local 
unrest and indigenous Chinese hatred for the Occupation that 
was responsible for Japan's soldiers' lack of security.
Both Japanese and British officials were later to 
characterize their dealings over Tientsin in terms of a 
quest for 'security'. But, given the destabilizing nature of 
the Japanese Army's other activities, questions concerning 
the origin of such unrest, how much responsibility the 
concessions (particularly Britain's) bore for it and the 
extent to which the pursuit of order and security were ever
realistic or sincerely held Japanese objectives need to be 
examined. If the Concessions were not primarily responsible 
for Japan's declining law and order situation, why was Japan 
so keen to portray them as such? Was the security issue used 
as a front to cover up ulterior motives? If so, how much did 
they have to do with the destruction of China, the 
undermining of British prestige, or a desire to hide the 
seriousness of the 'China Incident' from an increasingly 
restive Japanese population by blaming Britain and other 
Western powers for Japan's continuing woes?
An examination of such questions cannot take place 
without studying the economic significance of the besieged 
areas. While not ultimately important in expanding their 
home countries' commercial penetration into China, the 
British and French enclaves housed Chinese banks that, since 
the national Chinese currency was established in 1935, acted 
as local reserve repositories for the managed currency. 
Wanting to eradicate the Chinese notes by strengthening the 
backing of the alternative puppet currency, the North China 
Army demanded that the British and French Concessions hand 
over the reserves and prohibit the use of Chinese currency. 
But Britain was unwilling to accede to Japanese wishes.
The reason for Britain's intransigence is a topic of 
some debate. In an attempt to advance the notion that the 
Pacific War was caused not by Japanese aggression but
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"American-British-Chinese-Dutch (or ABCD) encirclement" of 
Japan, conservative Japanese historians have tended to 
regard Britain's support for China's national currency as a 
political rather than an economic act. It was perceived to 
be a way of surreptitiously supporting China's war effort 
against Japan, while making it more difficult for the United 
States, which also supported China's currency, from staying 
aloof from Britain's affairs. With Washington's declaration 
on 26 July 1939 that it would abrogate its Commerce Treaty 
with Japan, the Tientsin Incident has been viewed
increasingly in the West as a catalyst in bringing about a
more forthright United States commitment to the defence of 
western interests in Asia against Japanese encroachment.
There is no doubt that, with the Great Depression, 
Japan's exclusion from western-controlled markets and
western opposition to the development of a compensating
Japanese empire in China, tensions between Japan and the 
Anglo-American powers were considerable. In addition, each 
Japanese expansion into Asia increased its economic 
dependency, particularly for strategic materials, on western 
markets. But the extent to which such tensions impinged upon 
the situation at Tientsin is difficult to determine. Would 
China's currency really have been eradicated from the North 
had the British Concession acceded to Japanese demands? Even 
if Britain wanted to forge a closer relationship with the
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United States to impose joint-economic sanctions upon Japan, 
was such a desire shared by the United States? To what 
extent might US policy have been determined rather by the 
extensiveness of its economic links with Japan and its 
minimal economic involvement in North China? Was the US 
treaty abrogation declaration really linked to a disapproval 
of Japanese actions in China and a desire to strengthen 
British backbone in currency negotiations in Tokyo? Or did 
other factors predominate?
Many of these questions are examined in the following 
pages. Some of them do not easily lend themselves to 
definitive resolution. But in seeing this Incident primarily 
in terms of facilitating a reconstituted Anglo-American 
alliance in Asia, there is a danger of underestimating the 
extent to which conditions in 1939 were uncertain and in a 
state of flux. At least to many participants at the time, it 
was not clear that tensions between Japan and the Anglo- 
American powers would necessarily resolve themselves in war. 
In assessing why this Incident was transformed into an 
international crisis, other factors must also be taken into 
account.
One of these was the decision to move the negotiations 
from Tientsin to Tokyo. It has generally been assumed that, 
in convening the talks far from the scene of the Incident 
itself, cooler heads would prevail that would make chances
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for a mutually agreeable solution more likely. But, by 
letting negotiations be moved to Tokyo, the possibility 
increased that the Tientsin Incident would be caught up in 
other struggles. One of these was a long-standing Foreign 
Ministry agenda seeking to overturn or make irrelevant 
Britain's commitments to the League of Nations, the Nine 
Power Treaty and the interwar collective security treaty 
system. In addition, the high-profile nature of the talks
was likely to arouse public comment, particularly from a
burgeoning anti-British movement that increased dramatically 
in size over the summer of 1939.
The role of the anti-British movement in Japan is 
examined in some detail. This movement initially sought to 
do not much more than hold Britain responsible for the 
obstacles Japan continued to encounter in failing to bring 
the "China Incident" to a successful conclusion. But the
movement rapidly gained strength from June 1939 as the 
government became irreconcilably divided over whether to 
conclude a military alliance with Germany. Taking advantage 
of the political vacuum that was thereby created as well as 
the easing of restrictions upon anti-British campaigning
that went into effect about the same time, anti-British 
activists organized huge demonstrations of sometimes more 
than 100,000 people in which the pro-German, anti-British 
cause became inextricably intertwined with a more
18
traditional right-wing agenda that sought to 'purify' the 
state. As a result, a political atmosphere was created in 
which those reputed to be willing to settle for anything 
less than a complete British acceptance of Japanese terms 
risked being accused of defying the Imperial Will and 
betraying Japan's national interests —  something that could 
invite the assassin's bullet, or perhaps provoke attempts to 
take over the government by force.
In assessing why this Incident developed as it did, 
this study lays particular emphasis on the growing impact of 
Japanese domestic politics. It also highlights the blatant 
attack by Japanese occupation authorities on China's 
sovereignty as a state and nation. But how these factors 
became important can only be understood within the context 
of the situation at Tientsin itself. The interplay of such 
local and external factors is one of this study's most 
important concerns.
This study examines a broad spectrum of developments. 
In a description of the affair's origins (Chapters One and 
Two), attention is given to the military situation at 
Tientsin. In Chapters Three and Four, the impact of the 
North China currency war, the military-sponsored anti- 
British movement in China and the Japanese Foreign 
Ministry's desire to use the Incident to promote changes in 
British foreign policy towards Asia is assessed. Chapters
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Five and Six deal with the process by which it was decided 
to convene a conference in Tokyo, and how this decision 
affected and was affected by the growing anti-British 
movement in Japan. Chapters Seven and Eight deal with the 
political and security discussions that were held in Tokyo; 
Chapter Nine examines the course of the economic discussions 
and the Conference's breakdown in late-August. Chapter Ten 
examines the 'depoliticization' of the Incident, together 
with the reconvening of talks, the economic and police 
agreements that resulted from them and the lifting of the 
blockade in June 1940.
It is,to an examination of conditions in Tientsin that 
we must now turn.
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Chapter One: The Origins of the Tientsin Incident
The Concessions
The source of many of the difficulties between Japan 
and Britain over Tientsin can be traced to the changing role 
and composition of the foreign concessions. As blocs of land 
that foreign powers had forced the Chinese government to 
lease to expatriate families, the concessions were intended 
to be areas exclusively inhabited by foreigners who, under 
extraterritoriality, would be subject to their own rather 
than Chinese laws. On this basis, Britain, France, Japan, 
Italy, Germany and the United States became concession or 
settlement holders in Tientsin, Shanghai and a number of 
other urban areas on the Chinese eastern seaboard, in which 
their expatriate communities were meant to carry on trade 
and other activities with the minimum of Chinese 
interference or oversight.1
Things did not, however, turn out as planned. With 
industrialization and the influx of foreign capital, foreign 
powers put pressure on the Chinese government to permit the 
establishment of factories within concession areas, together 
with the necessary infrastructure to sustain them. Requiring 
a Chinese workforce, this development helped ensure that 
areas once earmarked for foreign settlement only became 
transformed into predominantly Chinese areas of residence 
and employment. The 1866 Land Regulations stated, with
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reference to the British Concession at Tientsin, that only 
"British subjects may rent land in the British settlement" 
and that "in no case shall a Chinese subject be permitted to 
do so."2 But, by 1939, about 75,000 out of the approximately 
77,000 residents within the British enclave were Chinese, a 
pattern observable in the other foreign settlements.3
This created unforeseen problems. Unlike the case with 
leased areas such as Hong Kong and Dairen, concession 
holders were never granted authority over Chinese nationals 
in their areas, a legal oversight that made any negotiations 
between foreign powers over the fate of such people 
technically illegal, especially if discussions were held 
without China's participation or consent.4 Another issue, 
that particularly concerned Japan, was whether these areas 
would remain subject to expatriate control. With foreigners 
so heavily outnumbered by Chinese, it was not clear whether 
the small cadre of foreign officials in charge could ensure 
that the concession remained immune from the massive wave of 
anti-Japanese sentiment that had inundated surrounding areas 
in the wake of expanding Sino-Japanese hostilities since 
1937.5
This was not an insignificant problem. Despite its 
early victories against Kuomintang armies in Central and 
South China, Japan was soon facing an insurgency campaign in 
the North that put its troops very much on the defensive. To
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combat the power of a Communist-led guerrilla insurrection 
that by Japanese estimates had expanded during 1939-1940 to 
about 200,000 armed partisans and 800,000■sympathizers,6 the 
Japanese military had hastily expanded the size of its 
forces in China to over a million men, with five new 
divisions being created in 1939 to deal with guerrilla 
uprisings in the North East alone.7
One of these occurred in February 1939 when, in just 
two or three weeks, Japanese troops clashed with 50-70,000 
Chinese guerrilla fighters in central Hopei, in what Japan 
admitted to be an unsuccessful attempt to prevent the 
Chinese Communist Army from "extending its influence... from 
Wutai and central Shansi province to Hopei and southern 
Shantung."8 This was particularly significant in view of the 
fact that Hopei was situated close to coastal regions and 
far away from the partisan-dominated mountains of Shansi, 
Shensi and Shantung. Yet even here, in what was assumed to 
be one of the occupied areas least likely to be subject to 
guerrilla influence,9 evidence of infiltration by the 
Chinese Red Army was apparent from as early as August 
1938.10
As a result of these developments, the influence of the 
Japanese occupation had been reduced to a tenuous control 
over major cities and lines of communication. A significant 
political, economic and communications centre surrounded by
23
an increasingly hostile countryside, Tientsin had become, 
according to Japanese military police, the target of 
nationalist groups linked both to Chungking and the 
communist-led Eighth Route Army.11 Situated in the plains of 
East Hopei about fifty miles from the coast, Tientsin, like 
Peking, located some 150 miles to the West, was one of the 
most heavily Japanese-occupied areas in North China. Yet as 
a result of the resistance activities taking place in the 
surrounding provinces, even here, all it took was "a two or 
three hours walk" out of the city to "bring one into the 
partisan area," with "guerrilla bands," according to another 
source, "active in the immediate outskirts of the city" from 
the autumn of 1938.12
According to the Japanese military police, one of the 
most dangerous of these groups was a 4,000-strong underground 
"army of national salvation" (chugi kyukoku gun), or Ninth 
Route Army. Supposedly under direct orders from Chungking, 
this squad had infiltrated Tientsin in early 1938 and, from 
March of that year, organized into cells in order to 
assassinate collaborationist officials and Japanese soldiers. 
The Japanese police believed that the adjoining British and 
French Concessions had been used by this group to hide at 
least four of its main leaders and much of its equipment, 
including over 4,000 guns, automatic rifles and a number of 
radios.13 It was also believed that the Concessions were
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being used to plan assassinations, house other anti-Japanese 
activists on the run and gather and propagate information —  
mainly through unlicensed radio —  about troop movements and 
other aspects of the occupation.14 The Japanese further 
suspected that certain Chinese officers within the British 
Municipal Police Force had links to, and were perhaps even 
bankrolling, some of these groups.15
Increasing concern about such activity spilling into 
foreign enclaves produced tension between Japan and other 
concession holders. Since there were numerous concessions in 
Tientsin, it was not simply the British enclave that could 
be used as a base by Chinese partisans. But the United 
States and Germany had abandoned their settlements, while 
the enclave belonging to Italy, a country that, together 
with Germany, Japan was engaged with in negotiations for a 
military alliance, was located on the other side of the 
river apart from the other concessions and seems to have 
been regarded as a friendly area (see map 2) . Although the 
French Concession had caused considerable concern, the 
authorities had since late in 1938 made a point of bending 
over backwards to comply with Japanese demands. This 
included expelling political activists whom the Japanese 
believed evaded capture by escaping into the contiguously 
situated British settlement. In view of the rumoured links 
between guerrilla groups and members of its municipal police
25
force, the British Concession —  which as part of the extra­
territorial system had performed an historical role of 
enabling foreign powers jointly to increase their influence 
at China's expense -- was perceived by Japanese troops to be 
a real threat to their security.16
Conditions Within the British Concession in Early 1939
Although the Japanese were concerned that the British 
Concession had become a security risk, the settlement had
already severely restricted the activities of Chinese 
citizens within its boundaries. Unless sanctioned by Chinese 
law and approved by the Chinese government, the imposition 
of any restriction by the British authorities upon Chinese 
nationals within their enclave was technically beyond
Britain's extra-territorial mandate. Yet, in an ongoing 
effort to please the Japanese in any way they knew how that
went back at least to the autumn of 1937, the British
Concession authorities, despite the absence of legal
entitlement, had subjected Chinese media outlets and schools
to strict censorship, imposed surveillance over public
meetings, curtailed the import of weapons, restricted the 
use of wireless transmitters to prevent information leaks on 
Japanese military and other activities to the Chinese
resistance, and had imposed severe penalties on those
26
implicated in nationalist activities even of a non-violent 
sort.17
These controls were pervasive. "No political meetings," 
according to Sir Robert Craigie, Ambassador to Japan, were 
"allowed to be held in the British Municipal area" "under 
(existing) regulations,"18 a claim that the Japanese did not 
deny. According to British officials in Tientsin, the only 
newspaper printed in the Concession (Peking and Tientsin 
Times) invariably toed "the official (i.e. pro-Japanese) 
line"19 and the others that were circulated were printed in 
Japanese-controlled areas.20 All were therefore "sanitized" 
of anti-Japanese bias, as apparently were all movies.21 In 
response to Japanese complaints during the summer of 1938, 
the British had also stamped out the dissemination of anti- 
Japanese leaflets and other propaganda22 and had pressured 
Concession schools to eliminate derogatory references to 
Japan in their curricula. From early 1939, these 
institutions used textbooks approved only by the authorities 
of what Britain officially regarded as an illegitimate 
Japanese regime of occupation and the organs of the 
diplomatically unaccredited Provisional Government.23
A particularly rigorous aspect of the British control 
regimen seemed to have concerned the manufacture and trading 
of weapons and ammunition. Because "dangerous substances" 
were "subject to license" —  something that, according to
British officials, was rarely granted and only applied for 
short periods of time (not more than three months) —  there 
were supposedly no trading firms within the Concession 
dealing in these articles and very few establishments
authorized to sell them. The possession of arms was also 
"subject to license" and seemed to have been very closely 
controlled.24 One consequence of this was that no caches of 
illegal arms had been discovered within the Concession. 
While this did not mean that no such weapons existed, the 
eagerness of the British police to act upon information 
received from Japan in this regard suggested that illegal 
gun-running was no more of a security problem within the
Concession than in the surrounding areas.
The effect of these measures was far-reaching. While 
unable to immunize the Concession from nationalist activity, 
the British authorities had been able to ensure that no
anti-Japanese (i.e. political) act of violence had taken 
place within their municipal area.25 For ordinary acts of 
violence and other criminal activity, which were more 
common, the authorities routinely executed arrest-warrants
issued by the Tientsin District Court, handing over without 
question those whom the Chinese puppet court wished to 
prosecute. With the disappearance of anti-Japanese
literature and posters from the autumn of 1938 onwards, the 
British had constructed a system of repression ensuring the
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absence of anti-Japanese acts of violence since 1937 and the 
elimination of almost all public expressions of hostile 
sentiment towards Japan since the beginnin-g of 1939.26
With conditions outside the concessions deteriorating 
so quickly, the autonomous status of the foreign areas meant 
that even the absence of anti-Japanese activity within the 
British enclave did not alleviate Japanese concerns, or stop 
their criticism. But the extent to which the British 
authorities had travelled in the direction of appeasing 
Japan was remarkable. The major assassinations, bombings, 
arson and other anti-Japanese acts of violence that were 
occurring took place within the French Concession, the 
Japanese Concession and the Chinese city, not the British 
municipal area. With virtually a clean sheet in this regard, 
the British appeared to be suppressing anti-Japanese 
activity with greater zeal and efficiency than anyone else, 
including the Japanese and their Chinese collaborators.27
Treatment of Political Suspects
Although there had not yet been a recorded anti- 
Japanese act of violence within the British Concession at 
Tientsin, British and Japanese officials assumed that the 
Concession authorities would, if such an act occurred, 
follow procedures developed in foreign settlements such as 
Shanghai, where political acts of violence were more common.
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In these areas, the procedures for dealing with political 
and criminal suspects developed by the authorities gave the 
Japanese an important role , in their . apprehension and
• • 2ftexamination.
What would happen when an anti-Japanese political act 
had been committed was broadly as follows. Anyone suspected 
of complicity in such an activity —  something that could be
defined merely as being a member of a "terrorist" group —
would be investigated by Japanese as well as British police
to establish grounds for assuming that the internee might be
guilty of the crime. If the determination was positive, 
those arrested for non-violent political activities would be 
expelled (most likely in the case of the British Concession 
at Tientsin transferred into Japanese hands since there was 
no other place to escape to) , while those arrested for 
violent crimes would be handed over, not to any organ of 
what the British government recognized to be the legitimate 
government of China, but to the Japanese military 
authorities or the puppet-controlled courts.29
In justifying these procedures, the British emphasized 
that they were not simply doing Japan's bidding. As the 
argument went, British settlements in occupied China had to 
cooperate with de facto local government entities because 
the authority of the Chinese Government in these areas had 
disintegrated in the wake of widening Sino-Japanese
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hostilities. Such an arrangement would obviously entail the 
possibility of many Chinese being handed over to the 
judicial organ of a regime that London and Chungking 
believed to be unlawful. But, according to Britain's line of 
thinking, handing over suspects after a period of British 
internment would at least make it more likely that culprits 
eventually transferred out of British custody had violated 
Chinese law rather than simply been victims of trumped-up 
charges from the occupying power.
While in certain respects persuasive, these arguments 
ignored —  and were perhaps being put forward deliberately
to hide —  the fact that Japan stood to profit greatly from
such arrangements. As well as having suspects arraigned on 
the basis of Japanese information, Japanese military police 
also had the opportunity of taking suspects who were British 
internees into their temporary custody for interrogation. 
According to procedures developed at Shanghai, confessions 
obtained by interrogation would be accepted as genuine as 
long as suspects, once returned to British custody, showed 
no bodily marks of torture. This caveat did not, however, 
prevent interrogators from using any coercion (such as water 
torture) that did not show such marks. On the basis of 
information gleaned from such interrogations, the Japanese
could then get the suspected culprits to reconstruct the
crime in front of Japanese and British officials.
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The interrogation was the crucial part of the entire 
process. In contrast to the re-enactment of the crime by the 
suspects in front of Japanese and British representatives 
(tachiai), interrogations were strictly off-limits to the 
British. Apart from- shielding them from viewing the torture 
that was no doubt going on, the reason for this was also to 
protect any information or intelligence that was extracted 
from the suspect over and above the bare bones of the 
confession of the crime for which he or she was being 
charged. This gave Japanese military police an opportunity 
to develop a case against the suspect under examination, 
while obtaining information about other anti-Japanese 
activists without having to inform the British authorities 
of its findings.30
As could be imagined, these procedures had dire 
implications for the Chinese. Not only had the British 
agreed to hand over those suspected of violent acts or 
involvement in a "terrorist" organization to the local 
courts; they had also invited the Japanese police to 
interrogate suspects officially in British custody but with 
no effective British oversight. The object of the entire 
procedure was simply to build a prima facie case —  which 
would only establish possible, as opposed to probable, guilt 
or guilt beyond a reasonable doubt —  on which the culprit's 
handover would be justified. Because British officials in
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China were generally so keen to cooperate with Japan, it was 
always likely that most criminal suspects would be handed 
over on the basis of unproven Japanese - intelligence, and 
that the Japanese military would be given advance warning of 
the likely date, time and place of the expulsion of non­
violent activists so that they could be ambushed by Japanese 
forces as they left.31
The Internment of Ssu Ching-wu
Since this procedure was so heavily weighted against 
the defenders, the Japanese authorities had no basic quarrel 
with its rationale. Whitehall justified such procedures in 
terms of the need to establish practical methods for 
ensuring, during times of anarchy, execution of Chinese law 
(as opposed to the whim of the occupier) . But, as the 
Chinese Government pointed out, Britain's decision to hand 
over Chinese subjects to "local authorities" that had not 
appeared as a result of the disintegration of central 
government, but were installed as "the mouthpiece of a 
foreign invading army" specifically committed to speed such 
"disintegration," could be viewed as a "de facto recognition 
of an illegal regime."32 At the very least, arguments 
designed to highlight Britain's seeming impartiality were 
being used to justify a procedure whereby people over whom 
Britain had been granted no authority were delivered to the
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judicial organ of what London agreed was an illegal regime 
without the consent of a government Britain recognized to be 
the legitimate sovereign of the whole of C-hina.
While clearly tailored to Japanese needs, this
procedure had not invariably been applied according to
Japanese expectations, or in a particularly consistent 
fashion. Problems in this regard became apparent from 
September 1938, when the British Concession authorities 
arrested self-confessed guerrilla leader Ssu Ching-wu and 
four accomplices, whom both Japanese and British officials 
suspected of being involved with criminal actions outside 
the Concession such as the blowing up of railway lines, 
kidnapping and currency counterfeiting operations.33 The 
Japanese believed that Ssu had entered the British
Concession to plan further anti-Japanese acts of violence 
and wanted him handed over immediately. This suspicion was 
confirmed in the opinion of local British officials by Ssu's 
explanation for his being in the Concession: treatment for a 
skin condition on his hand.34 The British Consul-General 
concluded that the flimsiness of Ssu's excuse constituted
grounds for believing that he was involved in less innocuous 
activities, and that he should therefore be handed over.35
According to Foreign Office guidelines drawn up in 
August 1938 for the Tientsin Concession, suspects should be 
"handed over to the de facto authorities for trial" in
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"cases of assassination or other serious crimes in which 
internment is not sufficient deterrent."36 But, in an 
unexpected rebuff to the Japanese, the -British Municipal 
Council was ordered by the British Ambassador in China not 
to hand over Ssu and his accomplices, who were interned 
within the Concession instead. The British maintained that 
they could intern Chinese suspected for involvement in 
political activities —  even if violent -- so long as such 
activities took place outside the British Municipal Area.37
There was no legal basis for such an argument. Under 
extra-territoriality provisions, Britain had been granted no 
governmental authority over any Chinese national anywhere in 
Tientsin. In fact, according to Article 21 of the 1858 
Treaty of Tientsin establishing extra-territoriality, 
Britain was specifically obligated to hand over "Chinese 
offenders take(ing) refuge in the houses.. of British 
subjects at the open ports" to the "Chinese authorities" 
upon "due requisition addressed to the British Consul."38
Because the local Chinese court was a judicial organ of 
a regime to which Britain had not accorded diplomatic 
recognition, the existence of this provision did not 
necessarily mean that the British authorities at Tientsin 
should hand over Chinese suspects to such an authority. But, 
had Britain refused to deliver Chinese suspects on the 
grounds that the local Chinese court was illegitimate, the
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British would have had to refuse to execute any arrest 
warrant emanating from the de facto authorities. 
Unfortunately, in their desire to curry favour with the 
Japanese military, as well as to deal with a problem they 
were ill-equipped to handle themselves, the British had been 
handing over to the local authorities Chinese implicated in 
non-political crimes of violence that had been occurring 
within and without the British Municipal area for almost two
39years.
This put the British in a very sticky legal situation. 
By acknowledging that the Japanese-installed regime had 
administrative and judicial powers over at least some 
Chinese within the Concession, London was destroying the 
sole basis for arguing that the British internment of 
Chinese suspects at Tientsin was not necessarily illegal in 
this particular case. It did not make sense for Britain to 
argue that it could not hand over political suspects to the 
de facto authorities on account of their illegitimacy if it 
had already agreed that the same authorities had 
administrative and judicial powers over other categories of 
Chinese offenders.
Britain's inconsistent application of its extra­
territorial obligations played into Japanese hands. The 
Foreign Ministry argued that it was the "Chinese government 
in the Tientsin area," not the British, that had "the right
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to exercise judicial and administrative powers over the 
Chinese residing in the... Concession."40 Whether the 
Chinese government in the Tientsin area was the legitimate 
representative of the Chinese people was naturally open to 
question. But in their insistence that Chinese nationals be 
administered by Chinese governmental institutions, the 
Japanese argument at least had some consistency. The British 
position had none. There was nothing in the extra­
territoriality provisions to suggest that a Chinese court 
had sufficient legitimacy to try non-political Chinese 
suspects but not political ones, or that the body to decide 
who constituted a political as opposed to a non-political 
suspect should be a Concession-holding foreign power rather 
than the Chinese themselves.
Japan Pressures Britain to Improve Co-operation
Assuming that interning someone wanted for violent 
anti-Japanese acts outside the Concession would simply 
encourage others to use the area as a base for their own 
activities, the Japanese authorities regarded the British 
decision to intern Ssu and his accomplices as a hypocritical 
and unfriendly action. Their response was predictably 
hostile, with actions ranging from proclamations urging 
foreigners and Chinese to leave the Concession, which 
appeared with increasing frequency from October 1938, to the
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imposition of blockades around the enclave (between December 
1938 and February 1939) designed to inconvenience Chinese 
entering and leaving the area.41
Another tactic mentioned by Nationalist newspapers and 
British officials was the covert encouragement by Japanese 
military officials of terrorist gangs within the British 
Concession and other settlements to commit acts of violence. 
Completely at odds with Japan's professed desire to uphold 
stability and order, this type of action was designed to 
reveal the impotence of foreign authorities, make it more 
difficult for them to resist Japanese demands for increased 
oversight or control of their activities and create a 
pretext for Japan to take over these areas later should that 
come to be considered necessary.42
Although disappointed by British actions, Japanese 
officials did not allow their negative reaction to get 
completely out-of-hand. Grudgingly accepting the British 
Municipal Council's decision to intern Ssu, the military 
made clear, through a policy of threats and inducements, 
that the price of their acquiescence would be a considerably 
heightened level of local British co-operation in the 
future. The first step in this process was the North China 
Army's appointment of Lieutenant-General Homma Masaharu to 
command the Japanese forces at Tientsin at the beginning of 
January 1939. Having spent a number of years in England
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receiving advanced military training, Homma had acquired a 
knowledge of English, as well as a reputation for being one 
of the most Anglophile generals in the Japanese Army.43
Almost immediately, the general initiated a review of 
security procedures towards the British and French Municipal 
Areas. This resulted in a relaxation on 8 February of the
three-month blockade of the British and French enclaves.
Regarding the threat of such action as more useful than its 
(often ineffectual) imposition, Homma argued that the easing 
of inspections would also encourage his British and French 
counterparts to "take important steps" (genju naru sochi o 
toru koto toshi) to satisfy Japanese concerns.44
The British and French authorities quickly obliged. At 
the beginning of February, British officials initiated their 
severest clampdown on unauthorized radio stations in the 
Concession, which were suspected of reporting Japanese troop 
movements to surrounding guerrilla units, requesting 
Japanese assistance in their efforts.45 On 22 February, the 
British Municipal Council issued an edict prohibiting 
Concession schools from using anti-Japanese textbooks, a 
move that the French had already taken the previous
December.46 On 11 March, the British authorities issued a
decree threatening severe action (i.e. not internment, but 
handover or expulsion) against anyone suspected of 
involvement in political activity, violent or otherwise.47
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Following suit a few days later, the French Ambassador —  in 
reaction to the assassination of a Chinese collaborator in 
the French area at Tientsin —  stated his determination to 
do more to arrest and hand over suspected communist and 
other anti-Japanese groups hiding within the Concession.48
This process of rapprochement was furthered in early- 
April with the visit to Tientsin and Peking of Major-General 
Francis S. Piggott, the British Military Attache in Tokyo. A 
passionate Japanophile, Piggott was known among his 
colleagues less for his knowledge of the issues to be 
examined than a tendency to "swallow without discrimination 
every threat and every assurance that the Japanese 
authorities make to him.//49 But Whitehall's acquiescence in 
Ambassador Craigie's idea of sending as a "trouble-shooter" 
someone in whom they were so unconfident indicated that 
Piggott's open partiality for the policies of his hosts 
tended to suit the priorities of many of the "superiors" who 
were so quick to deride him.50 Justifying his visit as a 
"necessary emollient" to "the exacerbated feelings of local 
military authorities,"51 London obliquely indicated to Tokyo 
that it might be prepared to endorse more Japanese-sponsored 
"solutions" for Tientsin, thereby rendering its diplomatic 
obligations to China even more meaningless than they had 
already become.
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Piggott's visit went off very much as expected. Hob­
nobbing with Japanese officials such as Lieutenant-General 
Homma, military police officers and Commander of the North 
China Army, General Sugiyama Gen, the British general made a 
point of reiterating to his hosts Britain's intention to 
cooperate more fully in the future, while lecturing British 
officials at Tientsin about the importance of being more 
sensitive to Japanese concerns. Although emphasizing that 
the Japanese had firm grounds for believing the British 
enclave had become a base for "terrorists," Piggott did not 
openly endorse Japan's demand for the expulsion of political 
activists, or the elimination of Chinese members of the 
Concession Police Force suspected of being too 
nationalistic. Instead, he convinced the British authorities 
to increase Japan's role in arresting suspects by agreeing 
to joint-raids of suspected hideouts by Japanese as well as 
British police. Through the institution of a plain-clothes 
Japanese "advisor" working out of the British Concession, 
greater use would also be made of Japanese intelligence in 
identifying and eliminating suspected "terrorist" targets.52
For Japan, the implication of these changes were far- 
reaching. While the British did not openly admit that the 
Concession was a guerrilla base, the joint-raids and 
investigations promised Japan vastly expanded opportunities 
to eradicate such activities. From now on, raids, arrests,
detentions, interrogations, expulsions and handovers of 
anti-Japanese suspects within the British settlement would 
not be driven just by the whim of Concession Municipal 
Police, but upon Japanese information with Japanese military 
police directing British constables to the target. The acme 
of a collaborative process going back to the arrival at 
Tientsin of Lieutenant-General Homma, these measures were 
part-and-parcel of a broad-based effort designed to shut 
down all nationalist activity within the foreign areas.53 
What from a Japanese perspective was now needed was an 
outrage of sufficient seriousness within the British 
Concession for its authorities to be galvanized into putting 
procedures that so far had only been agreed to in principle, 
or applied elsewhere, finally into practice.
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Chapter Two: The Outbreak of the Tientsin Incident
The Assassination of Cheng Lien-shih
It was not long before the arrangements devised by 
Japanese and British officials at Tientsin were put to the
test. On the evening of 9 April 1939, before General Piggott
had even returned to Tokyo from his trouble-shooting trip to
Tientsin, Cheng Lien-shih, the head of the Tientsin branch
of the Federal Reserve Bank, the Japanese-controlled central 
bank of North China, was murdered in a theatre within the 
British Concession. After committing the crime, the first 
clear-cut political act of violence within the British 
Concession since the Japanese take-over of North China in 
1937, the suspected murderer escaped in a car, after killing 
one foreigner and severely wounding another who attempted to 
prevent his getaway.1
Giving, in the words of Consul-General 
Jamieson, "absolutely no hint of... threats or reprisals 
against the concession,"2 the Japanese did not seem overly 
concerned about the apprehension of the culprits for this 
particular murder. As a Chinese collaborator, the victim may 
have been considered more expendable than would have been 
the case had the target been Japanese. In addition, having 
been instructed to "hand over to the de facto authorities" 
those suspected of "crimes of violence or other criminal 
offences,"3 the British authorities had clear-cut guidelines
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for treatment of criminal suspects, whether their activities 
were politically inspired or not. There therefore seemed 
every reason to assume that the assassins and their aides, 
if arrested within the British enclave, would be handed 
over.
As the first political murder in the British area, 
however, Cheng's assassination presented Japanese officials 
with an opportunity to make other demands. Occupation troops 
had for some time been trying to neutralize the activities 
of Chinese partisan organizations, whose activities seemed 
to flourish as the countryside surrounding Tientsin became 
increasingly hostile to Japan. According to Japanese 
military police, one of the most dangerous of these groups 
was a 4,000-strong underground "army of national salvation" 
(chugi kyukoku gun), or Ninth Route Army. Supposedly under 
direct orders from Chungking, this squad had infiltrated 
Tientsin in early 1938 and, from March of that year, 
organized into cells in order to assassinate Japanese 
soldiers and their Chinese collaborators. Suspected of being 
used by this group to hide at least four of its main leaders 
and much of its equipment, including over 4,000 guns, 
automatic rifles and radios, the adjoining British and 
French Concessions were believed by Japan to have been used 
to plan assassinations, house other anti-Japanese activists 
on the run and gather and propagate information, mainly
through unlicensed radio, about troop movements and other 
aspects of the occupation.4
Focused primarily upon this larger - problem, Japanese 
officials did not pay much attention to the Cheng case. In 
step with existing guidelines, the British Consul General 
promised in a meeting with Japanese officials on 11 April 
the "handover to de facto authorities" of Cheng's assassins 
and "anyone else intimately connected with the crime," a 
statement repeated to the Mayor of Tientsin the following 
day.5 But since this promised to be largely a routine 
matter, the Japanese spent most of their time pressing the 
British to implement other reforms, in particular, ending 
internment in favour of expulsion of non-violent political 
suspects, handing over criminal suspects and —  through the 
institution of joint-raids and a Japanese "advisor" within 
the Concession —  allowing Japanese forces a greater role in 
eradicating suspected guerrilla hideouts within the 
settlement.6 These demands had already been presented to, 
and sympathetically received by, General Piggott in the 
meetings of the previous week, but had yet to be endorsed by 
the rest of the British government.
Trying to capitalize upon the Cheng murder to push 
through an agenda to which the British had yet whole­
heartedly to subscribe, Japanese officials re-introduced a 
demand that even General Piggott had turned down: the
dismissal of Li Han-yuan, a Chinese police officer within 
the British Municipal Police force. For some time, the 
Japanese military had information suggesting that Li had 
attended "terrorist" meetings within the British Concession 
and had been paying monthly dues to members of the anti- 
Japanese assassination group supposedly using the settlement 
as a hideout with money provided by Kuomintang banks inside 
the enclave.7 With the British regarding Li as an effective 
policeman, his alleged payments of terrorists and attendance 
at cell meetings (had they really taken place) could have 
been an infiltration strategy designed to limit rather than 
encourage Chinese resistance activities —  something not 
inconceivable since the British Concession had been freer of 
political violence than other foreign enclaves. But even 
under this scenario, Japan would still have to deal with a 
self-proclaimed patriot of conflicting loyalties, which was 
potentially a threat to the joint-police work with Britain 
that General Piggott had already promised.
Creating the conditions for successful joint-raids was 
considered particularly important. Without joint-raids, the 
only way for the Japanese to apprehend suspected activists 
was to search Chinese entering and leaving the concession at 
inspection posts around the- concession perimeter. But, 
having failed to catch any Chinese guerrilla this way, 
despite the proliferation of anti-Japanese acts of violence
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throughout the Tientsin area, these investigations had 
proved time-consuming, unpopular and ineffective, a 
situation that prompted General Homma to - relax and suspend 
the blockade imposed in December 1938.8 By contrast, joint- 
raids would enable Japanese military police to pursue 
suspects within the British Concession that would be more 
difficult for the Chinese resistance to predict, while not 
inconveniencing foreigners. But, as long as there were 
Chinese officers with suspected links to the partisans 
within the British Municipal Police, information Japan might 
pass on to the British could end up in the hands of the 
Chinese resistance, thus enabling suspects to evacuate their 
hideouts before the raids commenced.
Arguing that Japan had not presented "reasonable proof" 
of "alleged anti-Japanese activities," the British refused 
to dismiss Li Han-yuan, or admit that he was a "terrorist." 
But willing to accept Japan's contention that the Concession 
had become a "hotbed of unneutral acts," Britain's Consul- 
General was determined not to allow the impasse over Li to 
sabotage Japanese participation in the joint-raids.9 He 
therefore promised Japanese officials that, in view of the 
likelihood that they would not want "information as to where 
the (suspected anti-Japanese) organizations existed... (to) 
be given to the British Municipal Council (BMC) police," 
"joint-raids" would be carried out with the "Japanese
gendarmerie... lead(ing the) BMC police directly to the 
spot."10 By offering Japan the opportunity to pursue 
suspects without parting with more than a. minimal amount of 
their intelligence material beforehand, this arrangement 
promised to make it next-to-impossible for Li Han-yuan or 
any other police officer employed by the British to warn 
suspects of impending raids.
In what seemed more good news for Japan, British 
officials indicated a greater desire to implement many of 
the other measures that Japan had been demanding. Declaring 
in a telegram to the British Ambassador that the policy of 
internment was "not deterrent enough to prevent (the) 
concession being used as a base for political and terrorist 
activities," Consul-General Jamieson recommended that 
Britain at least expel suspects in this category.11 On 14 
April, Japanese Consul-General Tashiro informed Tokyo that 
his British counterpart said that he would "recommend that 
London permit him to hand over anyone discovered to be 
carrying weapons at the time of his arrest and that London 
would probably grant this request" (kyozetsu suru ga gotoki 
koto nakaru beshi). The British Consul-General also said, 
according to Tashiro, that London was still "baulking at the 
idea of handing over or expelling (non-violent) anti- 
Japanese communistic elements," but that "more joint- 
investigations and joint-arrests of Chinese suspects" with
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greater access to "Japanese information" might prompt London 
to meet Japan's "requirements for handover or expulsion on a 
case-by-case basis," with the Consul-General rather than the 
Ambassador or Whitehall making the final decision.12
In efforts to minimize its responsibility for later 
events, Whitehall was to portray Consul-General Jamieson as
A-
a "loose carbon," acting out on a limb. Although London 
sometimes grumbled that Jamieson, like General Piggott, was 
"co-operating with a vengeance,"13 their proposals generally 
reflected and helped promote a growing consensus throughout 
the British government that internment was "inconvenient and 
dangerous"; that detaining Ssu Ching-wu was a mistake; that 
those (like Ssu) suspected of violent activities, even if 
committed outside the Concession, should be handed over; and 
that "lesser (non-violent) political offenders" should be 
expelled.14 Coming close on the heels of Piggott's warnings 
of terrorists taking over the Concession, the Cheng murder - 
- which could not have come at a better time for the
Japanese had they planned it themselves —  seemed to be 
breaking down the last British barriers to the idea of
unlimited Japanese access to, and elimination of, any
protections for those Chinese courageous (or foolhardy) 
enough to continue using the British enclave for anything
even remotely linked to the emancipation of their nation.
The Arrest of the Cheng Murder Suspects
Although agreeing to Japanese demands for joint-raids, 
the British Concession lost no time in looking for suspects 
by themselves. On 11 April, in what was approvingly referred 
to by the Japanese Consul-General as an effort to "prevent 
the further occurrence of lawless and violent anti-Japanese 
activities" and "arrest the perpetrators thereof," the 
British authorities "used patrol cars and instituted daily 
and nightly inspections by fully-armed police officers" in a 
sweep of suspected hideouts.15 The following day, a house- 
to-house search by British police resulted in the arrests of 
25 suspects and the seizure of arms, communications 
equipment and anti-Japanese propaganda.16 Focused mainly on 
ridding the Concession of anti-Japanese organizations, this 
raid was not primarily designed to apprehend the Cheng 
murder suspects, who remained at large. But the quantity of 
arms, anti-Japanese propaganda and wireless transmitters 
that were found had the effect of getting the British 
Consul-General to endorse fully the view put to him the 
previous week by General Piggott that the area was indeed a 
base of terrorist activity, with "arms no doubt being dumped 
into creeks and other suitable places."17
In an attempt to make further strikes, three joint- 
raids were organized and carried out at Japanese direction 
on 15, 17 and 22 April. As with the previous British raid,
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the main objective was to destroy the guerrilla network that 
was supposedly transforming the British Concession into a 
terrorist base. But because Japan's information about the 
whereabouts of this group came entirely from an unreliable 
source arrested months before in the French Concession for 
the murder of a Japanese soldier, numerous houses were 
searched at Japanese direction which turned out to have 
nothing incriminating inside them. Four suspects, however, 
were picked up from within the British settlement who were 
suspected of being involved in the Cheng assassination.18
Intent primarily upon warding off further Japanese 
criticism that the Concession was a hotbed of terrorist 
unrest, the British Consul-General wanted to eject all the 
suspects who had been arraigned on 12 April as soon as 
possible.19 The Consul-General did not seem to be so worried 
about the four suspects detained in connection with the 
Cheng murder, since existing guidelines clearly specified 
that those suspected of involvement in intra-concession 
violence must be handed over to the Chinese de facto court 
for trial. Because the acts were political in nature, both 
Japanese and British officials realized that the handover 
could only take place upon final approval by Whitehall. But 
this was expected to be a formality, especially since French 
authorities had been routinely handing over suspects of this 
type —  including one arrested at the end of April as a
result of information obtained through one of the joint- 
raids of the British Concession.20
Solidifying this impression, the British Concession —  
following procedures developed at Shanghai —  agreed to 
grant the Japanese gendarmerie temporary custody over the 
four Cheng murder suspects for interrogation. Occurring 
between 25 and 30 April, these interrogations linked the 
suspects to numerous politically-inspired acts of violence, 
as well as illegal possession of firearms.21 But because 
these acts -- which included the attempted assassination in 
Peking of the head of the Provisional Government (March 
1938), the planned (but aborted) murder of the Mayor of 
Tientsin and the assassination of the chairman of the 
Tientsin Chinese Chamber of Commerce (both in the French 
Concession, November and December 1938) and the wounding of
r/ui
a Japanese soldier in^Chinese-administered city of Tientsin 
(March 1939) -- took place outside the British area, they
were not in themselves sufficient to guarantee the handover 
of the four men. Since Britain was still interning people 
wanted for anti-Japanese acts of violence outside the 
enclave, it was also difficult to argue that just being in 
"unlawful possession of arms" was ground enough to hand over 
detainees either.22
The Japanese police did not divulge any of this 
information to the British authorities at this time. But a
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decision prompted by a desire to prevent suspect police 
officers (especially Li Han-yuan) from leaking the contents 
of the detainees' confessions —  particularly the names of 
others who might be involved —  meant that the British could 
not obtain the proof they wanted to show that internment did 
not deter these or other perpetrators of violent acts from 
using the Concession as a place to hide out and organize 
their activities. As a result, the transfer to de facto 
Chinese custody of the four detainees who had just been 
interrogated depended on whether they could be linked to the 
sole act of political violence that had occurred within the 
British enclave: the murder of Cheng Lien-shih.
This was much more difficult. Because of their desire 
to piece together what they believed to be the terrorist 
base that had infiltrated the British Concession, the 
Japanese police had been interested in using the 
interrogations to connect the suspects to many political 
acts of violence rather than proving conclusively their 
involvement in just one case. In addition, the person who 
shot Cheng was never caught, and two of the four arrested in 
connection with the Cheng murder did not, even in their 
confessions, admit to involvement in his murder. The other 
two detainees did confess to being at the scene of the crime 
on the night of the assassination, one of whom supposedly 
acted as a lookout in the getaway car.23 But the Japanese
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police received no third-party verification of anything the 
suspects confessed, a problem made worse by the fact that, 
as later pointed out by the British police, it was unclear 
that the so-called "getaway" car was actually used for this 
purpose since it was "parked in the wrong direction of 
traffic."24
This was not, however, considered by either side at the 
time as a likely stumbling block to the handing over of 
these men. Since the British Concession did not "exercise 
functions of a magistrate's court in regard to committing 
persons for trial," the British authorities, upon receiving 
an arrest warrant from the local Chinese court, were not 
expected to determine whether the suspect was guilty of the 
crime for which he was charged, but only whether there were 
prima facie grounds for assuming that he might be.25 To meet 
this lower standard of verification, it was agreed that the 
suspects would simply reconstruct the Cheng murder at the 
scene of the crime in front of Japanese and British 
officials. This method had the advantage of not obliging the 
Japanese police to hand over the transcripts of the 
confessions, or risk compromising any of the other 
information the suspects had divulged.
On 30 April 1939, the reconstruction of the murder was 
carried out under Japanese supervision at the theatre in 
which Cheng was killed, in front of a British consul and the
Chief of the Municipal Police. The two suspects who were at 
the theatre on the night of the crime played out how they 
thought the murder took place and accused one of the 
suspects who did not confess to any involvement of also 
being there at the time. The fourth suspect showed how he 
had murdered a Japanese soldier elsewhere.26 With 
indications that three of the four suspects might have had 
something to do with the murder, the Japanese "were given to 
understand" that the suspects "would be handed over."27 
While the crime confessed by the fourth suspect took place 
outside the Concession, the Foreign Office had the previous 
day instructed the British Ambassador in China to inform 
Consul-General Jamieson at Tientsin that "persons against 
whom there is convincing evidence of crimes of violence 
against the Japanese or their puppets (whether committed in 
the Concession or not) such as complicity in assassination 
or its attempt" should also be delivered up.28
After the reconstruction of the crime, the suspects 
were returned to British custody pending authorization from 
Whitehall to transfer them to the Chinese de facto 
authorities. Expecting such authorization to be a formality, 
the Japanese and British officials attending the re­
enactment afterwards retired to the Concession's racecourse 
for breakfast together. In the words of Consul-General 
Jamieson, "the local atmosphere (between Britain and Japan)"
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seemed "to have greatly improved." But because guerrilla 
activities against Japanese forces in Tientsin had not 
lessened, suspicions regarding the British Concession being 
a guerrilla base lingered. Consequently, Jamieson warned 
that "all the good that has been done may be jeopardized" 
unless a) internment was ended; b) minor political 
offenders were expelled; c) the Cheng murder suspects and 
anyone else implicated in violent crimes were handed over; 
and d) the final decision over the handover or expulsion of 
each suspect would remain with the Consul-General.29
Chiang Kai-shek Intervenes
Regarded by local officials as inevitable, the 
implementation of these measures was unexpectedly thrown 
into question as soon as the four men returned to British 
custody. Saying that they had nothing to do with the Cheng 
murder and that the reconstruction was a frame-up, the 
suspects revoked their confessions, arguing that they had 
been tortured in a way that did not leave marks (i.e. with 
water).30 Some British officials doubted whether these 
retractions were true. But because the British authorities 
did not know about the other violent acts to which the 
suspects had confessed, their guilt had to be determined 
solely on whether they were involved in the Cheng murder. 
With Cheng's assassin still at large and the method by which
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the suspects were supposed to have made their escape dubious 
(i.e in a car facing in the wrong direction of traffic), the 
British Municipal Police Chief decided that the confessions 
were probably "obtained under duress" and that "the men did 
not take part in the assassination."31
The same day that the suspects were handed back to the 
British authorities, Chiang Kai-shek, head of the Chinese 
National Government, had talks with the British Ambassador 
about the Tientsin situation. Saying that he was not making 
any "attempt to condone" "crimes of violence," Chiang —  who 
had previously turned a blind eye to Britain's handing over 
of non-political Chinese criminal suspects to the puppet 
court —  might not have spoken up on the suspects' behalf 
had the other activities to which they had confessed been 
generally known. But since all that was common knowledge was 
their tenuous connection to the Cheng murder, he felt 
emboldened to say that the four men were guilty only of 
"excessive patriotism" and should not be handed over. He 
also said that ending internment -- both for the Cheng 
suspects and other political detainees —  would create a 
"deplorable impression" amongst the Chinese.32
To be told by Chungking what to do in this matter put 
Britain in a serious quandary. Since the British at Tientsin 
had not been granted administrative or legal jurisdiction 
over the Chinese, "Chinese offenders" wanted for offences
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committed against other Chinese had to be handed over by law 
to the "Chinese authorities."33 Since such "authorities" 
could only be part of the regime Britain officially 
recognized as the legal sovereign of China (or a body 
sanctioned by it), to disregard its wishes would constitute 
a clear violation of the provisions of the treaties granting 
Britain extra-territoriality in China. But to comply with 
Chungking's wishes would entail a) giving those suspected of 
violent anti-Japanese acts superior treatment and protection 
to that accorded to ordinary criminal suspects, who had 
regularly been handed over to the local courts; and b) 
preserving the practice of interning political prisoners, 
something that Japanese and British officials at Tientsin 
had come to believe had to be abolished in order to preserve 
the "neutrality" of the Concession.
Another problem was the fact that compliance with 
Chungking's wishes would constitute a departure from the 
practice adopted by other foreign areas. As Consul-General 
Jamieson pointed out, the Shanghai Municipal Council (an 
international body staffed largely by British officials), in 
cases of politically motivated acts of violence, "sent men 
for interrogation to Japanese authorities," "accepted no 
complaint of torture unless there was physical evidence of 
such" and "accepted such confessions as sufficient evidence 
to justify handing over culprits." "In other words,"
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according to Jamieson, "if this case had occurred in 
Shanghai the men would have been handed over for trial."34
Believing that Britain "could not continue to afford 
protection to. people whose actions imperilled (the) safety 
of our Concession,"35 Ambassador Sir Archibald Clark Kerr 
had no objection in principle to ending internment or 
imposing any of the other restrictive measures being 
implemented or discussed by British and Japanese officials. 
These included joint-raids, Japanese plain-clothes police 
within the Concession, the elimination of textbooks 
containing criticisms of Japan in concession schools and 
regulations banning political activity in the British 
settlement. But the Ambassador was also uncomfortably aware 
that bad publicity over Tientsin threatened to enflame 
smouldering Chinese resentment over Britain's half-hearted 
efforts to uphold China's territorial integrity, its 
reluctance to furnish financial aid in the war effort 
against Japan and its continuing refusal to meet one of the 
most fundamental of Chinese nationalist aspirations: a
commitment to end extra-territoriality.
In an attempt to satisfy these seemingly-conflicting 
objectives, the British government decided that it would 
agree to all of Japan's demands concerning the treatment of 
future suspects. In other words, Britain would ensure —  and 
get Chungking to agree —  that non-violent anti-Japanese
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activists would be expelled; that violent suspects, upon 
"reasonable evidence" (i.e. not necessarily conclusive and 
perhaps emanating only from Japanese sources) that their 
activities were "directed towards" acts such as 
assassination, would be handed over;36 and that the final 
arbiter as to who was a "minor political offender" and who 
was involved in "terrorist activities" would no longer be 
Whitehall, but the Consul-General in Tientsin —  who could 
show suspects, in Ambassador Clark Kerr's words, "as little 
mercy as he liked."37 In return, Japan would allow Britain 
to expel or release existing internees.38
Fulfilling Japan's long-standing desire to abolish 
internment, this proposal was intended to do little more for
the Chinese than give them the impression that they were not
being betrayed over this particular case. Ambassador Clark 
Kerr attempted to convey the impression that he had a sense 
of concern over the fate of the Cheng suspects by saying 
that handing over the suspects would be tantamount to 
signing their death warrants and something "irreconcilable" 
with his "conscience,".39 But meant only for Chinese 
consumption and at odds with his recommendations about how 
future violators should be treated, such sentiments were in 
sharp contrast to the repressive nature of the arrangement 
that Britain was trying to negotiate with Japan. Essentially
a quid pro quo, the crux of this offer was that Japanese
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flexibility over British dealings with Chinese political 
suspects presently interned would be rewarded by even 
greater British efforts to eradicate such- elements from the 
Concession at Tientsin once and for all, as soon as the 
negative publicity over the Cheng suspects had died down.
Fearing that such a course would lead to "serious 
trouble" with Japan, the British Consul-General in Tientsin 
protested Ambassador ClflrkrKerr's instructions to expel the 
Cheng suspects.40 Especially with Japan having "co-operated 
in their arrest," the Consul-General and the Commander of 
British troops at Tientsin feared that a "refusal to hand 
over the Chinese alleged to be" involved in the Cheng 
assassination would be regarded by Japan as proof that 
Britain was not really interested in "eradicating guerrilla 
leaders from the Concession," or preventing them from "using 
the concession" as a base. With the Cheng suspects having 
become "the determining factor in the local situation,"41 
Whitehall countermanded Clark^Kerr's expulsion order on 23 
May and instructed Consul-General Jamieson to keep the 
suspects interned and isolated within the Concession unless 
more evidence could be found linking them to the Cheng 
murder or other violence.42
This task should not have been too difficult. With the 
Foreign Office ruling of 28 April about the need simply for 
"convincing evidence" of any "crimes of violence" wherever
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committed, all that was needed was some additional 
information linking the suspects to other violent acts. 
Because the British government was interested only in 
protecting itself against the charge that it was handing 
over innocent men, the quantity and quality of such 
additional information would probably not needed to have 
amounted to much. But unaware of the other acts of violence 
that the suspects had confessed, Consul-General Jamieson 
made the argument that the men should be handed over on the 
grounds that they were members of a "terrorist group"43 -- 
proof of which would require on Japan's part the disclosure 
of much more information, in particular the names of others 
involved and the organizational structure of such a body.
The Japanese were not completely unforthcoming in this 
regard. According to Consul-General Jamieson, they told him 
that they had pieced together a "terrorist organization" 
within the British Concession; that the four suspects 
received monthly payments from its leader, Wang Wen; that 
Wang Wen (who was still uncaptured) was probably the 
murderer of Cheng Lien-shih; that his gang had been 
responsible for the murder of three Japanese policemen; and 
that the bullets used for the murder of the policemen were 
identical to the ones used for the murder of Cheng. But the 
Japanese refused to make further revelations because their 
information was of "an extremely secret nature involving
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other members of the gang" which could be compromised if it 
got into the hands of Li Han-yuan, the. Chinese officer in 
the British Municipal Police regarded as. a "ringleader of 
anti-Japanese activities."44
This misunderstanding had an important effect in 
altering the situation. Britain needed information it did 
not know was in Japan's possession —  i.e. the suspects' 
confessions of other violent acts. We know from Japanese 
sources that the Japanese did not realize that the British 
really needed much less than they were asking for in order 
to hand over the suspects. The Japanese were therefore 
unaware that they could have met British needs without 
having to divulge information on "terrorist groups." But 
under the impression that Whitehall would only agree to the 
suspects' handover upon full disclosure of all information 
in Japanese possession about intra-concession "terrorist" 
organizations, Japan, for reasons mentioned above, refused 
to cooperate. This meant that the Japanese police did not 
inform the British of the suspects' other violent acts; 
refused to divulge the hard information that would 
convincingly show that the Cheng murder suspects were part 
of a larger "terrorist" group; and failed to link the 
suspects convincingly to the Cheng murder. As a result, the 
Chinese were presented with an opportunity to press their 
charge that Japan and Britain were simply trying to arrange
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for the transfer, trial, conviction and death of four 
innocent men.
Like Japan, Britain did not think these men were 
innocent. But the skill with which China capitalized upon 
the situation had the effect of forcing the British to ask 
for more information about people whose fate would otherwise 
have been immaterial to them. In response, the Japanese 
concluded that Britain's price for the handover of the four 
men —  assuming that it was interested in handing them over 
at all —  was nothing less than access to everything they 
knew, an unthinkable demand particularly since suspect 
officers remained on the Concession police payroll. As a 
result, the future of Anglo-Japanese collaboration at 
Tientsin was suddenly thrown into doubt.
Japan Loses Its Patience
As days and weeks went by without the suspects being 
turned over, the Japanese became increasingly uneasy about 
the situation at Tientsin. According to Japanese military 
police estimates, the Cheng murder was but one of some 400 
attacks by Chinese guerrillas on the Japanese and their 
allies in the Tientsin area between 9 January and 16 April 
1939.45 Although the British Concession was suspected to be 
the base of a terrorist group, anti-Japanese activists had 
been generally very successful in evading arrest. By
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unexpectedly refusing to hand over the Cheng murder 
suspects, Britain called into question procedures and 
understandings (and not just at Tientsin) that had either 
been implemented or agreed upon —  including phasing out of 
internment, instituting joint-raids, Japanese interrogations 
and re-enactments of the supposed crime -- that the Japanese 
were hoping would improve their precarious security.
Because Japan considered Britain to have failed in 
upholding existing undertakings, promises of future "good 
behaviour" were too unreliable for Japan to take seriously. 
Complaining that British inaction was "poisoning the 
atmosphere," General Homma expostulated that "we are dealing 
with Chinese, not with civilized people like ourselves."46 
Attempting to transcend political differences by appealing 
to common prejudice was one way of trying to get the process 
of local Anglo-Japanese collaboration back on track. But 
appeals to strengthen the esprit de corps of two foreign 
communities that could no longer take their existence for 
granted could not hide the fact that the Japanese offer had 
a time limit. The longer the Cheng murder suspects remained 
in British detention, the greater the chance that their 
confessions would —  via suspect officers in the British 
Municipal Police —  be divulged to anti-Japanese guerrillas 
still at large.
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Japanese officials continued to press for the handover 
of the suspects, as well as other reforms. One of these was 
for the dismissal of police officer Li- Han-yuan, who —  
accused of being a communist agent -- was the subject of an 
intense hate campaign orchestrated by the Japanese at the 
beginning of May.47 But on 6 May, a Japanese military 
spokesman warned that Britain's lack of co-operation in 
handing over the Cheng murder suspects might also make Japan 
less tolerant of its refusal to comply with the New Order in 
East Asia. An idea enunciated in November 1938 that would 
ostensibly transform Japan, Manchukuo and North China into 
an anti-communist, all-Asian political and economic bloc, 
the New Order was designed to institutionalize Japanese 
hegemony in Asia, as well as the permanent division of 
China. It was also a diplomatic vehicle through which Japan 
could criticize "foreign concessions" and "foreign troops" 
on Chinese soil at places such as Tientsin —  "a state of 
affairs," according to the Japanese military spokesman, that 
"we cannot but regard as a sign of an anachronism."48
Having little to do with the handover of the Cheng 
murder suspects, Japan's introduction of the New Order in 
East Asia was the first indication of an interest in using 
the impasse at Tientsin to further an agenda other than 
tightened local security procedures. On 29 May, the General 
Staff of the North China Army informed the Army General
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Staff in Tokyo that it wished not just to "round up anti- 
Japanese, communistic elements" within the Concessions 
(sokai o shite, sono naibu no konichi kyosanbunshi o 
torishimari shimuru totomo ni), but also to "pressure 
Britain into adopting greater political and economic 
collaboration with Japan and the Provisional Government" 
(seijiteki keizaiteki ni Nihon oyobi rinji seifugawa ni 
kyoryoku seshimu). This would include transferring silver 
stocks and deposits from Kuomintang banks within the British 
and French Concessions to finance houses controlled by the 
Provisional Government and lifting bans on the circulation 
of puppet currency within the concession areas.49
Having protected Chinese banks and allowed only the use 
of Chinese Government currency (fapi) inside their limits, 
the British and French municipal areas had been subject to 
intermittent, but relatively restrained, Japanese criticism. 
But by the early summer of 1939, the currency situation had 
worsened. Contrary to Japanese hopes, few holders of Chinese 
fapi had been willing to exchange their notes for Federal 
Reserve Bank puppet currency (FRB), which was inadequately 
backed and rapidly declining in value. Starved of capital 
from Japan, the North China Army had become increasingly 
reliant on manipulation of the puppet currency for 
defrayment of its expenses. As the magnitude of the failure 
of the voluntary fapi-for-FRB currency conversion program
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became clearer (it was meant to have been completed by the 
end of March), the temptation to clamp down on the economic 
autonomy of the British and French enclaves -- which allowed 
the rival currency to circulate and had considerable silver 
reserves that could have been impounded and then used to
back the ailing puppet notes —  became difficult to
■ 50resist.
The expansion of Japan's demands was not without its 
detractors. General Homma continually advocated that a 
solution to the Tientsin situation should be based solely on 
Britain's willingness to alleviate local Japanese security 
concerns. Expressing similar sentiments, the General Staff 
in Tokyo —  which also seemed concerned about the impact
upon Chinese nationalist sentiment that Japanese talk about 
the reversion of foreign Concessions to China might engender
refused to authorize the invasion of the concession 
(jitsuryoku koshi o mitomezu) and insisted upon compliance 
with their directions over how the political and economic 
issues arising from the Tientsin situation should be treated 
(seijiteki keizaiteki konpon mondai no shori ni tsuite wa 
chuo ni renraku shirei o aogu koto).51 But despite these 
remarks, it was becoming apparent that, as the incident
widened, handing over the Cheng murder suspects as a means 
of defusing the problem was going to be increasingly
difficult to achieve.
Pressured by a declining sense of security and growing 
unwillingness amongst the North China Army to treat problems 
with the British Concession entirely .as local issues, 
Japanese officials at Tientsin could finally wait no longer. 
The British had already been warned in the middle of May 
that their failure to hand over the Cheng murder suspects 
was a violation of the British Concession's neutrality and 
something that might force Japan to take unspecified "steps 
in self-defence."52 But on 31 May, Consul-General Tashiro 
and General Homma delivered an ultimatum informing the 
British that failure to hand over the Cheng murder suspects 
to the Chinese court by 7 June would be considered a refusal 
to implement -- rather than simply a delay in complying with 
-- Japanese demands, in response to which Japan would take 
unspecified steps in retaliation.53
An Inadequate Offer
Regarded by Whitehall as an insult rather than a 
threat, Japan's ultimatum did not provoke enormous concern. 
In the past, Japanese anger at Britain's internment of 
another group of violent political suspects —  Ssu Ching-wu 
and his colleagues —  had not obstructed subsequent efforts 
to improve Anglo-Japanese security under the direction of 
the newly-appointed General Homma. In addition, nothing 
unpleasant had happened during the month since the Cheng
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murder suspects were handed back to British custody. 
Concerned that this and other warnings (including General 
Piggott's) were rather "weakening the- will" of local 
officials "to resist Japanese encroachments,"54 the Foreign 
Office continued to assume that disagreement over treatment 
of one group of detainees (the Cheng suspects) would not 
derail the process of tightening repressive measures against 
Chinese nationalists in general.
Attempting to advance this broader goal, Whitehall 
offered Tokyo a set of general proposals that incorporated 
and even surpassed the "pro-Japanese" agenda of the much- 
maligned General Piggott. In future, the Consul-General 
could "hand over to the local Chinese authorities" "any 
persons whom he was satisfied were concerned with terrorist 
activities." Another proposal specified that "minor 
political offenders" would invariably "be expelled." In 
addition, the Consul-General would be able to hand over 
people just for illegal possession of weapons, ensuring that 
complicity in a crime would now be assumed unless the 
detainee could prove otherwise, not the other way round.55 
An attempt to eliminate the possibility that China could 
ever again prevent Britain from doing Japan's bidding, these 
proposals were designed to ensure that suspects would be 
transferred to Japanese-controlled bodies long before any
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Chinese person or group could proclaim that they might 
actually be innocent of the charges against them.
Arguing that the Japanese could not•"have any serious 
grounds for complaint," Whitehall believed that it had gone 
"a long way to meet (their) wishes." But, in return, Japan 
was expected to acquiesce in Britain's refusal to hand over 
the Cheng murder suspects because the "evidence" linking 
them to a "terrorist gang" and "crimes of violence" was 
insufficient.56 There were grounds for presuming that Japan 
might eventually grudgingly accept such an arrangement. 
According to the information at Britain's disposal, the men 
wanted in connection with the Cheng murder had been involved 
in far fewer acts of violence than those alleged to have 
been committed by Ssu Ching-wu and his accomplices, other 
internees whom Japan was not insisting that the British 
Concession authorities should hand over. However, a demand 
that —  had it been limited to information about the 
suspects' complicity in other violent acts with no mention 
of terrorist groups —  might have induced serious Japanese 
consideration was accompanied by the remark that "it would 
be repugnant to the British sense of justice to hand over to 
execution men against whom the British authorities have.. 
received no evidence of the crime alleged."57
For Britain to justify its refusal to deliver up the 
suspects in terms of upholding a "British sense of justice"
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was extremely problematic. Apart from being aware that 
British activity in China since the Opium Wars one hundred 
years before had never been dominated by such a notion, the 
Japanese knew that, under extra-territoriality, the British 
had not been granted judicial powers over the Chinese and 
that, "in refusing to hand over the suspects," they were 
"exercising administrative authority over the Chinese which 
they did not have by law."58 From this perspective, "British 
justice" was being used to legitimate Britain's violating 
its extra-territorial mandate in order to prevent Chinese 
courts trying criminal suspects whose guilt was suspected 
even by British officials. At the same time, Japan was 
supposed to believe Britain's promise that future offenders 
would not receive such "protection," even if their guilt was 
more questionable.
Betraying a level of illogicality and double-standards 
that opened Britain to the charge of blatant hypocrisy (from 
China as well as Japan), Britain's anomalous position was 
soon made to look even more contradictory. On 6 June, 
Consul-General Jamieson received an order from Whitehall to 
hand over two other internees.59 Arrested before the Cheng 
assassination, these men, who were suspected of being 
members of the "terrorist gang" supposedly working out of 
the British Concession, were picked up for unlawful 
possession of weapons. But unlike the other detainees, they
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had not been accused of actually committing a violent crime. 
Nor were the Japanese demanding at this time that they be
handed over.60 Being in unlawful possession of weapons
arguably constituted prima facie grounds for assuming that 
the suspects were intending to plan or commit a violent act. 
But because nothing had happened, Britain, by agreeing to 
their handover, was saying that it was acceptable to submit 
to the full force of Chinese law internees who had not
committed a violent crime, while protecting from the court's 
clutches others who were suspected of, and in cases had even 
admitted (to British as well as Japanese officials), being 
involved in the commission of such activities. And all this 
in the name of upholding a British "sense of justice."
In an attempt to minimize the damage, Ambassador 
Craigie informed Foreign Minister Arita on 6 June of his 
disagreement with the Foreign Office finding about the 
"insufficiency" of the evidence linking the Cheng suspects 
to violent acts. He nevertheless begged Japan to accept 
British terms on the grounds that officials at Tientsin
would henceforward be able to deal with anti-Japanese 
elements entirely to Japan's satisfaction.61 But reacting 
negatively to this proposal, the Foreign Minister pointed 
out that the British, in believing the suspects' denial of 
their confessions to the Japanese, were attaching more 
credqjice to the dubious pleas of suspected criminals rather
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than the evidence obtained through extensive interrogations 
by the Japanese police. Arita also reminded Craigie that the 
suspects had admitted to British officials their complicity 
in the Cheng murder and, in one case, the assassination of 
the Japanese policeman.62 Since the British Concession had 
been handing over ordinary (non-political) criminal suspects 
with much less to go on, the Foreign Minister believed this 
was an adequate prima facie basis upon which Britain could 
transfer the suspects to the Chinese authorities for trial.
Japan Raises the Stakes
Reflecting Foreign Minister Arita's sentiments, 
reaction from the rest of the Japanese government to the 
British offer was extremely hostile. Criticizing Britain for 
refusing to accept "Japanese co-operation," the Japanese 
"adviser" to the British Municipal Council at Tientsin, 
Nakagawa Kosuke, asserted that "there remained no further 
reason for continuing talks with the British."63 On 12 June, 
the Tientsin office of the Asia Development Board publicly
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the British Ambassador in China for undercutting 
Consul-General Jamieson's efforts to be constructive and 
said that the concessions had become an impediment to the 
New Order in East Asia.64 Saying the following day that 
"this problem is no longer simply concerned with the 
handover of the Cheng murder suspects," the North China Army
General Staff announced that it would institute a blockade 
around the British and French municipal areas starting on 15 
June because of Britain'’ s failure to hand, over the suspects 
and eradicate other anti-Japanese activities.65
Japan's new demands were spelt out in instructions from 
Commander-in-Chief of the North China Army General Sugiyama 
Gen that were sent to General Homma on the evening of 13 
June. Homma was directed to inform the British that, in 
return for lifting the blockade, they would not just have to 
hand over the Cheng murder suspects but also "cooperate with 
the construction" of a new order by instituting other 
measures as well. These included the arrest and handover of 
all "anti-Japanese communistic elements"; the expulsion of 
Li Han-yuan and other "anti-Japanese" police officers; a 
prohibition on the circulation of the Chinese National 
Government currency (fapi); authorization for the Japan- 
backed puppet currency (Federal Reserve Bank notes) to take 
its place; the submission of intra-concession Chinese 
government banks to joint-investigations with Japan; co­
operation with Japan in removing the banks' deposits and 
reserves to Japanese-controlled institutions outside the 
concession; and an agreement to promote security by 
instituting joint-investigations into economic as well as 
military matters.66
Unlike Japan's previous demands, these conditions —  
while still partly local in character —  emphasized as a 
"number one objective" (saidai mokuteki) -or "condition for 
the lifting of the blockade" (kenmon haishi no joken to nasu 
koto) economic policies that were regional in scope and 
designed to improve Japan's standing at Britain's, not just 
China's, expense.67 Even more ominous for Whitehall was a 
directive contained within the 13 June instructions calling 
upon General Homma to "instigate discord within while 
preserving order without" the areas to be blockaded 
(sokaigai no chian iji ni manzen no chui o harau totomoni 
sokainai kakuran o shisakusu) .68 In line with the sentiment 
of a 6 June telegram from the East Asia Divioi-em of the 
Japanese Foreign Ministry to Consul-General Tashiro, such a 
strategy implied commitment to the more ambitious goals of 
"eradicating Britain's entire policy of aiding Chiang Kai- 
shek" (En-Sho seisaku o jokyo suru) and -- by revealing 
Britain's impotence as an imperial power -- "replacing the 
Chinese feeling of dependence upon the British with that of 
scorn" (Sinajin no Eikoku izon shoso o bu-Ei shiso ni itten 
shi) , while effecting a "transformation of Chinese anti- 
Japanese sentiment into a feeling of dependency" (mata sono 
ko-Nichi shiso o Nihon izon shiso ni ten suru).69
Unconcerned about and partly unaware of such 
developments, the British Foreign Secretary informed the
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Cabinet on 15 June that Japan's latest moves were a "damp 
squib."70 With members of the Far Eastern Department urging 
Whitehall to be "ready with any means of- retaliation which 
may be considered practicable," the advice of the Foreign 
Office was to sit tight, refuse any compromises, pursue 
"economic retaliation" should Japanese troops move against 
the Concession, or "fire on the mob" if there occurred any 
popular demonstrations against the British that might have 
been instigated by Japan.71 An atavistic spasm harking back 
to the days of gunboat diplomacy at its height, this plan, 
had it been executed, would have meant that the failure of 
Japan and Britain to agree upon how to withdraw rights from 
the Chinese at Tientsin would have been treated as a crime 
for which the Chinese would have to pay, perhaps with their 
lives.
This course of action was not, however, endorsed by the 
rest of the British Cabinet. Incensed at "this mess into 
which our Foreign Office has so rashly landed us," Prime 
Minister Neville Chamberlain feared that refusing to hand 
over suspected criminals on the basis of Japanese evidence 
was "unsound ground" to make a stand that gave the Japanese 
an opportunity to challenge Britain's position in the rest 
of China.72 On 10 June, the United States Consul-General in 
Tientsin had voiced his opposition to Japan's escalating 
demands and the intransigence of Britain's stand over the
Cheng murder suspects that had precipitated them. In an 
attempt to return to the status quo ante, Whitehall on 13 
June proposed the formation of a three-person arbitration 
committee at Tientsin, with the US Consul-General as its 
"neutral" member, that would reassess the evidence for —  
i.e. look for a face-saving way to facilitate —  the handing 
over of the Cheng suspects for trial.73
This proposal was not well-received in Washington or 
Tokyo. Declaring that the United States government was "not 
concerned in the original incident at Tientsin relating to 
the requested delivery of the four accused Chinese," 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull informed the British that 
the US Consul-General at Tientsin was "being instructed to 
hold himself aloof from any action relating to the merits of 
the question at issue between the British and Japanese 
authorities."74 In Tokyo, the Japanese Foreign Ministry 
refused to do anything more with the arbitration committee 
idea than forward it to the North China Army for their 
consideration.75 Meanwhile the Japanese press —  which 
viewed the Incident as an opportunity to press Britain to 
end all aid to Chiang Kai-shek —  castigated the proposal as 
a "plot" to involve the United States in the conflict and 
prevent Tokyo from adopting "the uncompromising course that 
is the only way of bringing the situation to a successful
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conclusion" (kyoko hoshin nomi ga jitai o yuri ni kaiketsu 
suru no de aru) .76
With Britain outmanoeuvred into dealing with the 
Tientsin question on Japanese rather than British terms, 
"the arrow," to quote an official Japanese government 
communication to Britain, "had left the bow,"77 and Anglo- 
Japanese relations had reached a new stage from which there 
was no going back. But with their incompetence having been 
alluded to by the Prime Minister as the major cause of the 
crisis, officials from the Far Eastern Department latched on 
to a statement made on 11 June by Consul-General Jamieson 
("the manner in which the (Cheng) culprits should be handed 
over was merely left as a matter for further discussion") to 
imply that he had made an "undertaking to the Japanese 
authorities that the men would in fact be handed over."78 In 
what seems to have been a last-gasp effort to pass onto 
others responsibility it was unwilling to bear itself, the 
Foreign Office Far Eastern Department argued that the real 
cause of the crisis was Japanese "pique" at Whitehall's 
failure to carry through on an unauthorized commitment made 
by an operational officer in the field.
The Foreign Office allegation was not entirely false. 
Jamieson had promised to the Japanese and the Mayor of 
Tientsin on 10 and 12 April that the suspected murderers of 
Cheng Lien-shih would be handed over; a similar
communication was made by the British officials before whom 
the suspects reconstructed the crime at the end of that 
month.79 But these statements were made on the basis of the 
August 1938 and April 1939 Foreign Office guidelines 
specifying that those suspected of committing acts of
violence would be handed over for trial. In addition, the 
Japanese realized as well as anyone that it was not
Jamieson, but Whitehall, that had to give final permission 
for the suspects' transfer to Chinese custody. The idea that 
Japanese hostility could be traced to a particular 
"undertaking" of a local official that was not carried out 
implied that —  had the undertaking not been made —  the 
Japanese would somehow not have been so angry and that the 
later troubles might not therefore have arisen.80
Such an interpretation certainly did not fit the facts. 
Japan's hostility had nothing to do with Consul-General 
Jamieson, who was viewed as a friendly official. It was 
explained rather by Whitehall's failure to hand over the
suspects. The Japanese believed that Britain, by interning
the suspects and arrogating to itself the judicial function 
of deciding whether and which Chinese suspects should go to 
trial, had violated its extra-territorial mandate. 
Furthermore, in abandoning practices followed by other 
foreign areas by refusing to accept Japanese-induced 
confessions, Britain also seemed to be giving more credence
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to what the suspects said in their defence rather than what 
Japanese interrogators found out to their detriment, as well 
as c^l^ into question agreements dating • back to at least 
January 1939 for the arrest, apprehension and exclusion of 
Chinese activists from within the Concession. With its 
military security under challenge, the Japanese North China 
Army was no longer prepared to accept a situation in which 
the Chinese government could persuade British authorities to 
give greater protection to those wanted for anti-Japanese 
crimes of violence than suspected common criminals.
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Chapter Three: The Widening of the Crisis (1): The Economic 
Dimension
Imposed at 6 a.m. on 15 June 1939, the North China 
Army's blockade of the British and French Concessions at 
Tientsin was the consequence of the British authorities' 
failure to turn over four Chinese internees suspected of 
involvement in the murder of a puppet official. Japan, 
however, indicated that the blockade's removal would be 
contingent not simply upon handing over the suspects, but 
British and French compliance with a range of other demands 
—  including co-operation with the Japanese Army's currency 
policies in North China, an end to Britain's "policy of 
supporting Chiang Kai-shek," a "transformation of British 
attitudes" (Igirisu no sei ga mitomerareru teido ni nari) in 
China generally and a greater willingness to "cooperate" 
with the New Order in East Asia.1 Thus^ a relatively
minor administrative disagreement was transformed into a 
major political crisis, the heart of which concerned the 
promotion of an economic and political agenda with 
ramifications emanating far beyond the confines of Tientsin.
The meaning of many of these new demands, together with 
the extent to which Britain would have to comply with them, 
remained unclear. But the act of introducing such an agenda 
meant that an incident that was the somewhat fortuitous 
consequence of a breakdown in procedures concerning
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restrictions upon anti-Japanese activists that had already 
generally been agreed upon, or was in the process of being 
worked out, by both countries could now only be solved by 
addressing other issues upon which the two countries had 
been unable to unite, even in principle. Therefore, as the 
Incident widened, the misunderstandings or faulty execution 
of existing agreements that had characterized the outbreak 
of the problem were overshadowed by more fundamental 
differences that had already affected Anglo-Japanese 
relations in China generally, but until then had not greatly 
impinged upon the situation at Tientsin. Long preceding the 
immediate causes of this particular incident, these 
differences originated in a pattern of economic rivalry in 
China going back many years.
Britain, Japan and China's Financial Solvency
Britain —  particularly the City of London and 
financial, manufacturing and trading concerns based in Hong 
Kong and Shanghai —  had extensive relations with China. The 
largest foreign investor in China,2 one of China's biggest 
trade partners and the dominant shipping magnate in the 
region,3 Britain was also the largest foreign holder of 
Chinese government debt,4 a development through which it 
acquired a vested interest in maintaining financial 
mechanisms to ensure the service of foreign loans that post-
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1911 governments of China, mired in civil war and government 
breakdown, might otherwise be unable to honour. As a result, 
Britain's stake in China had widened from the elimination 
(through force of arms or otherwise) of domestic barriers 
impeding foreign trade to the preservation of China's
ability to underwrite existing and future foreign investment 
—  in particular the shoring up of the debt-paying capacity 
of the Chinese government.5
To preserve China's solvency, Britain used its control 
over the China Maritime Customs service which, since the
imposition of the unequal treaties granting Britain extra­
territoriality in China, had been staffed and subsequently 
supervised by British administrators, to ensure that China's 
tariff revenues would service foreign debts before being 
utilized by government officials for any other purpose.6 In 
this way, Chinese creditworthiness became dependent upon the
expansion of China's foreign trade rather than the
rebuilding of the Chinese administration, or the 
strengthening of its revenue-raising capacity, or even 
support of China's national credentials against the 
depredations of an invading army.7 For the Chinese an 
intrusive action geared to the creation of a favourable 
foreign investment climate at minimum risk, de-linking the 
Maritime Customs from the rest of the administration was a 
strategy that could survive, and cater to, the enfeeblement
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of the Chinese state, the partition of the nation and 
virtually anything short of China's total economic collapse.
An arrangement promoting international acquiescence in 
Japanese aggression while preserving China's capacity to pay 
its foreign creditors (of which Japan was one) might have 
been considered to Japan's advantage.8 But setting aside 
China's customs revenues for the payment of foreign debt 
also raised the possibility of British support for a 
revision of China's unequal trade status, in particular an 
upward adjustment of the tariff. Japan's access to India and 
other western-controlled markets had been curtailed as a 
result of tariffs and imperial preference policies imposed 
by Britain and others in the wake of the Great Depression.9 
With the overwhelming proportion of its foreign investment 
located in North China,10 Tokyo was extremely unwilling to 
acquiesce in measures devised by the West that might —  
through the protection of Chinese industry —  retard Japan's 
efforts to control and reorient, the economy of China's 
northern provinces.11
Negotiations between Britain and China on tariff 
autonomy and other questions concerning the ending of extra­
territoriality were first initiated before Japan invaded 
Manchuria in 1931, but had ended inconclusively.12 What for 
Japan was the haunting prospect of tariff revision was 
brought closer by the anti-Japanese economic boycotts
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throughout China that the invasion of Manchuria 
precipitated, together with the deflationary effects of 
global economic recession and the rise- in world silver 
prices from 1931 to 1935 that was its consequence. With 
Chinese currency linked to silver, this development 
thanks largely to a US government silver-purchase initiative 
and Japanese smuggling activities in the occupied areas —  
led to huge silver outflows from the country, depletions in 
reserves, more expensive exports, a contraction of trade and 
the spectre of government default on China's foreign 
obligations.13
Pressured by contractions in world markets and a well- 
organized China Lobby determined to preserve British market 
share,14 London responded to China's growing financial 
crisis by sending in 1935 a Treasury mission to the Far East 
to facilitate the country's economic rehabilitation.15 ■ Being 
"capital scarce," China required, according to mission 
leader Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, a "flow of credit" from 
abroad that/only be assured if the country's financial well­
being —  in particular the government's capacity to pay off 
existing obligations and "settle old debts" —  was sound.16 
But unable to obtain an international loan for China or 
induce any Japanese co-operation for its mandate, this 
mission was eventually restricted to assisting the Chinese 
government in implementing a decision dictated by economic
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necessity to withdraw silver as legal tender, set up a 
managed currency under the direction of a central bank, 
create a unified note issue backed by the silver no longer 
in circulation and establish centralized direction of the 
newly expanded reserves for which these reforms were 
responsible.17
Aware of the political power of the Hong-Kong trading 
community and Britain's interest in consolidating its 
position as China's major supplier of capital goods (the 
import of which was determined largely by the government),18 
Japan criticized the British initiative as an intrusion into 
Chinese affairs designed to shore up an unpopular pro­
western regime.19 But Tokyo was less concerned with 
Britain's role in promoting China's currency reform than 
with the implications for Japan of the reform itself. 
Japanese plans for the integration of North China, Manchuria 
and Korea into a Japan-dominated blocS hinged largely upon a 
two-tiered financial structure in which a few Japanese banks 
would control the separate and diverse currencies, reserves, 
deposits and investment flows of numerous weaker local 
Chinese counterparts. A unified Chinese currency with 
reserves and deposits in Chinese government banks outside
Japanese-occupied areas threatened to complicate the entire
20Japanese-led process of China's economic dismemberment.
As things turned out, Britain's role in promoting 
China's currency reform was so undistinguished that the 
initiative almost died before it was launched. What Tokyo 
had portrayed as a plan imposed by a cunning and powerful 
rival was in fact undermined by Britain's failure to 
generate the international backing considered necessary for 
these measures to succeed. Unsupported by its allies, London
shied .away, from making a loan to support China's currency
(C. / Jt&c /
until^an ineffectual stop-gap measure in early 1939.21
This threatened to have dire consequences for China. 
With its currency vulnerable to Japanese depredations in the 
North as well as to the temptation for Chinese officials to 
print notes indiscriminately, the Chinese government was 
forced in late-1938 to default on its foreign debts. 
Meanwhile, the continuing chatter in London, Geneva and 
Washington about what turned out to be an ineffectual, 
virtually non-existent, aid package to China provided Japan 
with an incentive as well as an excuse to advance its own 
time-table of pre-emptive strikes throughout the country.
Abetted by international inaction, the degeneration of 
a modest bureaucratic initiative into a series of missteps 
hastening China's disintegration was unexpectedly halted by 
a local desire to make these reforms work. According to a 
senior Treasury official, "no part of the country" had 
"substantial difficulty in securing the acceptance of" the
beleaguered "Government legal tender notes."22 As a result, 
a currency that by mid-1939 was pushed by inflation, lack of 
international backing, mismanagement- and Japanese 
depredations to just 20% of its official value remained 
basically "unaffected" in terms of "the confidence" with 
which it was "regarded by the Chinese masses."23
China's public endorsement bestowed a strength upon its 
currency that absence of foreign support, monetary setbacks 
and Japanese sabotage efforts could never entirely 
undermine. In particular, Japanese efforts to collect "the 
remaining silver in local circulation" to serve as the 
"basis for a separate local currency" in occupied areas 
failed to prevent the notes of Chinese government banks from 
becoming the "main currency" in the region. In this way, the 
establishment of a single Chinese currency was transformed 
from being a narrowly-based governmental decision dictated 
by fiscal prudence into one of the most important national 
initiatives that a "corruption-riddled" regime of chequered 
nationalist credentials had ever attempted.24
Frustrated by these developments, Tokyo intensified its 
anti-British pronouncements. What were once described as 
"misguided British efforts to put a wayward country's house 
in order" were now being called a reassertion of "Britain's 
colonial dominance" (Eikoku no shokuminchi shihai).25 With 
Chinese currency reform resulting in appointment of British
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advisors to China's Central Bank, currency loan discussions
(1936, 1938 and 1939), the flotation of bonds for a railway
in South China from which —  contrary to the Nine Power
Treaty —  Japanese capital was excluded (1936), and talks
about credits for purchases of British capital goods (1938),
criticism of British meddling in China gained resonance,
particularly within Japanese military and ultra-nationalist 
26groups.
As implied by Japanese criticisms, there was nothing in 
Britain's actions to suggest that they were motivated by
anything other than self-interest.27 But as China's role in 
its financial regeneration became apparent, currency reform 
was transformed from being a foreign imposition into an 
indigenous initiative. Therefore, Japanese accusations that 
the process represented simply the workings of British 
imperialism could not hide (and were perhaps being voiced to 
deflect attention from Japanese anxiety about) the 
possibility that —  together with a unified Maritime Customs 
Service and Chinese migration to the under-populated 
Northern Provinces28 -- the adoption of a managed currency 
represented one of China's most serious challenges to 
Japan's plans of developing a separate, Japanese-dominated 
North China-Korea-Japan economic and political bloclt that 
was no longer under Chinese control.
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The Currency War in North China
Japan's increasingly hostile criticism of Western 
policy in China was accompanied by intensified efforts by 
its armed forces to create "a completely subservient" regime 
in the North. The Japanese Army had already forced the 
Chinese government to remove any local official it did not 
like; in 1935, it went one step further by inaugurating the 
Hopei-Chahar Political Council as a separate regime under 
its control. A few months later, when it became clear that 
this group "represented nothing but... (personal) ambition 
and a readiness to subordinate all other considerations 
in... pursuit" of its own self-interest, the military threw 
its weight behind a regime in East Hopei headed by a "self- 
appointed Dictator" who, it was hoped, would be more 
effective in carrying out Japanese plans. However, his 
"record of dishonesty" was so extreme that the process of 
governing became little more than an exercise in family- 
enrichment.29
Concerned primarily with sabotaging Chinese national 
unification efforts, Japan seemed less interested in 
promoting efficient government than in using these creations 
to undermine the authority of the Chinese Government. Under 
the guise of promoting "new realities," the Japanese 
military demanded that Nanking impoverish itself by 
sanctioning the diversion of a portion of the Chinese
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Maritime Customs' receipts from North China to finance these 
new regimes, while agreeing to lower tariffs on the major 
items Japan was smuggling into the region.30 But when in 
late-1937 Japanese residents and military advisors in Hopei 
were murdered by supposedly pro-Japanese officials, the 
Japanese became sufficiently alarmed by the incompetence and 
venality of their creations to replace them with the 
Provisional Government of North China. Armed in theory with 
a mandate for the entire area, this group consisted of anti- 
Kuomintang warlords, narcotics' profiteers and other 
"unreliable old men" recruited to front the decisions of a 
North China occupation force that Japan in late-1937 had 
augmented from 10,000 to over 200,000 troops.31
As part of the process of preventing the creation of a 
unified Chinese state, these transformations were intended 
to eliminate conditions in which the national currency could 
take root. But unlike the situation in occupied Manchuria, 
where Japan had been more successful in imposing financial 
control, the notes circulating in North China were part of a 
unified monetary system and were recognized on international 
money markets as legal tender.32 They were also backed by an 
entrenched resistance movement that by 1939 was in control 
of virtually all non-urban areas33 and by fixed reserves and 
deposits in Chinese banks that were either outside Japanese- 
controlled regions or in non-Japanese administered zones
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within occupied areas such as the British and French 
Concessions at Tientsin.34 As a result, Japan's decision to 
intensify its previous efforts to separate North China from 
the rest of the country by invading the region failed to 
arrest the circulation of China's currency, or undermine its 
strength within the occupied areas.35
This situation posed serious problems for Japan. As in 
Manchuria, currency control was crucial in North China as a 
means of extending the administrative power of fledgling 
occupation authorities. Japan's failure to consolidate its 
military hold over the area made currency control all the 
more important. With prolonged Chinese resistance, 
deployment of larger-than-expected numbers of troops, 
failure to entice investment for the strategic development 
of North China's iron and coal resources36 and the region's 
continuing food deficits, the North China Army was forced to 
scale back initial occupation plans designed to promote 
Japan's economic autarchy to simply "paying for occupation 
expenses by the use of conquered resources." This strategy 
could not be implemented, however, without the ability to 
sequester assets, control banking facilities and force 
Chinese to invest in the "paper money" the Japanese Army 
would have had to print in "indiscriminate amounts" to 
defray its growing military costs.37
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Short of deploying troops in large numbers to rural 
areas and taking over foreign-run settlements —  including 
probably those in Shanghai and Hong Kong as well as Tientsin
—  in which Chinese banks were located, there was no way the 
Chinese notes could be eradicated by military force. But 
developing an alternative strategy with the same end in 
mind, the North China Army in November 1937 decided to 
establish a new currency —  Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) notes
—  exchangeable with the Chinese yuan (fapi) on a 1:1 basis 
until March 1939, when fapi would become illegal tender. The
currency would be managed by a reserve bank and capitalized
at 50 million yen, 50% of which would be paid up 
immediately. Of this, 12.5 million would come from the 
Provisional Government, which was meant to raise the money 
through bonds to be bought up by the Japanese government and 
Japanese banks, and 12.5 million from the reserves of the 
major local Chinese banks.38
As a result of the 1935 currency reforms, the reserves 
and deposits of the Chinese banks were considerable. Over 50 
million yuan (the equivalent of the same amount in yen) was
estimated to be within the vaults of Chinese banks in
3 Qforeign-controlled areas m  Tientsin and Peking alone. To 
induce the co-operation of the Chinese banks, the Japanese 
authorities dangled the carrot and wielded the stick. The 
carrot consisted of an offer of shares in the new reserve
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bank and a decree that the new currency -- which was illegal 
tender in international money markets —  could be converted 
into yen at a rate of 1:1. Through this mechanism, FRB note­
holders could purchase, through conversion into yen and then 
other denominations, foreign currency at a rate equivalent 
to that of the yen of about one shilling and two pence 
sterling for each FRB unit.
The stick consisted of declarations of intent to 
curtail various Chinese banking operations in North China. 
Arguing that the National Government had never acquired the 
right to issue currency in North China, Occupation officials 
withdrew note-issuing authority from the Chinese banks, made 
persistent efforts to make the banks' reserves subject to 
Japanese scrutiny or to have them transferred to Japanese- 
controlled areas, and imposed progressively severe 
restrictions upon local and foreign exchange dealings in 
Chinese currency.40 Through these measures, it was hoped 
that the transfer of reserves and deposits to parent 
affiliates in Free China or other areas outside Japan's 
control would become impossible.
Despite these measures, it was soon apparent that the 
necessary co-operation from both Chinese and Japanese 
sources would not be forthcoming. Proposing to finance a new 
currency to take the place of over 300 million Chinese fapi 
with a paid-up capital reserve of only 25 million yen (a
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ratio of less than 1:12) made the prospect of severe 
inflationary pressure unavoidable. Furthermore, the actual 
paid-up backing amounted to considerably less than that 
figure: with Chinese banks refusing to transfer any of the 
12.5 million yuan they were expected to contribute to the 
puppet currency's reserve, and the 9 million yen's worth of 
reserves promised by Japanese banks (in return for 
acquisition of Provisional Government bonds) remaining 
within Japanese vaults, the only backing that was actually 
handed over to the Federal Reserve Bank was 3.5 million 
yen's worth of silver stock from the Japanese government.41 
Yet, largely because of North China Army pressure to produce 
unlimited quantities of notes, over 450 million yen's worth 
of Japanese-sponsored currency had been printed by 1939 -- 
in excess of 150 million yuan (of Chinese dollars) of the 
fapi that were circulating.42
To back an issue of over 400 million yen's worth of 
notes with million yen of reserves was an act of
recklessness that had predictably disastrous results. By May 
1939, the FRB currency was trading at a 34% discount with 
the North Chinese fapi, which was also declining rapidly in 
value (trading at only 8 pence, down from its official value 
of one shilling and two pence, in early 1939 on the Shanghai 
and Hong Kong money markets, the fapi plunged to 6 pence and 
then 3 pence during June and July of that year).43 With
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Federal Reserve Bank notes shunned by Chinese, Japanese and 
foreigner alike, Japan's policy of forcibly converting fapi 
into FRB currency failed resoundingly. Attempting to 
eliminate fapi by March 1939, the Occupation authorities 
were confronted in July by the continuing circulation within 
the North China region of hundreds of millions of yuan of 
Chinese government currency notes.44
Because Federal Reserve Bank notes could still be 
exchanged in Japanese money markets at the official rate of 
1:1 with the yen, these failures had severe financial 
repercussions for Japan. With the divergence of the official 
and actual value of the FRB currency, trading firms, 
entrepreneurs and smugglers could make huge profits at 
Japan's expense in currency and 'other exchange transactions 
by acquiring Federal Reserve Bank notes at a heavy discount 
in China and then selling them in Japan at the inflated
official rate —  which, by the summer of 1939, was about
five times the notes' real value. With the preservation of 
Federal Reserve Bank currency at the inflated 1:1 ratio with 
the yen, Japan was purchasing imports from North China at 
about five times their real price and selling exports for 
about 1/5 of their real value. This ensured that the Federal 
Reserve Bank currency-yen link would put more downward
pressure on the yen, which since the expansion of
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hostilities in 1937 had already fallen twice below its 
official exchange rate on international markets.45
Poorly conceived and ineptly implemented, Japan's 
currency measures might nevertheless have benefited the home 
country had they helped to improve North China's economic 
output. With reserves of coal and iron and the incipient 
growth of a cash-crop agriculture (especially in cotton), 
the region had the potential —  if not of making Japan 
"self-sufficient in national defence" or enabling it to 
"sustain war with war" —  of at least "supplementing Japan's 
economy with conquered resources."46 A booming North China 
might have been able to exchange the increasing number of 
internationally unconvertible Federal Reserve Bank notes 
that Japan was accruing from sales of its exports to the 
region for goods that would ultimately benefit the Japanese 
economy.
This was not to happen. Since North China traditionally 
suffered trade-deficits and was not self-supporting even in 
food, Japan ran up large trade surpluses with the region 
that became even larger with its military domination after 
1937 .47 But because of other problems —  in particular the 
strangulation of North China's other foreign trade, 
indigenous anti-Japanese resistance, failure of FRB 
currency, the Occupation authorities' inability to generate 
capital for infrastructural development and the reversion of
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much of the countryside to subsistence farming —  North 
China's economic output was actually contracting. With the 
flood of Japanese imports into the region- matched by a fall 
in output of Chinese export industries such as coal mining 
and the decline in cultivation of cotton and other cash- 
crops, FRB notes held by Japan as a result of its trade 
surplus with North China could only be used to purchase 
goods that were increasingly scarce, useless, expensive and 
irrelevant to Japan's economic needs.48
Faced with a situation in which the survival of China's 
currency threatened to turn the occupation of North China 
into a Japanese as well as a Chinese economic disaster, 
Japan reacted to its worsening monetary and trade problems 
in the region with anxiety and consternation. In the summer 
of 1939, the Governor of the Bank of Japan even advocated 
the de-linking of FRB currency from the yen.49 Likely to 
have had a dire impact upon the North China Army-sponsored 
currency, the Army's ability to finance itself and even the 
security of its troops, this recommendation was not 
implemented for lack of military support. But to prevent 
similar proposals from being made in the future, Japanese 
authorities in China began to search for other methods of 
shoring up the puppet currency. One of these was the 
imposition of "severe pressure on the concessions" and other
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foreign-controlled zones in which Chinese government 
currency was circulating. 50
The Tientsin Concessions and the Currency War
Although only a few miles wide, the Concessions had 
played a disproportionate role in the economic development 
of North China. Acting as a funnel for foreign trade and 
investment into the area, the British and French Concessions 
alone accounted for 80% of all Tientsin trade.51 The 
enclaves were also responsible for the development of a 
regional economy geared largely to the production of primary 
or semi-finished materials for manufacture in industrial 
enterprises located within the Concessions.52 In addition, 
branches of two Chinese banks in the British and French 
Concessions at Tientsin —  the Bank of China and the Bank of 
Communications —  had under China's Central Bank acted as 
local reserve depositories and note-issuing authorities of 
the national currency that was created in November 1935.53
By providing these institutions with an opportunity to 
carry on operations while Japan occupied the surrounding 
areas, the British and French areas at Tientsin helped 
solidify fapi as the major currency in the region. Together 
with the Foreign Legation area in Peking, the enclaves 
housed between 50 and 60 million yen in f api currency 
reserves.54 Slightly more than Japan's proposed
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capitalization amount for the puppet currency (50 million 
yen) , this figure was at least five times larger than the 
actual backing that was mustered for the FRB notes (10.7 
million yen). In addition, the existence of the Concessions 
as autonomous areas within Japanese-occupied North China 
provided a means by which fapi could be funnelled out of the 
region entirely. The remittances to South China of Chinese 
banks within the British and French Concessions at Tientsin 
in the first four months of 1939 alone amounted to an 
estimated 70 million yuan in fapi notes, about one fifth of 
the currency estimated to be circulating in North China.55
Although widely supported, the creation of a unified 
currency did not receive unqualified endorsement in North 
China. Since the fapi's inception as a managed currency in 
November 1935, North Chinese authorities had continually 
refused to allow the silver deposited in the region's banks 
to be transferred to the Chinese Central Bank in the South. 
Because of local distrust of any outside group seeking to 
remove local wealth from the region, the question of whether 
the silver that was withdrawn from circulation in the North 
belonged to the Nanking government, or whether it could be 
transferred from North to South China, remained unresolved. 
Attempting to exploit such suspicions, the North China Army 
argued that the assets belonged to the people of North 
China, not a southern-based regime that had never been able
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to establish its authority over the region, and that fapi, 
as a "foreign" creation, should be eradicated entirely.56
These arguments were not without plausibility and were 
naturally of great convenience in furthering Japan's plans 
of separating the North from the rest of China. But they 
were based on the assumption that China's national currency 
could be eradicated from the occupied territories simply by 
raising doubts about certain aspects of its management. But 
the existence of opposition in the North to the transfer of 
silver deposits to the South did not prevent the national 
currency from establishing itself as the region's main 
medium of exchange. Nor was this process reversed by the 
1938 launch of the FRB currency and the 1939 fapi-for-FRB 
note-conversion scheme. There also seemed to be scant 
indigenous support for moving the currency reserves out of 
the Concessions into a Japanese controlled institution 
elsewhere in North China. With their hands forced by these 
unwelcome developments, the North China Army began to blame 
enclaves such as the British and French Concessions at 
Tientsin for the failure of the Federal Reserve Bank notes 
throughout the entire region, as well as for being the main 
obstacle preventing the fapi's "natural" disappearance from 
the rest of the occupied areas.57
The Concessions had undoubtedly played an important 
economic role in North China. But this did not mean that
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simply getting these areas to change their currency policies 
would be enough to bring about a fundamental change in the 
currency situation in as a whole. For instance, the bank 
deposits within the British and French Concessions (about 40 
million yuan) comprised only about one eighteenth of the 
value of the fapi reserves held outside North China (just 
over 700 million yen), an amount too insignificant for their 
transfer to Japanese-occupied areas to have had a 
significant downward impact on the fapi. The remittances to 
South China from the Concession banks had certainly helped 
thwart the North China Army's fapi-for-FRB note-conversion 
program up until the spring of 1939. But, in the words of 
North China Army Chief of Staff General Muto, "there had 
been" -- partly as a result of this very development —  such 
"a great exodus of silver from (North) China" by the summer 
that "there was now very little left" for anyone else to lay 
hands upon.58
In addition, the Japanese military was soon to discover 
that isolating the Concessions would not prevent China's 
currency from circulating elsewhere. For political as well 
as economic reasons, fapi had been the preferred medium of 
exchange in numerous areas in North China outside, and with 
very few links to, the British and French enclaves. These 
included Border Governments and other guerrilla-dominated 
regions, in which Federal Reserve Bank notes were often
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prohibited on pain of death.59 As the currency continued to 
circulate both in outlying regions such as these and in 
other foreign-dominated areas in close • proximity to the 
Japanese military,60 it became apparent that the outcome of 
the currency war in the region depended less upon what was 
happening within the foreign areas at Tientsin than upon 
whether Japan could make Federal Reserve Bank currency a 
sufficiently attractive alternative for Chinese government 
notes to disappear from the region of their own accord.
This was a daunting task. Japan had introduced with 
virtually no backing or international recognition a currency 
that was meant to take the place of a unified, 
internationally-backed currency system that was already in 
place. With much less than one half of the over 300 million 
yuan total of fapi notes in North China having been 
converted into Federal Reserve Bank currency by May 1939,61 
even the Japanese Foreign Ministry realized that prospects 
for establishing a successful currency were slim.62 By 
recognizing that Federal Reserve Bank notes might become 
more unstable and that the policy of exchanging fapi for 
Federal Reserve Bank notes at par was unlikely to catch on, 
the Foreign Ministry's position was not markedly different 
from the British view that, currency agreement or not, the 
persistence of fapi in North China, the continuing weakness 
of its puppet rival and the failure of Japanese efforts to
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substitute one for the other were not primarily the 
consequence of recalcitrant foreign Concessions, but of more 
intractable problems that were beyond the -capacity of either 
Japan or Britain to solve.
With its financial independence linked to the solvency 
of the puppet currency, the North China Army remained 
interested in bolstering the Federal Reserve Bank currency 
under whatever conditions. But as time went by, a growing 
awareness that the Concessions were insufficiently important 
to determine the currency situation in North China one way 
or the other called into question the value of coming to an 
agreement with Britain at all. As a result, an initiative 
that was originally conceived as a means of "fulfilling the 
objective of establishing a sound currency system in North 
China" (Hoku Shina tsuka seido o kakuritsu shi, tsuka kachi 
iji o tassei suru koto o mokuhyo shi)63 was in danger of 
being exploited —  and used as a justification for —  a 
political campaign geared to destroying the national 
credentials of the Chungking Government and blackening the 
reputation of Britain as its principal backer.
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Chapter Four: The Widening of the Crisis (2) : The Political 
Dimension
The Imposition of the Blockade
As the North China Army had promised, the blockade of 
the adjoining British and French Concessions at Tientsin 
from 15 June was "stringent" and "severe." Japanese troops 
placed checkpoints on the seven roads linking the British 
and French Concessions to the Chinese city, the wharves on 
the river and the Japanese Concession. At these checkpoints, 
which were in operation between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m., Japanese 
and puppet officials subjected persons entering or leaving 
the blockaded areas to interrogations and searches. Entry of 
all goods into the concessions under siege except essential 
food items and medical supplies was forbidden, and riverboat 
pilots were directed to get temporary permits from local 
Japanese military authorities and instructed to on- and off­
load their cargoes at Japanese-controlled wharves.
As a result, the number of people entering the British 
and French areas each day declined by 60 percent (to about 
3,000) by 19 June 1939 and business activity was brought 
virtually to a complete standstill. By 26 June, according to 
a Japanese police report from Tientsin, most large Japanese 
companies with offices or warehouse facilities within the 
Concessions had withdrawn from the besieged areas.1
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This was not the first time that the British and French 
settlements had been blockaded. Between December 1938 and 
February 1939, the North China Army had imposed restrictions 
on people and goods entering the areas and issued edicts 
instructing businessmen to remove their enterprises from the 
besieged locations. But the main objective of the earlier 
blockade was the interdiction of Chinese guerrillas 
suspected of using the Concessions to further their 
operations; and the sanctions on foreign business were 
imposed primarily to register discontent at Britain's 
failure to clamp down on Chinese political activists.2 This 
blockade, however, was not conceived primarily as an anti­
terrorist device. In the words of the 13 June 1939 North 
China Army directive, the aim was to "foster disorder within 
the concessions" (sokunai kakuran o shisakusu) and to 
undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of British and 
French rule.3
Carrying out such an objective required a blockade of 
considerable duration. But how long the siege of the 
Concessions should last was at first a topic of considerable 
controversy amongst the Japanese. With British and French 
fiscal non-co-operation in North China being declared a 
threat to the safety of Japanese troops, some junior 
officers made veiled threats about "seizing the currency 
reserves" (genkin no jitsuryoku sesshu) within the enclaves
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if Japan's economic demands were not met.4 Emphasizing also 
the disruptive impact of various currency counterfeiting 
operations discovered within the Concessions, these officers 
believed that the mere threat of military action would be 
enough to bring about an immediate British capitulation to 
all of Japanese demands. But concerned about the possibility 
of wider foreign involvement in the wake of extensive 
military demands already being put on Japanese troops in 
China, Lieutenant-General Sugiyama Gen, the North China Army 
Commander-in-Chief, rejected this approach in favour of a 
siege without a time limit.5
With a long-term blockade, it was possible to implement 
a series of Japanese-inspired disorderly acts within and 
around the Concessions that would gradually erode the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of the Concession authorities. 
But as before, the Chinese were likely to be most 
inconvenienced and harrassed by the Japanese and their 
collaborators at inspection points. Not just factory workers 
but also white-collar Chinese employees of the Concession 
authorities were singled out for abuse. With as many as 80 
percent of the Chinese clerical staff of the British 
Municipal Council living outside the British area, this 
group was particularly vulnerable to the taunts of Japanese- 
controlled, Chinese crowds demonstrating outside the 
settlements. Anonymous threats were received by families of
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Chinese employees of the British Municipal Council police 
force in particular, bringing about three resignations from 
the force by the end of the month.5
In another destabilization tactic, the Japanese 
military made efforts to ensure that the Concessions would 
not have enough food to feed their inhabitants. This meant 
prohibiting, or strictly curtailing, the entrance of fresh 
produce into the British and French areas, while depleting 
the considerable stocks of food that had been hoarded 
within.7 To sabotage daily business, the blockade generally 
prevented people going in and out of the British and French 
settlements. But in an effort to generate food and drink 
shortages in Concession eating areas and markets, Japanese 
sentries surrounding the enclaves occasionally allowed, or 
even forced, large numbers of Chinese into the British 
Concession (13 and 19 June).8 To drive up prices even 
further, a committee was set up under the leadership of a 
senior North China Army General Staff official that 
consisted of local representatives from Mitsui and 
Mitsubishi who were to launder Federal Reserve Bank funds 
and pass them to Japanese agents so that they could 
surreptitiously buy up the flour, rice and other staples 
that the besieged settlements had already stockpiled.9
These actions resulted in a steep rise in the price of 
essential goods. The North China Army's refusal to allow
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into the Concessions anything except the most essential food 
items soon resulted in a 50 percent price rise in beef, eggs 
and potatoes inside the British and Fren-ch areas from the 
day the blockade was first imposed. By 22 June, Japanese 
undercover agents had bought up almost 100,000 of the 
estimated 2.7 million sacks of wheatflour within the 
blockaded areas and expected to buy up the rest by the 25th. 
As a result, flour had become between twelve and fifteen 
times more expensive inside than outside the Concessions. 
Two days later, according to Consul-General Tashiro, stocks 
of meat, vegetables and fish had reached very low levels 
within the French Concession. By 29 June, the price of all 
vegetables entering both settlements from Shanghai were 
automatically marked up 60 percent.10
Anti-British Discrimination at Tientsin
Part of the effort to make the Concessions 
"ungovernable" was the instigation by sentries manning 
inspection posts around the Concessions of a campaign of 
racial harassment directed against Westerners. A novel 
tactic that received much comment in the western media, 
these incidents never resulted in serious bodily harm or 
death. In addition, the number of people subjected to 
serious abuse in the early weeks of the blockade numbered 
only about two dozen, with reported instances of
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mistreatment declining markedly from the beginning of 
July.11 Within those limits, however, the treatment could be 
severe, as the following examples illustrate:
"girl. . . was manhandled and called 'Ni Ma Ti Ke Pi' 
several times by one of the Chinese police who was 
acting under the Japanese sentries. Expression is one 
of the filthiest swearwords... Girl... understood 
Chinese well enough to know it was the worst type of 
swearword (and) was reduced to hysterics."
"Two male British subjects leaving concession this 
morning (were) stripped naked, had their private parts 
tickled and were made to put on (their) clothes in the 
open."
"A Mr. Ivor House (who was) going out of the Concession 
through the Woodrow Wilson Street barrier was compelled 
to take off all his clothes, stretch his legs apart and 
have his hair searched in full view of many passers by, 
including women... (His companion was also) stripped, 
ordered to open his mouth for inspection and when it 
was not opened wide enough for the satisfaction of his 
examiners, it was pressed open with his own passport."
(case of Mr. Whitewright and Mr. and Mrs. Finlay who 
were) "told to go out and (whose) clothes were flung 
outside into road one by one after (them) so that 
(their) dressing took place in full public view."
"While going to his office, which is in Japanese 
controlled territory, (Mr. Donaldson) was compelled to 
strip and open his mouth. A Japanese sentry then 
sharply struck him on the head and chin, shutting his 
jaws with a shock. Donaldson was then made to 
extinguish a cigarette with his bare feet. Finally he 
was forced out of the Japanese shed clad only in his 
shirt. He was ordered to bend as he left and was then 
kicked. "12
In these and other instances of abuse, the similarity 
of treatment was striking. While none of the victims
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suffered serious physical assault, systematic efforts were 
made to degrade them psychologically. Many of the methods 
used to bring this about —  such as verbal abuse, indecent 
exposure of bodily parts during searches, exposure of 
victims to public view during part of the search and 
prolongation of the victims' embarrassing exposure to the 
public through, for instance, making them wait virtually 
naked for their clothes to be thrown out to them one by one 
—  were identical. Furthermore, the actual searches were, 
according to the victims, usually carried out by Chinese or 
Koreans under Japanese surveillance rather than by the 
Japanese themselves, a ploy that provided the North China 
Army with an opportunity to distance itself from a policy 
for which it was nevertheless entirely responsible.
Imposed neither haphazardly nor as a result of the 
mercurial temperaments of interrogators, these humiliations 
were inflicted according to clearly preordained guidelines. 
One of these was a policy of discrimination between British 
and other western nationals, many of whom were issued passes 
by the Japanese military in a somewhat uneven effort to show 
that its actions were not aimed at westerners generally.13 
This often meant no more than some non-British expatriates 
being inspected first while Britishers were told by "most 
offensive" officials to wait an extra half-hour.14 But 
certain acts of discrimination —  such as that of "British
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subjects in motor cars hav(ing) to dismount" to "take their 
place with Chinese riff-raff in the boiling sun while other 
foreigners go straight through,"15 or of- a senior British 
manager of a Chinese railway company being "compelled to 
take off his trousers, socks and shoes... (while) a Swedish 
junior railway employee... was allowed to pass without 
examination"16 -- symbolized to a demoralized community yet 
"another nail in the coffin of British prestige."17
Such actions left westerners at Tientsin in no doubt 
about Japan's overall objectives. In an assessment from 
Consul-General Jamieson that bore striking resemblance to 
the sentiments of some within the Japanese Foreign 
Ministry's East Asia Bureau, they were to induce "Chinese, 
who in normal times dislike the existence of any foreign 
concessions in China... (to) conclude that their belief in 
British strength is misplaced," while showing "Japanese who 
have tacit respect for the white races and for British in 
particular... that they can with impunity humiliate British 
people."18 There was also concern that largely "uneducated" 
Chinese, who supposedly suffered from "innate anti-foreign 
tendencies" and had "no counter-propaganda" to combat the 
accusations of "professional agitators," would be 
"influenced by a few malcontents" to riot or force other 
Chinese to resign en masse from employment within the
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Concessions, particularly from the municipal police 
forces.19
This sense of foreboding was not limited to officials 
at Tientsin. Despite the small number of reported cases of 
harassment, the nature of the mistreatment of white men and 
women that did occur around the Concessions' perimeters was 
sufficient to prompt diplomats and government officials in 
Britain and the Dominions to declare that "Orientals can 
(now) insult Englishmen with impunity," the "British Empire 
is too enfeebled to react,"20 "the white man's prestige in 
the East was at zero," and that "unless... rehabilitated, 
(that prestige) will inevitably sink to the same level in 
the countries round the Indian Ocean." To officials 
administering restive empires with inadequate military 
resources, the possible "domino effect" of the abuse of a 
mere handful of Westerners at Tientsin seemed to pose a far 
greater threat to British authority than Germany's take-over 
of entire countries in Europe. Indeed, worried about 
"repercussions in Africa which are as obvious as they may be 
disastrous," one official even criticized "the nations of 
Europe" for being "so blind with hatred of each other as to 
forget that the prestige of the white man is not the 
prestige of any particular nation but of the whole white 
race."21
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The Anti-British Movement in North China
Although there were fears in London that the 
mistreatment of westerners at Tientsin might be part of a 
Japanese . campaign to "throw Britain over —  and out" of 
Asia,22 this did not happen. The stripping of white people 
at inspection points around the blockaded areas at Tientsin 
provoked too much negative western press for such practices 
to continue without fear of reprisal. Therefore, although 
instances of harassment continued, with reports of not just 
British but also American nationals -- men and women -- 
having their "faces slapped" surfacing as late as 12 
August,23 racial harassment of Westerners, including British 
subjects, entering or leaving the Concessions declined 
markedly from about the middle of July.24
With the blockade carrying on without letup, however, 
"widespread efforts to incite Chinese against British 
continued." Chinese employees of the British Concession's 
Municipal Police Force continued to be pressured to leave 
their jobs,25 as were employees of British firms doing 
business in the Tientsin and surrounding areas.26 In 
addition, restrictions on the entry of Chinese to the 
Concessions —  down to perhaps about one quarter of the pre­
blockade number —  were accompanied, according to a late- 
July report of the North China Army's 27th Division, by the 
periodic issue of large numbers of entry permits to
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collaborator-students to whip up anti-British fervour 
within. Meanwhile, it was decided to compound problems 
created for Concession residents as a result of dwindling, 
rotting or increasingly expensive food supplies by 
instituting a crackdown on opium smuggling to the barricaded 
areas.27 In settlements containing numerous victims of 
chronic drug addiction, such a tactic had both anti-British 
propaganda value as well as the potential for instigating 
massive social disorder.
A similar pattern of sustained hostility towards 
Britain could be seen in the areas surrounding the 
concessions under siege. On 24 July, an "Anti-British 
League" was formed at Tientsin with the stated objectives of 
boycotting British goods, ending all commercial relations 
with British traders, pressuring Chinese employees of 
British firms to leave their employment and encouraging 
Chinese residents to evacuate the British and French 
Concessions.28 A few days later, Chinese seamen responded to 
stepped-up Anglophobia by refusing to load British goods 
onto lighters and junks plying their way between Tientsin 
and ships either anchored on the Haiho river just outside 
the concession "bund" or berthed at the head of the river at 
Tangku some fifty miles downstream.29 On 23 July and 4 
August, Chinese demonstrators, assisted by "Japanese amongst
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the crowd," invaded and smashed property belonging to 
British-owned shipping and trading firms in both towns.30
These events coincided with a substantial increase of 
anti-British rhetoric throughout occupied China. With the 
overriding aim of whipping up hysteria, Japanese officials 
and their puppets became engaged in a war of words against 
Britain that was designed to reveal "how fruitless have 
been... (Britain's) attempts to meet Japanese requirements," 
and yet to show the British had no alternative but to comply 
absolutely with their demands."31 In remarks of such 
intemperance that even the propaganda of the anti-British 
movement in Japan seemed tame by comparison, General Staff 
officers and Special Services agents in China tried to break 
all limits in the extremity of their denunciations, one 
officer going so far as to say that British diplomacy —  
which seemed to most people, including even some Japanese 
after an Anglo-Japanese accord was signed on 23 July, to 
smack of ingratiating servility towards Japan —  could be 
compared to "the acts of a fierce, vicious beast" (27 
July) ,32
Accompanying such verbal onslaughts were extremely 
virulent poster campaigns and editorials in the Japanese- 
controlled press. In Peking and other occupied areas, 
Britain was accused of promoting the "mutual slaughter of 
the yellow races" (although the British had supported
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diplomatic mediation of the Sino-Japanese conflict since 
1937) (16 July):33 "forcing" the Chinese to purchase "mines,
weapons and ammunition" from them (when the Chinese were in 
fact complaining that they needed more) (17 July ):34 
"plotting" the "July 7th Incident (enlarging the Sino- 
Japanese War in 1937) to bring calamity to China" (when 
Japan's invasion of China actually heightened the threat to 
Britain's imperial position) (25 July);35 and for being, 
together with the Chinese Communist Party, one of the two 
"evil influences" that had to be "overthrown" if China was 
to be "rehabilitated" (when British diplomacy had in fact 
been almost as hostile towards Chinese communism as Japan's) 
(25 July). On 5 August, a particularly imaginative poster 
appeared in Peking describing "the anti-British movement" as 
"the foremost opportunity for a Mohammedan revival."36
These activities received little, if any, support from 
Chinese in non-occupied areas. But in a development that was 
interpreted by anxious British diplomats as a possible sign 
of changing Chinese loyalty, the authorities of "Free China" 
"never publicly utter(ed) any condemnation" of these 
events.37 In addition, conservative Chinese nationalists —  
"bankers, naval officers, ex-military men, business men, 
retired officials of the old Peking regime and rich second 
generation who do not have to work because of large land 
holdings, factories, etc... who helped to dissipate" the
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Anti-British Movement of 1926-8 —  started saying that
Britain's "inability to deter aggression" made it "no longer 
fit" to act as China's "elder brother" in-"world affairs,"38 
implying that Japan would take over the mantle by default. 
Such feelings of betrayal, the British ambassador to China 
warned, might result in "a strong wave of feeling against 
us" that could "transform" "the present synthetic anti- 
British movement... into something real and dangerous."39
These fears turned out to be overblown. By the North 
China Army's own admission, "the anti-British movement was 
not yet spontaneous amongst the Chinese" and it was because 
of this that "Japanese assistance" was "needed."40 
Therefore, the intensity of Japanese military involvement, 
be it through puppet officials, Japanese-appointed police 
officers, opium dealers, smugglers or other flunkies 
belonging to various collaborationist organizations such as 
the Hsin Min Hui, in organizing rallies, despatching 
Japanese in Chinese dress to pose as native protesters, 
printing materials critical of the British and pressuring 
Chinese workers to leave British employment or participate 
in anti-British events, was an indication that such 
activities would probably not have taken place under their 
own volition.41 Unlike the mass-meetings in Japan during the 
summer of 1939, which sometimes topped 100,000, anti-British 
protests in China were small-scale, closely controlled
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affairs, usually amounting to no more than a few hundred 
people, perhaps reflecting —  apart from a lack of genuine 
Chinese enthusiasm —  Japanese concerns- that, even under 
their tutelage, large-scale anti-British xenophobia could 
turn hostile towards them as well.
In an assessment of the anti-British movement written 
in November 1939, a British intelligence officer in North 
China wrote that considering "how quickly... Chinese anti- 
British feeling" had been raised in the past (particularly 
between 1925 and 1927),**“ "taken as a whole, the results are 
negligible."42 The blockade of the Concessions carried on, 
as did other anti-British activities elsewhere in the 
region. But the intensity of the hostility towards western 
people never again reached the pitch of the first three 
weeks of the blockade, with only two anti-British activities 
being reported in the Tientsin area between the end of July 
and October of 1939.43 In addition, the actions sponsored by 
the Japanese fell far short of encouraging Chinese to take 
over the Concessions entirely. Efforts to get Chinese to 
refuse work within the concessions, end their employment in 
British firms, or boycott British goods amounted to an 
invitation to engage in acts of limited non-co-operation, 
but not to revolt.
As the focus of the anti-British movement switched from 
rallies in Tientsin to vilification campaigns in Japanese-
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controlled newspapers in other parts of occupied China, the 
dissipation of anti-British sentiment continued. With "the 
Chinese... loathing the Japanese even more than they loathe 
us (the British),"44 there was always a danger that stoking 
up Chinese hostility towards Britain might simply boomerang 
on Japan. Some Japanese also had misgivings about the 
movement developing into an anti-Western campaign, with the 
added international hostility that that was likely to 
provoke.45 Furthermore, it was difficult to back measures 
such as the reversion of the Concessions to China when Japan 
was itself the holder of a concession at Tientsin with 
which, as an area that had developed into an integral part 
of a lucrative underground narcotics economy, it was not 
prepared to part.46 With Japan's major objective remaining 
the division of China, it became increasingly apparent that 
the North China Army-sponsored anti-British movement was 
designed less to stimulate Chinese revolt against Britain 
than enlist greater co-operation from a chastened and 
weakened Britain in furthering Japan's primary goal of 
extending China's subjugation.
The New Order In East Asia
As the Tientsin Incident widened, Japan's priorities 
underwent a gradual, but perceptible transformation. The 
introduction of the North China Army's currency demands
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ensured that what was originally a local problem concerning 
how Britain and Japan would cooperate in clamping down on 
Chinese nationalists at Tientsin was converted to the wider 
purpose of enlisting British "co-operation in rebuilding 
North China."47 But, spurred by the blockade of the 
Concessions and the anti-British movement that accompanied 
it, this objective was subsumed within a yet broader 
strategy of using the Incident to promote, in the words of 
the 1 July 1939 edition of the Asahi newspaper, a "change in 
Britain's attitude towards Asia."48 Transforming "British 
attitudes towards Asia" was part of an agenda that 
originated neither in Tientsin nor in North China. It was 
instead the product of a growing Japanese discontent with 
multilateral treaties that were meant to govern 
international relations in Asia. Concluded primarily under 
British and American auspices in the aftermath of World War 
One, these agreements, Japan believed, represented an 
increasingly untenable set of arrangements that represented 
European greed rather than Asian realities.
In particular, Tokyo was faced with the problem of how 
to deal with an international community that was legally 
committed under the 1922 Nine Power Treaty to prevent China 
from becoming in whole or in part the exclusive preserve of 
any one country.49 Preventing China from being taken over 
even more than it had been already did not mean support for
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the removal of existing impediments upon Chinese sovereignty 
—  in particular, the foreign "rights and interests" that 
extra-territoriality had spawned, of which the Concessions 
at Tientsin were a part. But through the outlawing of 
aggressive wars under the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact,50 the 
signing of collective security agreements to deter 
aggressors (1919 League of Nations Covenant),51 opposition 
to any unilateral challenge to China's existing territorial 
status and support for the principle of equal access for 
international trade and investment to all areas of the 
country (the Nine Power Treaty's "Open Door" clause),52 it 
was hoped that the existing balance of power between 
competing foreign interests in China could be preserved.
Japan was a signatory to all these treaties. But with 
its invasion of Manchuria (1931) and North and Central China 
(1937-8), Tokyo became increasingly vociferous in expressing 
its belief that these agreements were little more than 
cynically conceived mechanisms for the preservation by non­
military means of an imperial position the West could no 
longer defend by military force.53 A country which professed 
to have relatively few colonies of its own, Japan was being 
excluded from the markets of others and faced demographic, 
economic and military expansionist pressures from within. It 
therefore became politically difficult to carry on upholding 
treaties seeking to ensure that the one area into which
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Japan could expand —  i.e. China —  would remain "off- 
limits" to any more unilateral Japanese incursions.54 But, 
as long as these agreements remained on the statute books, 
the Japanese government faced the problem of how to obtain 
international recognition for the country's "belligerency 
rights" —  i.e. that it was involved in hostilities abroad 
in which Third Countries should remain uninvolved —  without 
igniting the possibility of international sanctions that a 
formal declaration of war with China was likely to engender.
Seeking to avoid confrontation with the West, Tokyo did 
not openly renounce the terms of these treaties. But in a 
more gradual process, Japan sought to change the situation 
on the ground in China sufficiently for their terms to cease 
having any real meaning. In particular, it was hoped that 
commitments to China's territorial integrity would be 
reduced to a fiction through piecemeal military advances 
that individually would be too insignificant for the West to 
consider applying the collective security provisions of 
interwar treaties in China's defence. Meanwhile, by 
declaring the conflict in China an "incident" rather than a 
"war," Japan hoped that the international community would 
absolve itself from the responsibility of addressing the 
issue of war guilt, or whether it had an obligation under 
various covenants signed since 1918 to uphold the 
independence of China as a victim of external aggression.
The international community performed very much in line 
with Japanese expectations. While issuing pro-forma (and 
somewhat oblique) criticism of Japanese military aggression, 
Britain and its associates seemed primarily concerned with 
ensuring that the collective security terms of interwar 
treaties not be invoked when Chinese independence, rather 
than the security of western interests in China, was 
primarily at stake. Blatant Japanese attempts to undermine 
China's sovereignty —  including the creation of a bogus 
"demilitarized zone" in North China south of the Great Wall 
(1933), the Amau statement (1934), the imposition of 
Japanese control over East Hopei (1935), the huge increase 
in Japanese-sponsored smuggling (1935-6) and the invasion of 
central and south China (1937-8) —  were not declared to be 
violations of the Nine Power Treaty provision upholding the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of China, or 
provocations sufficient to implement the sanctions clause of 
the 1919 League of Nations Charter.55
With the expansion of hostilities in 1937, however, the 
scale of the fighting changed dramatically. What had been 
viewed in Japan and sometimes passed off in the West as a 
police action of limited duration had escalated into an 
open-ended military conflagration that had spread to those 
areas of China —  the centre and the south —  in which the 
hub of western financial, trading and other economic
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interests was located. Initially, the international 
community was reluctant to go beyond the position that the 
"military operations carried on by Japan against China" were 
"out of proportion to the incident that occasioned the 
conflict" and "inconsistent with the principles which should 
govern the relationship between nations."56 These were limp 
statements that did not admit that Japan and China were 
engaged in full-scale war, or that Chinese territorial 
integrity was under threat, or even that Japanese aggression 
was the main cause of expanded hostilities. But, as the 
possibility that the West would consider retaliatory actions 
upon Japan emerged, pressure mounted on Tokyo to preempt 
such an eventuality by devising strategies that would force 
the international community to accord even greater 
legitimacy to Japan's position in China than it had already.
Tokyo made its move in November 1938, when Britain, the 
United States and France protested the closure to western 
commercial traffic of the Yangtze River, the crucial central 
Chinese artery that had been taken over by Japanese troops 
in the wake of expanding Sino-Japanese hostilities. 
Concerned that their position in China would be severely 
affected, these countries argued that Japan's action 
violated the Nine Power Treaty's Open Door provision. But 
Tokyo, which viewed these protests largely as the last gasp 
of imperial powers seeking to preserve a pre-eminence in
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China that they no longer had the military or political 
means to sustain, responded by declaring that the provisions 
and principles of the Nine Power Treaty were "vague" (aimai) 
and "inapplicable" (risshienai) to the "new developments in 
the Far Eastern situation that had been brought about by the 
Sino-Japanese War" (Ni-Chu senso no kyokuto josei no 
shintenkai). This formulation was subsequently rephrased as 
the "New Order in East Asia" (Toa Shinchitsujo).57
London remained unprepared formally to renounce 
adherence to the Nine Power Treaty or other conventions that 
were the subject of Japanese criticism. But in a move that 
was interpreted in Japan to be an attempt to come to grips 
with the new "realities" in China referred to in Tokyo's 
November 1938 communique, the British government had 
informed its Japanese counterpart on 15 January 1939 that it 
did "not contend that treaties are eternal" and that it 
would "consider any constructive suggestions concerning the 
modification of any multilateral agreements relating to 
China" that Tokyo might wish to make.58 With extensive 
interests in China and a severely reduced military capacity 
to defend them, Britain's existence as an imperial power in 
Asia was becoming dependent on Japanese goodwill and 
military protection. London's January statement had 
suggested to Japan the possibility that an Anglo-Japanese 
agreement on China could be signed that, by specifically
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mentioning Japan's belligerency rights in that country, 
would induce Britain to weaken even further its already-
tarnished treaty obligations to uphold the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of nations subject to external
aggression.
Just six months after London's accommodating statement, 
the blockade of the British and French Concessions at 
Tientsin was imposed at the very time when the Japanese
government was looking to obtain greater international 
legitimacy for its occupation of China. In the words of a 19 
June Nichi Nichi Shimbun editorial, the root of the problem 
was "London's refusal to acknowledge new realities in East 
Asia and the continuation of its biased attitude in favour 
of Chiang (Kai-shek)" (Rondon seifu wa Toa no genjitsu o 
ninshiki sezu sara ni en-Sho taido o shizoku shi) .59 As a 
result, there was a marked tendency for officials in Tokyo 
to put specific demands by Japanese field armies for 
improved British and French military and economic co­
operation in places such as Tientsin within a broader 
framework of a perceived need to "change... British 
attitudes toward the China incident" (Eikoku no tai jihen
taido o zesei), "elicit British approval for the steps Japan 
is taking to solve the (China) Incident" (Eikoku no... waga 
jihen shori ni docho seshimuru)60 and make the British
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"recognize the new situation in East Asia" and cooperate in 
the construction of a New Order.61
The parameters of this widened agenda remained ill- 
defined and subject to debate. In a host of attempted
clarifications, definitions of the "new realities" in East 
Asia ranged from more extensive collaboration with Japan's 
puppet regimes as given by Ambassador Shigemitsu62 and an 
end of all aid to the Chinese National Government as
insisted upon by the War Ministry and EaKf Asia Development
Board^63 to the ending of extra-territoriality and a
reversion of the concessions to China (Foreign Ministry East 
Asia Division).64 To the British expatriate community, these 
statements were simply euphemisms for what they believed to 
be a co-ordinated Japanese attack on western interests 
designed to increase Japan's influence over both the 
concessions at Tientsin and international settlements in 
other Treaty Ports such as Amoy (Kulangsu) and Shanghai, in 
the expectation that the business activities of all foreign 
enterprise in China would, through these means, be subjected 
to complete Japanese control.65
Using the Tientsin Incident to press for a wider 
agreement on China was not theoretically incompatible with 
support for the North China Army's military and economic 
demands concerning Tientsin. But it was apparent from the 
moment the blockade was imposed that the refusal of the
129
British and French authorities to hand over criminal 
suspects or cooperate with Japanese currency policies could 
be used to justify imposing a broader agreement in which the 
major issue under discussion would be "a general revision of 
British policies towards the Far East" (Eikoku no kyokuto 
seisaku ippan zessei no mondai).66 In this situation, 
solving local issues at Tientsin would be of less importance 
to Japan than the extent to which, as unresolved problems, 
they could continue to be exploited for the implementation 
of this larger political end.
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Chapter Five: From Tientsin To Tokyo
When the Japanese Army blockaded the British and French
Concessions at Tientsin on 15 June 1939, there was a common 
assumption within Japanese military and government circles 
that negotiations for its lifting would be held locally at 
Tientsin. Two weeks later, however, it was agreed that the 
talks would take place in Tokyo instead. The proposal for a 
Tokyo conference on Tientsin originally came from Britain. 
With civilian rather than military officials directing
negotiations far from the scene of conflict, it was hoped 
that a greater sense of Japanese "moderation" would be
engendered.
This did not occur. In examining the reasons for this, 
this chapter emphasizes the difficulties facing an unpopular 
and divided Japanese administration in pressing its field 
armies that were popular and constitutionally well-protected 
to reverse an action that they had insisted was taken to 
enhance the safety and security of Japanese troops. The 
chapter also argues that Japanese politics had become so 
coloured by a pervasive mistrust and hostility towards 
Britain that increasing the public profile of the Incident 
by moving the discussions to Tokyo had the effect of putting 
at risk the career and physical safety of any politician 
suspected of being willing to settle for anything less than 
British capitulation. This, it is suggested, might have made
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the prospect of a compromise solution more remote than could 
have been the case had discussions been left in the hands of 
"extremist" military officers at Tientsin..
The North China Army Asserts Its Operational Prerogative
"In order to fulfil our fundamental security 
requirements," a Japanese military official at Tientsin 
argued, "we have no alternative but to impose a rigorous 
blockade and inspection of both Concessions" (shizen no boei 
sochi toshite, ryo sokai ni taishi genju naru kenmon oyobi 
kensaku o jisshi suru no hoka naki mono to mitome).1 Under 
the Meiji Constitution of 1889, national security issues 
were the preserve of the Emperor as Commander-in-Chief, 
concerning which the armed forces had the right of direct 
petition to the Throne.2 Although non-military organs of 
state were not expressly prohibited from proffering advice 
upon these matters, army leaders were arguing by 1939 that 
questions relating to security, national defence and the 
deployment of troops abroad were "operational" issues beyond 
the purview of non-military officials, including the Prime 
Minister, Cabinet, Privy Councillors and Elder Statesmen, 
over which they could therefore neither negotiate nor 
compromise.
With reference to Tientsin, noone within Japan 
questioned the North China Army's contention that the
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blockade around the British and French Concessions was an 
operational measure necessary for reasons of military 
security. But whether the North China Army's conditions for 
the lifting of the blockade were also essential for the 
safety of its troops was less clear. Lieutenant-General 
Homma Masaharu, Commander of the North China Army's 27th 
Division, argued that Japan's non-negotiable demands should 
be limited to issues directly related to troop security such 
as the handover of Chinese guerrilla suspects and the 
undermining of guerrilla capacity to inflict harm upon 
occupation soldiers. But of the opinion that "if 
predominance is given to solution of economic problems at 
Tientsin and these problems are indeed solved, Japanese 
military security will gradually improve of its own 
accord,"3 the North China Army General Staff believed that 
British co-operation with its currency and banking demands 
should also be considered as "necessary measures for the 
self-preservation of local Japanese military forces" (gun no 
seizonjo hissu no jiko).4
This far-reaching assertion of operational autonomy 
occurred at a time the Japanese government was particularly 
nervous about the prospect of its field armies being given 
freer rein. Diplomatically isolated since its withdrawal 
from the League of Nations in 1933, Japan on 6 June 1939 had 
to abandon its efforts to conclude a military alliance with
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Germany. The despatch of over 42 divisions and a million men 
to China had failed to curb China's guerrilla insurgency, or 
quell Russian troops on the Manchurian-Mongolian border, the
(jerAfj
latest incident (occurring the previous month) the 
consequence of unauthorized actions by Japanese officers in 
the field that resulted in unexpected military setbacks.
These problems were compounded by Japan's increasing 
dependency on Western and particularly.American markets for 
scrap iron and strategic metals that was a consequence of 
its invasion of China. Unwilling to provoke a showdown with 
the West, Yamamoto Isoroku, Vice Minister of the Navy,
declared that "the Tientsin problem is an unwelcome 
distraction that will cause a lot of trouble if it is 
allowed to develop into something big" (Tenshin mondai wa... 
iya na mondai de, anna koto ga ogesa ni natcha komaru).5
The blockade of the Tientsin Concessions was first
discussed at Cabinet level in a Five Minister Conference on 
16 June 1939 (Prime, War, Navy, Foreign and Home Ministers). 
It was agreed that the administration "would support the 
action of its forces in the field to blockade the 
Concessions at Tientsin" (konkai no Tientsin sokai fusa wa 
desakigun nite nashitaru koto nareba kore o shiji shi) . It 
was also recognized that the North China Army, which "would 
not be satisfied simply with the handover of the Cheng
suspects but wanted British recognition of its economic and
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currency demands" (hannin hikiwatashi nomi motte manzoku 
suru koto naku kinnyu keizai kosaku wa kore o mitomuru koto 
shidai nari), was advancing "reasonable- demands" (gun no 
dashitaru yokyu wa dato naru mono toshite kore o shonin 
su).6 This admission, however, fell short of recognizing the 
North China Army claim that its economic demands were non- 
negotiable items crucial to the self-preservation of local 
Japanese forces.
Efforts to elicit more government support for the North 
China Army position fell upon deaf ears. In meetings on 15 
and 16 June 1939 in the Imperial presence, the War Minister 
and the Chief of the Army General Staff apparently gave the 
Monarch reason to believe that "once the suspects were
handed over," all that Britain needed to do was "to show 
sincerity" in its dealings with Japan (hannin hikiwatashi no 
ato wa, sono seii o mitomete kaiketsu suru).7 In "heatec(
discussions" (tsuyoi giron) between the Prime Minister, the
War Minister and the Foreign Minister on 16 and 17 June, it 
was agreed that the British must comply with measures to 
"preserve public order" (chian iji) and fulfil "the
necessary conditions for the survival of the Japanese armed 
forces" (guntai seizon no tame hitsuyo joken).8 But the Army 
Chief of Staff then admitted that "while not unrelated" 
(kanren wa gozaimasu), "economic problems" (keizai mondai) 
were "not included in" (fukumarete orimasen) either category
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and that the Tientsin Incident "could be treated as a 
political problem with economic issues placed to one side" 
(keizai mondai wa kirihanarete, seiji no mondai toshite 
toriatsukau).9
A similar sense of caution imbued the 17 June War 
Ministry-General Staff policy statement on the Tientsin 
Concession problem ("Tenshin Sokai Mondai Ni Kan Suru Ken"). 
Urging that everything concerning Tientsin be negotiated 
locally, this document suggested that Japan's central 
authorities simply "urge Britain to revise its attitude 
towards the China Incident" (Eikoku no tai jihen taido o 
zes&ei shi) . The statement admitted that "a positive 
attitude" (yuiteki taido) towards the Japanese-sponsored 
Federal Reserve Bank currency was a "minimum step the 
British Concession must take to promote the self- 
preservation of Japan's military forces" (gun seizonjo hissu 
saishogen no Eikoku sokunai keizai sochi). But in a 
repudiation of the North China Army position, it was 
suggested that tfeeet the "actual (economic) details of such 
an agreement" (sono gutaiteki jiko ni oite wa) could be 
"negotiated on the spot after the blockade is lifted" (keibi 
oyobi kanshi kaijogo sesshu su) (italicization inserted).10
Although in many respects non-committal, the formula 
that was beginning to emerge was less uncompromising than 
Japan's negotiating position was subsequently to become.
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According to the plan, if Britain was prepared to hand over 
the suspects, both countries could enter into detailed 
discussions to resolve the situation at Tientsin 
immediately. Although part of the final settlement might 
have entailed some sort of British recognition that "changed 
circumstances" in Asia had given Japanese armies of 
occupation the right to preserve order and take measures 
necessary for the safety of their troops, there was no move 
to make such an understanding a separate agreement that 
Britain would have to sign before the talks on Tientsin were 
to commence. In addition, Tokyo hinted that, with reference 
to economic issues, a commitment merely to negotiate 
constructively, but not necessarily an acceptance of all the 
North China Army's demands, might have been sufficiently 
acceptable for the lifting of the blockade, which could
possibly take place before such negotiations had commenced.
Britain was subsequently to argue that attempting to 
solve the crisis through negotiations on the spot would have
meant that the Japanese delegation would have been unduly
influenced by "extremist" military officers rather than
"moderate" civilian officials. As a result of what happened 
in the months leading up to the blockade, some of Japan's 
military representatives would no doubt have been in a 
suspicious and hostile mood. But, as members of the North 
China Army, such adversaries would at least have been able
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to ensure that, once an agreement had been reached, the 
blockade would have been lifted. In addition, in sharp 
contrast to many in the Japanese press, public and even 
certain government officials in Tokyo, Japan's commander at 
Tientsin, Lieutenant-General Homma, was desirous of 
resolving rather than exploiting the Tientsin Incident as a 
"test-case" of British willingness to comply with the "New 
Order in East Asia." Had Japan's delegation been led by him, 
as would probably have been the case had discussions been 
convened in Tientsin, the British would have been faced by 
opponents who, while mistrustful of their intentions, might 
have been less afraid to compromise, less vulnerable to 
popular pressure and in a better position to bring about an 
end of the crisis than any team negotiating on Japan's 
behalf in Tokyo.
Ambassador Craigie-*s Proposes Negotiations in Tokyo
Frustrated at Britain's inability to prevent the 
imposition of the blockade and in particular annoyed at the 
role of the Ambassador to China, British Ambassador to 
Japan, Sir Robert Craigie, floated a proposal for 
negotiations at a meeting with Foreign Minister Arita 
Hachiro on 18 June 1939. In this meeting, Craigie told Arita 
(according to the Foreign Minister) that "if efforts were 
made to solve the Tientsin problem on the spot, (British
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Ambassador to China) Clark Kerr's position of just seeing 
things from an Anglo-Chinese viewpoint would prevail"
(Tenshin mondai o genchi nite kaiketsu sen to sureba Cl^rkj^ 
Kerr wa Ei-Shi no tachiba nomi o kangaeru), making the talks 
"Sino-British in character and in neither of our interests." 
Arguing that "if moved to Tokyo, the whole affair could be 
treated as a bilateral Anglo-Japanese problem," which "would 
be much preferable," the British Ambassador proposed a 
conference between himself and the Japanese Foreign
Minister, with British and Japanese representatives from 
Tientsin participating as their subordinates.11
Ambassador Craigie mentioned none of the above remarks 
in his despatches to London. But in an effort to get the
British government to support his proposal, he stressed his
fear that talks in Tientsin might be taken over by 
"extremist" North China Army officers. He also emphasized 
the opportunity this Incident posed to advance a strategy of 
improving Anglo-Japanese relations through a resolution of 
local "points of difficulty."12 Although Whitehall was 
divided over Craigie's strategy for improving relations 
with Japan, it was aware that Britain lacked the military 
capability to respond forcibly to the blockade, or 
international support for instituting economic retaliatory 
measures. Therefore, while realizing that they were opening 
themselves "to considerable humiliation and criticism,"
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Whitehall instructed Craigie to seek a "settlement by 
negotiation... along the lines you have suggested."13
The Ambassador's proposal was endorsed by London on 19 
June 1939 and submitted formally to Tokyo the following day. 
It contained three parts. The first was that negotiations 
should take place in Tokyo between himself and the Japanese 
Minister, with military and consular representatives from 
Tientsin participating as their subordinates. The second was 
that the negotiating agenda not be limited to the Cheng 
suspects, but that "all outstanding questions relating to 
Tientsin" be discussed. The third was a suggestion that, in 
return for Japan's acquiescence in the maintenance of 
British control over its concession, British authorities
would follow a neutrality policy "compatible with the 
avoidance of acts prejudicial to the task of the occupying 
Power in maintaining law, order and economic life of the 
surrounding area."14
Craigie's proposal contained some ambiguity. It was 
unclear, for instance, whether Britain could avoid "acts 
prejudicial to the task of the occupying Power in
maintaining law, order and economic life of the surrounding
area" without violating another fundamental tenet of 
neutrality mentioned by Craigie: refusing to engage in "acts 
calculated to give aid and comfort to (an) occupying Power 
as against its opponents." Although Tokyo believed that
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London's support of the Chinese National Currency (fapi) was 
an "act prejudicial to" Japan's "task" as an "occupying 
power" in "maintaining" the "economic life of the 
surrounding area," a decision to cease support for the fapi 
and collaborate with the puppet Federal Reserve Bank 
currency was likely to be regarded by China and most of the 
international community as an "act calculated to give aid 
and comfort to (an) occupying Power as against its 
opponent."
Japan Responds to Craigie's Proposal
Despite such ambiguities, the proposal held 
considerable promise for the Japanese. Craigie's offer to 
widen the scope of negotiations seemed to denote a new 
British willingness to revise its economic and currency 
policies in North China as part of a settlement over 
Tientsin. In addition, Craigie did not ask Tokyo to pressure 
local military authorities to lift the blockade, or even 
bring about an improvement in the treatment of British 
nationals at Tientsin, as a precondition for the talks' 
commencement.15 This seemed to denote an acceptance of 
Japan's contention that decisions concerning the 
implementation of the blockade of the concessions were 
operational matters that devolved entirely upon the North 
China Army, which could not therefore be dictated by Tokyo.
Craigie's proposal also had beneficial ramifications 
for Japan that went beyond Tientsin. In particular, the 
promise to "avoid acts prejudicial to • the task of the 
occupying power" contained policy implications applicable to 
all occupied areas. Since 1937, Tokyo and London had been 
careful to call the conflict in China an "incident" rather 
than a "war," so as to avoid a situation where League of 
Nations member-states and the Nine Power Treaty signatories 
would have to accept that China was a nation under attack 
whose sovereignty they were committed by treaty to uphold. 
According to the Craigie formula, Japan was not an aggressor 
in China, but simply "an occupying power" with a task to 
maintain "law, order and economic life" of the area under 
its control. If the formula were accepted, Britain would 
still preserve the fiction that Sino-Japanese hostilities 
did not amount to war, while going further than ever before 
in recognizing that the two countries really were at war, 
that Japan's occupation of China was a stabilizing event and 
that Britain would follow a stricter policy of neutrality. 
As the Chinese Ambassador to Britain was later to point out, 
Japan would be able to "enjoy the rights of belligerency 
without having to make a formal declaration of war."16
Predictably enough, Foreign Minister Arita responded to 
Craigie's overture in a very positive fashion. Interpreting 
the offer as an indication of British interest in solving
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the situation at Tientsin by re-adjusting British policies 
in China to be more in line with Japanese desires, he made 
encouraging remarks to Craigie during their talks on 18 June 
and indicated to a colleague the next day that "negotiations 
on the Tientsin Incident should be held in Tokyo."17 On 21 
June, the Foreign Minister convened a meeting of "concerned 
officials" (kankeisha atsumari) in which he said that, while 
in principle supportive of on-the-spot talks, he felt that 
having negotiations in Tokyo would be a good way of finding 
out how far the British "were prepared to recognize and 
cooperate with the new conditions prevailing in East Asia" 
(genchi kaiketsu o yuri to kangaeru mo, Ei ga Toyo no shin 
jitai o shonin shi, makotoni kyoryoku suru taido naraba 
koryo subeshi).18 Apparently eager to eliminate the 
influence of Ambassador Cl&rk Kerr and promote a bilateral 
Anglo-Japanese solution, Arita's colleagues agreed to pursue 
a settlement based upon respect for Japanese interests, 
"improvements" within the British Municipal Council and no 
lifting of the blockade until negotiations had ended.19
As could be seen from Arita's remarks about using a 
conference in Tokyo to ascertain Britain's co-operation with 
"new conditions" in Asia, the link between the Tientsin 
problem and the wider issue of changing British policy 
towards Asia was generally considered crucial by Japanese 
policymakers. In an uncompromising affirmation of this, a 26
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June memorandum from the Foreign Ministry East Asia Bureau 
argued that Japan should use the Tientsin crisis to do 
nothing less than "reconstitute the basis of Japan's 
relations with foreign states according to moral principles" 
(kokusai kankei no kiso o dogikashi). Specifically, this 
meant opposing the system of extra-territoriality and the 
"Unequal Treaties" and insisting that the British and French 
return their concessions at Tientsin to the Chinese. Having 
urged (on 6 June) that the Tientsin Incident be used to 
force Britain to "end" its "pro-Chiang (Kai-shek)" policies, 
the East Asia Bureau believed that Japan's "mission" in 
China —  i.e. Chinese "liberation" from communism, western 
imperialism and its "Chinese surrogate," the Kuomintang —  
could best be pursued by pressuring Britain, "the ringleader 
of imperialist powers in Asia," whenever the opportunity 
arose.20
These sentiments were the more extreme manifestations 
of a general desire to challenge the policies and interests 
of western powers in China. For not just those within the 
Foreign Ministry East Asia Bureau, but also the North China 
Army, members of the military authorities in Tokyo, the 
Japanese public and other government officials, the Tientsin 
Incident had to be solved within the vortex of discussions 
upon British foreign policy towards China. Within this broad 
consensus, however, there were elements —  particularly
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within the War Ministry, General Staff and ultranationalist 
pressure groups —  who were predisposed to regard anything 
short of a British recognition of the "New Order in East 
Asia" and a capitulation to North China Army demands over 
Tientsin as a betrayal of the national interest. Stoking 
these suspicions, leaders and editorials in the national 
press warned that British diplomatic demarches were a trap 
designed to involve the United States on Britain's side, not 
to reach an agreement upon changing Britain's role in 
Asia.21
To ward off such extremist views, Foreign Minister 
Arita decided that he wanted to "limit as far as possible 
the problems to be discussed" (Tenshin mondai wa akumade 
kyokuchi teki no mondai toshi) 22 As could be seen from his 
statement about using discussions on Tientsin as a way of 
finding out British attitudes towards the New Order in East 
Asia, this did not mean that he intended to solve the 
problems at Tientsin without reference to such larger 
questions. But as far as the Foreign Minister was concerned, 
a willingness-in-principle to use any opportunity to force 
Britain, France and the rest of the international community 
to end diplomatic recognition of the Chungking government, 
initiate relations with Japanese puppet regimes and do 
whatever else was necessary to recognize the "new 
conditions" in East Asia was tempered by a scepticism about
the feasibility of using this particular incident to promote 
such action. In Arita's words, "now was not the time to use 
this incident as an opportunity to press for a solution to 
the problems raised by British interests in central and 
southern China."23
Because Britain's stake at Tientsin was a fairly 
unimportant component of a complex of interests throughout 
China with its nucleus situated in the South, this stance 
made sense to a number of people. For instance, Asakai 
Koichiro, a junior member of the Foreign Ministry East Asia 
Division, argued that it was "virtually impossible for Japan 
to get Britain to change its policy towards China as a 
whole" because the "British position in China" could not be 
fundamentally undermined "just by applying pressure at 
Tientsin."24 But, as with Arita, the basis of Asakai's 
opposition to using the discussions on Tientsin to pursue 
more ambitious goals was pragmatic rather than ideological. 
With nothing to suggest that these men were temperamentally 
less interested than anyone else in bringing about a "new 
order" in Asia, it was becoming clear that, at least with 
regard to Tientsin, "the difference between the extremists 
and the moderates," in the words of Commercial Counsellor 
and Japanologist Sir George Sansom, was "not one of 
destination but of the road by which that destination is to 
be reached and the speed at which it is to be travelled."25
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On this basis, a desire for a compromise solution to 
the crisis was prevalent amongst other groups as well. With 
the North China Army's decision to comply with the order 
sent by the Tokyo General Staff at the end of May not to 
invade the Concessions, military officials in China as well 
as Tokyo realized that Japan could not retaliate immediately 
in the event of any British or French reluctance to comply 
with Army demands.26 In addition, the Navy, which had 
traditionally been cautious about the prospect of 
deteriorating relations with Anglo-American Powers, had 
become increasingly determined since the collapse of 
negotiations with Germany for a military alliance to ensure 
that the Tientsin Incident not provoke a military showdown 
with Britain (Nichi-Ei buryokyu shototsu no jitai o sakui 
sezaru). Advocating that a general conflict with the Western 
Powers over this issue be "avoided at all costs" (zettai ni 
zenmen shototsu no jitai ni tachiitarazaru koto), the Navy 
Ministry recommended that the problem be "treated as a local 
matter" (kyokuryoku genchi ni kyokugen shi),27 a stance that 
was supported also by senior statesman (genro) Prince 
Saionji, members of the Imperial Household and Home Minister 
Kido Koichi, that is, the nucleus of the so-called Anglo- 
American faction (Ei-Bei ha).
Sensitive about the need to head off any possibility of 
economic sanctions, Japan's leading economic and financial
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institutions were also desirous of a compromise solution at 
Tientsin. Since foreign trade with areas outside Japanese 
military control remained crucial to the country's economic 
growth, there was a general recognition that Japan was still 
vulnerable to Anglo-American sanctions. For leading
conglomerates such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi, which had a 
greater proportion of their business dealings with the 
western world —  or areas dominated by it —  than with
Japanese-controlled areas in Asia, the spectre of growing 
Anglo-American counter-measures against Japan loomed
particularly large. Since these could include a dissolution 
of Anglo-Japanese and United States-Japan trade treaties 
granting Japanese goods most-favoured nation trading status, 
and even an embargo on strategic raw materials such as oil, 
it was not surprising that, in the words of a Mitsui 
memorandum to the Foreign Ministry, they wanted "the
(Tientsin) problem to be limited as much as possible and 
conciliatory solutions to be sought."28
The Position of the Army
Being most likely to gain from the imposition of a new 
order in East Asia, the Army had a vested interest in 
utilizing the situation at Tientsin to pressure Britain into 
coming to a larger political agreement. But the outbreak of 
the Tientsin crisis had occurred unexpectedly, during a time
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that the Army was not in a good position to exploit it.
Because the Japanese government had failed at the beginning 
of the month to conclude a military alliance with Germany, 
Japanese field armies could not count upon support from the 
Axis powers should matters at Tientsin escalate into a 
military conflict with the Allied Powers. In addition, 
central military authorities had to contend with a worsening 
military situation in other parts of Asia. The despatch of 
over a million troops to China seemed to have had more
impact in arousing Chinese opposition than stabilizing the 
Japanese-occupied areas.29 Matters were made worse by a 
deterioration of conditions along the north Manchurian- 
Mongolian border, with the outbreak since 1938 of military 
incidents of varying severity between Japanese, Soviet and 
Mongolian troops in which Japanese armies suffered 
considerable losses.30
The worst of these incidents occurred on the North 
Manchurian-Mongolian border in the early summer of 1939. In 
late-May, a Japanese cavalry regiment was annihilated by 
Mongolian forces at a remote outpost called Nomonhan, 
precipitating a build-up of Japanese and Soviet forces on 
both sides of the border. Not wanting the dispute to 
escalate into war, the General Staff in Tokyo ordered 
Japanese forces in the field not to initiate attacks and.to
come to an agreement with their adversaries.31 But with
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local Mongolian forces being steadily reinforced by Soviet 
troops, chauvinistic field army officers within the Kwantung 
Army became intent on striking the enemy while they felt 
they had the military advantage. Tensions on the border 
increased dramatically between 21 and 23 June 1939, 
resulting in an unauthorized air attack far inside Mongolian 
territorial lines on the 27th, and an ensuing Russian 
counter-offensive between July 1st and 11th that forced 
Japanese troops to retreat from the border area on the Halha 
River (separating Manchuria and Mongolia) with heavy 
losses.32
The extent to which these developments coloured the 
Army central authorities' initial reaction to the Tientsin 
crisis cannot be precisely determined. But the worsening 
situation on the Manchurian-Mongolian border was no doubt 
one of the factors prompting the General Staff to advocate 
restraint in military activities elsewhere. Together with 
the War Ministry, the General Staff had already ordered the 
North China Army —  which was asked by the Kwantung Army to 
despatch a division to Manchuria to strengthen its forces -- 
not to invade the Concessions at Tientsin at the end of May. 
In their joint-policy directive of 17 June, the General 
Staff and War Ministry had backed a local compromise 
settlement at Tientsin, with the British being asked to do 
not much more than negotiate in good faith.33 As with its
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navy counterpart, therefore, the Army High Command seemed 
desirous of resolving this incident locally rather than risk 
military confrontation with the West by exploiting the 
situation for other purposes.
The situation, however, was extremely fluid. Any 
uncompromising stance by a field army against countries such 
as Britain or France was likely to be strongly supported by 
the press and ultranationalist groups anxious to mobilize 
popular anti-British sentiment for the purpose of either 
sabotaging the negotiations or bringing down the government. 
The Cabinet would have to resign at any time the Army High
Command decided that the War Minister, who had to be an
acting general, should resign and then refused to recommend 
a successor. Seemingly demoralized and uncertain of its 
future course, the Army High Command —  i.e. the War
Ministry and the General Staff —  was not in a good position 
to withstand the build-up of such pressure, should it occur.
In an attempt to forestall such a development, Foreign 
Minister Arita solicited Imperial intervention. On 22 June, 
before his plan for a negotiated solution to the Tientsin 
incident had been submitted for Cabinet or even Five 
Ministers Conference approval, Arita successfully requested 
Emperor Hirohito's support for the idea of limited 
negotiations, as well as his co-operation in "using any
method possible to appraise military authorities that we do
not intend to use this Incident as an opportunity to force a 
solution to the problems raised by British interests in 
Central and South China."34
This was an act of considerable political daring. By 
getting the Emperor to intervene at this early stage in the 
policy-making process, the Foreign Minister was utilizing 
the supreme power of the monarch to prevent the War Minister 
from ever disagreeing with a policy of which he was probably 
not yet even aware. As a result of this machination, Arita 
hoped to promote his compromise plan for Tientsin as well as 
drive a wedge between the Army and extra-governmental 
organizations in an effort to prevent them collectively from 
being able to turn popular anti-British feeling into 
meaningful political pressure. Amounting to manipulation of 
the Emperor, this was one of the few means by which an 
unpopular group of officials —  the Anglo-American faction - 
- could impose an unattractive policy -- accommodation with 
the British at Tientsin —  without matters getting entirely 
out of hand.
The North China Army Intervenes
At first the Foreign Minister's strategy seemed to be 
succeeding. On 23 June, the Cabinet agreed formally that 
talks on Tientsin would occur in Tokyo between the Foreign 
Minister and the British Ambassador, assisted by officials
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from Tientsin, as suggested by Ambassador Craigie and that, 
as Craigie proposed, "the basis of negotiations" would not 
be "fixed beforehand."35 The following .day, the Foreign 
Minister's position seemed to be strengthened when the Army 
Chief of Staff said that he was content to "leave 
negotiations on strengthening the Anti-Comintern Pact (with 
Germany) in the hands of Foreign Minister Arita."36 Arita 
had indicated that the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern 
Pact was "no longer an urgent priority" and that diplomatic 
efforts on this front "should be postponed until Japan has 
come to an agreement with the British over Tientsin."37 The 
General Staff chief's remark can therefore be interpreted as 
an oblique endorsement of Arita's approach of dealing with 
the Tientsin crisis before confronting these larger issues.
The North China Army, however, was vehemently opposed 
to’ such an approach. In a 25 June communique to the General 
Staff, the North China Army Command said that, while "not 
opposed in principle to talks in Tokyo," it believed that 
"an agreement concerning the specific conditions under which 
the blockade could be lifted should be negotiated on the 
spot."38 This statement was a repudiation of the War 
Ministry-General Staff position of 17 June that the blockade 
could be lifted after Britain had agreed to hand over the 
suspects and simply make a general declaration of intent to 
negotiate other measures in good faith sometime in the
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future. It was also an indication that, contrary to the 
views of the central military authorities, the North China 
Army was not prepared to regard its . demands for the 
abolition of Chinese National currency and the circulation 
of Federal Reserve Bank notes within the Concessions, as 
well as the transfer of deposits and reserves of Chinese 
banks within these areas to Japanese-controlled locations, 
as anything less than "economic measures necessary for the 
preservation of peace and the self-preservation of Japanese 
troops" (chian iji narabini gun seizonjo hitsuyo gendo no 
keizai sochi) —  i.e. security issues that could not be 
compromised.
The North China Army said that it might be willing to 
acquiesce in the idea of negotiations over Tientsin taking 
place in Tokyo. But it said that this would depend upon an 
undertaking by both parties to negotiate a general 
agreement-in-principle about British activities throughout 
China before detailed talks on Tientsin could commence. This 
prior agreement would oblige Britain to "recognize the new 
situation in Asia," refrain from interfering at Tientsin or 
elsewhere with any measures the Japanese military might take 
to "promote public order" and the "safety of occupying 
troops," follow a policy of "strict neutrality within the 
Concessions" -- i.e. that municipal councils should be in 
effect strongly pro-Japanese in policy and composition —
and undertake to replace existing "pro-Chiang (Kai-shek)" 
China policies with alternatives "more responsive" to 
Japan.39
Although some of the North China Army's recommendations 
were diffuse, the role it envisaged for the Tokyo conference 
differed markedly from the Foreign Minister's proposal. In 
contrast to Arita's strategy of using the discussions merely 
as a gauge of future British intentions in China, the North 
China Army —  by insisting upon a prior agreement-in- 
principle —  wanted to force the British to make concessions 
in China as a precondition rather than a consequence of the 
holding of such talks. A preliminary agreement would also 
commit Foreign Minister Arita to uphold a set of well- 
publicized criteria in subsequent bargaining over the 
lifting of the blockade which the press and ultranationalist 
groups could use as a justification for opposing virtually 
any proposed Japanese concession. In other words, this was a 
device that offered an opportunity for those inside and 
outside the government who wished for reasons of their own 
to oppose any sort of compromise formula.
At the heart of this proposal was a quid pro quo: the 
North China Army would go along with negotiations in Tokyo 
if the Japanese government agreed that the lifting of the 
blockade at Tientsin —  and the conditions for bringing it 
about —  were unequivocally operational matters. But this
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meant that the Emperor would be constitutionally obliged as 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces to act upon the 
advice proffered by his military rather than civilian aides. 
This would seriously undermine the value of his prior 
backing for Arita's compromise approach, thereby effectively 
ensuring that negotiators in Tokyo would not be allowed the 
leeway Foreign Minister Arita and Ambassador Craigie had 
wanted for a compromise solution to be worked out. In this 
way, by insisting that there were overriding security 
implications with the safety of Japanese troops at stake, a 
Japanese field army —  as had happened in the past —  could 
force a monarch with unlimited constitutional powers over 
his government and armed forces into becoming an unwilling 
accomplice of a policy formulated by a group of military
officials who were supposedly obliged to carry out the
Imperial Will.
The Changing Scope of the Negotiations
The North China Army submitted its proposal to Tokyo at
a time when the Foreign Minister was developing an
alternative plan that was markedly non-committal. Arita had 
told Craigie that, if Britain agreed "not to fix the basis 
of negotiations beforehand," he would try to limit the talks 
to problems arising directly out of Tientsin. In other 
words, he would try as best he could to delink negotiations
from larger issues such as Britain's extra-territorial 
privileges in China, the New Order in East Asia, or a change 
in policies towards the Kuomintang government. But whether 
he would be able to ensure that there would not be a prior 
agreement-in-principle, or that discussion would definitely 
be limited to Tientsin rather than include the issue of 
British China policy as a whole, remained unclear.
In an effort to keep the British interested in the idea 
of a Tokyo conference, Arita informed Craigie that the 
"commencement of negotiations" would probably result in a 
"moderation of" discriminatory "measures" against British 
nationals at Tientsin. But the Foreign Minister also told 
the British Ambassador that the blockade at Tientsin had 
been imposed in response to "military need."40 If the 
blockade had been imposed in response to "military need," 
its lifting could only take place when the North China Army 
had decided that such "needs" had been met. The North China 
Army had already made clear that the satisfaction of its 
"military needs" depended upon Britain's willingness to meet 
all its political and economic demands arising out of the 
Tientsin situation. But if there was no choice but for 
Britain to capitulate to all the North China Army demands, 
the likelihood either that an agreement could be forged, or 
that it could bring about what for the British was their
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primary objective —  i.e. the ending of the blockade —  was 
extremely slim.
What Foreign Minister Arita was really offering Britain 
was little more than a declaration of personal intent. In 
contrast to the War Ministry-General Staff document of 17 
June, Arita made no reference to a possible lifting of the 
blockade before negotiations over Tientsin got underway. He 
also tempered his declaration of intent by warning Craigie 
that his hand was limited by the "general belief in my 
country that the present China affair would have been 
brought to an end long before this but for the assistance 
given by your country to Chiang Kai-shek" and "the unanimous 
desire of my country that... your country will bring herself 
to abandon in due course its policy of assisting Chiang Kai- 
shek and to adjust it so as to be in line with our policy in 
China."41
The warning was rather vague. By making general 
references to "the desire of my country" that Britain "in 
due course" would end its pro-Chiang proclivities and better 
"adjust" its China policy to "bring it in line" with that of 
Japan, Arita seemed to be indicating that fundamental 
changes in British policy towards China might not be part of 
the price Britain would have to pay for a solution of this 
particular crisis. But the statement also suggested that the 
Foreign Minister did not regard talks on Tientsin simply as
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a conflict-avoidance mechanism with the West, but an 
indicator of subsequent British co-operation with Japan's 
wider aims in China, if not Asia as a whole.42 In addition, 
Arita was implying that, while not personally inclined to 
insist upon British compliance with these wider political 
aims as part of a settlement over Tientsin, the extent to 
which such an agenda would be inserted into the talks might 
not be determined by him or even his Cabinet colleagues, but 
a more general political process in which public "opinion" - 
- i.e. organized extra-governmental pressure groups with a 
popular following —  might have an important role to play.
This was not good news for Ambassador Craigie. In line 
with his belief that improvements in Anglo-Japanese 
relations could be generated simply by solving various 
bilateral "points of difficulty," the British envoy had 
hoped to use Arita's formula for negotiations to end the 
Tientsin blockade in a way that would allow the British to 
maintain full authority over its concessions, while leaving 
the rest of its China policy intact. But loath to admit that 
Japanese thinking was going in an opposite direction, the 
Ambassador interpreted Arita's statement simply as an 
indication that "a stricter conception of neutrality will be 
necessary if a settlement is to be reached."43 As a result, 
British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain assured 
Parliament on 27 June that, just by agreeing to further
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restrictions upon the rights of Chinese under British 
authority at Tientsin —  the real meaning of Craigie's 
"stricter conception of neutrality" Britain could
negotiate in Tokyo a "local" settlement that would end the 
blockade and the insulting treatment of Britishers in 
Tientsin, while leaving British China policy intact and its 
authority over the concessions unchanged.44
Events in Japan were soon to highlight the dubiousness 
of this assumption. On 27 June, there was a Cabinet meeting 
in Tokyo that decided to notify the public of the 
government's decision to hold talks with the British.45 
According to a Foreign Ministry press release issued that 
day, Japan had "accepted Britain's request for negotiations 
in Tokyo on Tientsin... in an attempt to solve all problems 
arising out of the crisis."46 A 28 June Foreign Ministry 
communique stated that the Tientsin Incident "no longer just 
concerned Britain's willingness to hand over the (four) 
suspected assassins" (Tenshin Eikoku sokai mondai no hattan 
to natta ansatsu hannin hikiwatashi mondai o koe...), but 
the need for Britain and Japan to come to agreement upon 
"all political and economic problems" arising out of the 
crisis (seiji oyobi keizaijo no kakushu mondai ni tsuki 
Eikoku seifu no setsujitsu naru koryo o motomeru koto to 
naru). In addition, the communique stated, "Japan hoped that 
the outcome of the Tientsin discussions would serve as a
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basis for a fruitful exchange of views with reference to 
various other problems of mutual concern as well" (Hon 
mondai no taigi o keiki toshite, kore -ga kongen o nasu 
shomondai ni tsuite mo yuko naru kien no kokan no 
okonowareru koto ga kitai serarete oru).47
Using the Tientsin discussions as a "basis" for an 
"exchange of views" on "other problems" with Britain was 
less far-reaching than the North China Army demand of 25 
June for a preliminary agreement setting out the principles 
of a revised British policy towards the whole of China. But 
it was not entirely different. Tokyo had become vociferous 
from at least November 1938 in its desire to challenge the 
validity of interwar covenants such as the Nine Power Treaty 
upon which official British policy towards China was 
based.48 It had also received on 14 January 1939, through 
Craigie, a statement from Whitehall about such treaties "not 
being eternal."49 Trying to limit the talks, as the Tokyo 
Nichi Nichi pointed out, was, at the very least, likely to 
be regarded as a cynical stratagem designed "to get out of 
the difficult position to which.... (Britain) has been 
reduced at Tientsin." If that was "the main motive behind 
the move to negotiate a settlement of the Tientsin issue," 
the newspaper admonished, "the negotiations are bound to end 
in failure."50
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The British Embassy could not but have been aware that 
there would be considerable political pressure to include a 
wider agenda in the adjudication of any dispute with 
Britain. The British must also have known that the 
negotiations on Tientsin would be used by those interested 
in pursuing such an agenda to pressure Britain to comply 
with wider goals. With the government unpopular and the 
safety of some of its officials possibly at risk, there 
were, in addition, indications that Arita and his "pro- 
British" colleagues —  many of whom in any event believed 
that Britain's policy in China, if not now at least some 
time in the near future, would have to change —  might not 
feel able or even inclined to insist that the talks be 
immunized from this wider agenda. But London remained 
unappr^ised of this possibility, and consequently unaware 
that there might ultimately be a higher price to pay for an 
improvement in relations with Japan than a settlement at 
Tientsin aimed simply at eradicating Chinese rights.
This resulted in a curious situation. As British 
politicians were seeking to assure their public that the 
scope of the negotiations would be limited, events in Japan 
suggested that the Japanese were trying to do exactly the 
opposite. Between 28 and 30 June, Japan's main-line press 
was carrying leaders and editorials suggesting that a 
solution to the Tientsin crisis was possible only if Britain-
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stopped treating China "like its colony," acknowledged the 
New Order in East Asia and ended all links with Chiang Kai- 
shek. Meanwhile, the Japanese public, which was beginning to 
attribute ballooning Japanese casualties in China to 
Britain's support for the Kuomintang, seemed to be generally 
convinced that anything less than a British undertaking to 
change its "pro-Chiang" policies towards China as a whole 
would be an inglorious betrayal of the national interest.51 
As a result, there seemed to be increasing popular support 
for the view that Japan should not be holding talks with the 
British over establishing a modus vivendi at Tientsin at 
all, but searching for ways to exclude them from China 
entirely.52
The Situation at the End of June
Japan's acceptance of Ambassador Craigie's proposal for 
a conference in Tokyo over Tientsin raised more questions 
than it answered. The British wanted to convene the talks in 
order to end the blockade and the anti-British campaign at 
Tientsin. But they had been informed by both the Japanese 
Foreign and Deputy Foreign Minister that these were 
operational decisions over which Tokyo could not impose its 
will.53 Japan and Britain had agreed that the British should 
be "neutral" at Tientsin. But neutrality was a legal concept 
that could only be invoked if there was a commonly agreed-
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upon "state of war" between two countries that neither 
Japanese nor British politicians had been prepared to 
declare or acknowledge. Ambassador Craigie suggested that 
the British Concession at Tientsin could effectively be 
"neutral" if Japan agreed that concession authorities had 
the right to refrain from acts "calculated to give aid and 
comfort to an occupying Power as against its opponents." But 
Japanese politicians were being goaded by their public and 
press into saying that "neutrality" was only attainable if 
Britain gave as much "aid and comfort" to occupying troops 
at Tientsin as Japan demanded.54
Officials in London were loath to admit that "public 
opinion in Japan" really existed. Wedded to the racially 
preconceived but empirically unproven notion that "Japanese 
enthusiasm or hate" had for "a long period of years" simply 
been "switched on or off like a tap," the Foreign Office Far 
Eastern Department believed that the latest displays 
represented no more than a reflection of "the prompt 
obedience one expects of the Japanese people" and the "usual 
native hysteria" that manifests itself in the process.55 But 
with the government unpopular and army and civilian central 
authorities divided over Tientsin as well as other crucial 
foreign policy matters, there was a power vacuum at the 
centre of Japanese politics which were becoming sufficiently 
destabilized to be more-than-usually vulnerable to the
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activities of extra-governmental groups. Backed by a 
disgruntled public, while receiving support from junior 
military officers, lower officials in the War Ministry, 
ideologues in the Foreign, Home and Justice Ministries, and 
a nationalistic press, these elements had already made 
considerable progress in ensuring that the Tokyo 
negotiations with Britain would encompass a far larger 
agenda than simply the problems arising out of Tientsin.56
Ambassador Craigie was by no means unaware of this 
trend. Highlighting "the cumulative effect of nearly two 
years of various anti-British propaganda" in "weld(ing) this 
nation into a single unit," he warned Whitehall that "we are 
at present witnessing" an "even more unpleasant 
manifestation" of "the growing menace of (a) bitterly 
hostile public opinion" than "anything I have witnessed."57 
But the Ambassador never suggested that the movement might 
be sufficient to overwhelm the efforts of "moderate" 
politicians to broker a compromise settlement. As a result, 
the British government seemed unaware of the possibility 
that Japan's room for diplomatic manoeuvre was in fact being 
rapidly curtailed. The combination of stiffening Army 
resolve against a compromise, inflamed Anglophobic public 
sentiment and the growing efforts of well-organized 
ultranationalist groups to channel such sentiment into a 
campaign that threatened to put the Tokyo conference, the
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physical safety of its major proponents and the strategy of 
the '-Anglo-American faction" at risk were already seriously 
undermining the possibility that a conference in Tokyo could 
bring about a negotiated solution to the conflict.58
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Chapter Six: The Anti-British Movement in Japan
By the beginning of July 1939, it was becoming apparent 
that a conference in Tokyo would not be convened simply to 
negotiate a settlement limited to issues arising 
out of Tientsin. As we have seen in the previous chapter, 
the 26 June memorandum of the North China Army was a key 
action in preventing such an outcome. But this process,
which had its roots in a longer-standing Japanese desire to 
alter the inter-war treaty system that was meant to govern 
international relations in Asia, was strengthened
immeasurably by the outpouring of popular anti-British
sentiment from the beginning of July.
Japanese distrust of Britain in one form or another can 
perhaps be traced back as far as 1918.1 But popular anti- 
British feeling became particularly prominent as Japan 
expanded into Asia, especially from 1937 onwards. The
government began to finger Britain as one of the main 
obstacles supposedly standing in the path of a quick and 
efficacious resolution of the "China Incident," while ultra­
nationalist groups deliberately stirred up anti-British 
sentiment during 1938-9 as a way of pressuring the Japanese 
government to fulfil their program of concluding a military 
alliance with Germany.2 It was in the summer of 1939, 
however, that the anti-British movement witnessed its most 
dramatic increase in size and political significance.
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Largely the consequence of changes in administrative 
regulations at the beginning of July loosening the 
restrictions upon demonstrations and other organized forms 
of popular expression, this development was to be of crucial 
importance in crystallizing Japan's diplomatic position with 
reference to solving the crisis at Tientsin.
The Anti-British Movement and Ultranationalism
From the beginning of the 1930's, ultranationalist 
organizations had been a prominent feature of the Japanese 
political landscape. Consisting of disaffected younger 
military officers sometimes backed by ultra-rightist 
civilian cabals containing members inside and outside the 
government, these groups had been responsible for the 
assassination of prime ministers, senior Cabinet officials, 
prominent military officers, industrialists and members of 
the Imperial Household whom they felt were betraying the 
national interest and impeding the process of a "Showa 
Restoration,"3 a term that was meant to denote a cleansing 
of politics —  especially of "corrupt" foreign influences —  
by promoting the notion of a nation-state under an Imperial 
institution that was transcendental and absolute.
With the expansion of the Sino-Japanese war from the 
summer of 1937, the activities and scope of right-wing 
organizations diversified. Instead of being involved simply
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in assassinations and other conspiratorial activities, a 
plethora of groups established themselves throughout the 
country as political pressure groups with -a clear programme: 
to protest what the Japanese Home Ministry described as the 
"the undisguised attempts of Britain, France and the Soviet 
Union" to prop up the Chiang Kai-shek regime and thwart 
Japan's efforts to expand peacefully and bring a peaceful 
end to the "China Incident."4 By the end of 1938, these 
organizations had been active in organizing demonstrations 
in favour of strengthening the Anti-Comintern Pact with 
Germany and opposing talks with Britain, which was rapidly 
taking the position of the Soviet Union in the minds of the 
Japanese public as the main barrier preventing the 
successful development of a New Order in East Asia.
This did not mean that such organizations were not 
strongly supportive of —  or did not have direct links with 
the earlier military-dominated groups. But the 
associations that sprang up in the wake of the expansion of 
the Sino-Japanese war seemed to be broader-based and to 
derive more of their strength from an organized popular 
following than their predecessors. Backed often by a cross- 
section of civilian, military and reservist associations, 
these groups began to organize demonstrations, letter- 
writing campaigns, mass-meetings, rallies, posters and a 
variety of other highly publicized events directed at
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changing policy rather than simply conspiring to eliminate 
policymakers whom they did not like. Generating on the one 
hand the beginnings of a sustained, grass-roots movement 
while retaining covert links with the Army, the military 
police and the Home Ministry on the other, these 
organizations were well-positioned to convert latent anti- 
British feeling into a lobbying campaign directed against 
the policies as well as the physical safety of those 
suspected of wishing to come to an accommodation with 
Britain.
It did not take long for ultranationalists to make an 
impact over Tientsin. By 26 June 1939, barely ten days after 
the imposition of the blockade of the British and French 
Concessions, groups such as the Nihon Kakushinto (Party for 
the Renovation of Japan), the Dai Nippon Seinento (Greater 
Japanese Youth Association), the Aikoku Seisenbu (Group for 
Patriotic War) and other rightist associations had convened 
meetings throughout the country, published posters and 
engaged in letter-writing campaigns to bolster the position 
of the North China Army. Expressing strong support for the 
"anti-terrorist stance" of Japanese military authorities at 
Tientsin as well as for the North China Army's demand for an 
end to Third Country support of the Kuomintang, these 
organizations urged Japan to "take advantage of the Tientsin 
Incident to eradicate concession problems," grasp "the key
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to the solution of the China Incident" by insisting upon
"the reversion of the concessions to China" and "resolutely 
oppose any compromise" which —  thanks to the "blind 
policies in China of Britain, France and the United States" 
—  would be "makeshift" and "short-lived."5
These activities immediately. rang alarm-bells within 
the Japanese Cabinet. On 29 June, Foreign Minister Arita 
informed the Prime Minister that "a successful resolution of 
Japan's foreign policy problems (the Tientsin incident and 
the impasse over relations with Germany) in Tokyo is going
to be extremely difficult. Even if things go well, a
solution may not be within our grasp; if they go badly, the 
going will get very tough indeed. My pessimism stems from 
the enormous damage that will occur as a result of 
ultrarightist meddling in the various facets of this crisis" 
(Tokyo de yaru mondai wa kekkyoku hijoni muzukashi. Yoku 
ittatte yoku wa iwarenaishi, aku ikeba nao warui... tada
fuhitsuyo ni uyokuha ga ironna mondai ni yokai suru koto 
dake wa hijoni komaru).6 Impending changes in legal and 
administrative regulations governing the formation and 
activities of such groups were to justify Arita's fears.
The Home Ministry Loosens Restrictions on Popular Protest
Although popular anti-British feeling had for some time 
been on the rise, its potential political impact had
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nevertheless been impeded by a host of laws and 
administrative regulations stretching back at least to the 
Peace Preservation Laws of 1925 and 1928, which imposed 
strict limitations on the size and content of public 
meetings and other expressions of popular sentiment.7 
According to Home Ministry regulations issued in 1937 and 
1938, all public meetings and other activities that went 
beyond an enthusiastic affirmation of support for government 
policy, or did not receive the express approval of the 
governing authorities, were banned. This included street 
demonstrations presenting "demands, petitions or appeals" —  
especially for "vigorous action abroad" (taigaiko sono hoka 
no tame ni gaito koshin o keikaku suru ga gotoki wa izure no 
bawai mo yonin sezaru mono tosu) —  and public meetings 
"stirring up fears and antagonistic feelings towards 
Britain, the United States, France, the Soviet Union and 
other foreign countries" (Ei-Bei-Futsu-So nado no kanjo o 
kotosara ni chohatsu shi iji tekitai no osore aru ga gotoki 
genron wa issai kore o sakuru koto).8
On 1 July 1939, however, the Home Ministry's Police 
Department issued a new set of regulations concerning public 
movements "against Third Countries —  especially England —  
that are obstructing the successful accomplishment of 
Japan's Holy War (in China)" (Seisen Kantetsu o Bogai Suru 
Daisankoku (Nakanzuku Eikoku) No Haigeki Undo). According to
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the new rules, anti-British "speeches and public meetings" 
(even in central Tokyo) were sanctioned, as were anti- 
British "popular movements under the leadership of approved 
organizations" (taishu undo, tosei aru dantaiteki kodo...) 
and the "distribution of appropriately edited (anti-British) 
writings" (bunsho naiyo o tekito ni shido shi sono bunpu 
hoho ni oite wa... kyoyo suru koto). Furthermore, there 
would be "a loosening of regulations" (aru teido no enwa o 
nasu koto) concerning "signboards criticizing pro-British 
groups" (shin-Eiha haigeki tatekamban).9
This was followed by a set of press guidelines issued 
by the Cabinet Information Office on 3 July easing
restrictions on "the publication of newspaper articles 
dealing with Britain's pro-Chiang activities in China." 
These guidelines encouraged the press to "arouse public 
opinion firmly against Britain's attempts to assist Chiang 
kai-shek" (Eikoku no enjo kodo ni taishite wa danko kore o
haigeki suru kokumin no ketsui o kyoko ni shite... yoron o
kanki kakuritsu ni tsutomuru koto) and "emphasize that
Britain's continual attempts to aid Chiang will 
automatically result in the elimination of British interests 
in China." The guidelines also urged the media to "exploit 
anti-British movements everywhere" (kakuchi no hai-Ei undo 
no jokyo ni oite wa kore o sekkyokuteki ni toriatsukai) by 
"impressing the British with the voice of the people to the
173
greatest possible extent" (dekiuru kagiri Eikokugawa ni 
'kokumin no koe' o hanei seshimuru tsutomuru koto).10
The government's decision to loosen legal restraints 
upon public assembly came at a time during which there was 
rising concern that, left to their own devices, Japanese 
negotiators would be coaxed by the British into making 
unacceptable concessions. According to the 6 July edition of 
the newspaper, Kokumin: "What we are concerned about are
Japan's clumsy diplomacy and lack of national determination. 
War is won, but diplomacy is lost, is often mentioned by the 
people. Japan's traditional diplomacy has been a marked 
failure since the Meiji Restoration, while its military 
results have proved victorious." Whereas "British diplomatic 
authorities, sly and cunning as they are, may try to limit 
the parley to the Tientsin Incident as a local issue," Japan 
needed to "break the circle of hostility Britain is drawing 
around us" by —  in the words of a government publication 
issued at the time —  insisting that "the authorities of the 
British Concession undergo a 180 degree change of policy," 
"recognize the new situation in China" and "cooperate in 
building a New Order in East Asia."11
Underlying efforts to foment Anglophobic sentiment was 
more than a desire to avoid another diplomatic climb-down, 
however. In a memorandum sent on 4 July to military police 
units throughout Japan, the Headquarters of the Military
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Police expressed concern that "with the prolongation of the 
China Incident, popular enthusiasm for the war is beginning 
to wane" (jihen choki ni sensuru ni tomonai kokumin no aida 
ni kentai kanjo nashi jihen ni taisuru kanjosei o shosei(?) 
shi). The memorandum went on to say that "it is going to be 
difficult to end hostilities in China successfully" (senso 
suiko o konnan narashimuru) "unless we exploit issues that 
would arouse the public and keep its support for the war 
alive" (kokumin ni taisuru tekito naru shigeki o atae tsune 
ni kore o bentatsu kincho seshimuru) . "In view of the 
paramount importance of sustaining strong public support for 
a no-compromise policy with Britain," the document 
concluded, "we must take a leading role in fostering popular 
(anti-British) movements" (Seifu no tai-Ei kyoko seisaku 
suiko no tame ni wa.... kokumin o shite honmondai ni kanshi 
kyoko naru shinnen o hochi seshimuru.... kyojin naru kokumin 
undo tarashimuru gotoku shido suru koto hitsuyo nari).12
The loosening of constraints upon the expression of 
anti-British sentiment did not mean that the government 
wanted to abandon controls entirely. In its revised 
regulations of 1 July, the Home Ministry was careful to 
specify that anti-British demonstrations could only go ahead 
if they were organized by, or received permission from, 
"government-controlled groups" (tosei aru dantai). The 
regulations designated these to be local and national
175
political parties, veterans' associations, bureaucratic and 
educational organizations, business groups, student unions 
and youth leagues with links to "the Home- Ministry, Army or 
Navy authorities, the Foreign Ministry, Tokyo municipal 
government or provincial governments" (Naimusho, rikukai gun 
tokyoku, gaimusho, Tokyo-fu, shi to no kinmitsu naru 
renraku) .13
As admitted by Prime Minister Hiranuma in a 6 July 
audience with the Emperor, however, the Home Ministry's 
decision to exert control over anti-British demonstrations 
through government-approved groups was an indication that 
the government could no longer completely contain the tide 
of popular anti-British discontent.14 Pitted against a 
volatile public that was being manipulated by 
ultranationalist groups and surreptitiously funded, 
according to the Home Minister, by the military was a 
demoralized administration irreconcilably divided over the 
entire question of Japan's relations with the West.15 In an 
effort to protect itself against a rising tide of popular 
discontent, the Hiranuma Cabinet decided to abandon the idea 
of a complete clamp-down on all popular demonstrations in 
favour of a more discriminatory policy that permitted a 
gigantic expansion of approved forms of anti-British 
activity so long as the organizations directing it remained 
subject to some form of indirect governmental guidance.16
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In loosening controls, the Home Ministry was attempting 
to prevent a further radicalization of anti-government 
feeling. "If the anti-British movement is- mishandled," Home 
Minister Kido Koichi warned, "concern about its
revolutionary potential is likely to grow." Obsessed with 
the danger of insurrection from below, the Home Minister 
probably overestimated the revolutionary potential of this 
movement. But the Home Minister expressed the concerns of 
many of his colleagues in fearing that, if the leadership of 
anti-British demonstrations passed completely into the hands 
of out-and-out ultranationalist fanatics, the chances for 
the introduction of far-reaching demands like an immediate 
war with England —  as well as attacks on all those
suspected of having "pro-British" sympathies —  would
increase. Since some extreme nationalists equated pro-
British feeling with a reluctance to go along 
unquestioningly with Army demands for a military alliance 
with Germany, the list of suspected traitorous "Anglophiles" 
within high government circles could include the Emperor, 
court officials, senior statesmen, the Prime Minister, the 
Foreign Minister, the Navy Minister and Vice-Minister, and 
the Home Minister, among others.17
In such a highly charged environment, the safety as 
well as the policies espoused by many of Japan's most 
prominent political leaders were at risk. To preserve the
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former, the government agreed to compromise the latter by 
permitting the holding of massive anti-British popular 
demonstrations. Central to these protests-was opposition to 
British policy in China and any tendency by Japanese 
politicians to make concessions in the upcoming Tokyo 
discussions.
The Growth of the Anti-British Movement
The government's decision to ease crowd-control 
regulations resulted in a permeation of anti-British feeling 
throughout Japan, with dramatic transformations in patterns 
of popular anti-British activity. Before July 1939, 
demonstrations against Britain were almost invariably small- 
scale, sporadic affairs usually ranging between 300 and 
3, 000 people, with a maximum of no more than 6, 000. But 
after 7 July, the second anniversary of the Marco Polo 
Bridge Incident that triggered the second phase of Japan's 
invasion of China, there was an explosion throughout the 
country of public meetings, street demonstrations, 
petitions, posters and other forms of popular anti-British 
protest. Monster meetings were held in Tokyo, Osaka and Kobe 
of 30,000, 80,000 and 100,000. In July alone, over a million 
people were estimated to have taken part in public anti- 
British activities of one form or another.18
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These activities helped bring about a distinct 
hardening of attitudes against the British. By the middle of 
July, even the more moderate public demands towards the 
British —  such as the following statement issued by ten 
influential Tokyo newspapers —  called for "a complete 
change of attitude by Britain in East Asia" and "a 
willingness to cooperate with the construction of the New 
Order."19 Other groups, not content with simply advocating a 
more compliant British policy in China, directed their 
criticism at Britain's continuing presence in Asia as an 
imperial power. Common demands were for "all concessions be 
returned to China" and "all British interests to be expelled 
from East Asia." A Niigata group even argued that "the
construction of a New Order in East Asia is impossible
2 0unless Britain is expelled from the region."
In advocating the extinction of concessions and other 
British interests in China, anti-British activists were 
arguing for a much more radical solution to the Tientsin 
crisis than was envisioned by those involved in the 
negotiations. In the words of a naval reservist captain's 
letter to Foreign Minister Arita, "the ending of the China 
Incident will depend upon the skill with which the 
government handles the concessions problem. They must go to 
the heart of the issue by being unflinching in their demands 
for the reversion of all concessions to China."21 A school
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teacher from Wakayama put it more directly by saying that 
"the Tientsin Incident must be exploited to throw Britain 
out of China and the whole of East Asia."22
Coincident with this trend was a mounting crescendo of 
criticism against the idea of holding a conference in Tokyo 
about the Tientsin crisis at all. The 3 July press 
guidelines issued by the Cabinet Information Office 
specifically enjoined the media to "refrain from printing 
articles saying that the Tokyo Conference will lead to Japan 
making compromises and bargains with the British."23 But 
this did not prevent the Japanese public from lambasting the 
proposed talks as "irrefutable proof that the government -is 
not serious in its efforts to solve the problem," and "an 
indication that the government has already given in to the 
British." Some protesters argued that the simple decision to 
negotiate constituted "evidence of a British plot to 
manipulate Anglophile groups within the government"24 and 
"proof" of "Britain's unceasing obstruction of the Imperial 
Army's historical mission in China" that "put it on a par 
with the Soviet Union as one of Japan's two worst
// 25enemies.
Contrary to the government's legislative efforts to 
keep the movement focused on policy, there was mounting 
criticism of Japanese diplomats and supposedly "pro-British" 
politicians. The former were castigated in the press for
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losing wars at the conference table that the armed forces 
had won on the field; the latter were targeted by 
ultranationalist organizations for being- obstacles to the 
conclusion of a just peace.26 According to the Association 
for the Study of the Imperial Way (Nippon Shugi Kenkyujo) , 
for instance, "so long as the pro-British group within the 
government remains on top, we doubt that the problems (at 
Tientsin) will ever be thoroughly resolved" (Shin-Ei teki 
seiryoku ga tsuyoi kara tetteiteki kaiketsu wa gimon de 
aru). The League for the Prosecution of the Holy War (Seisen 
Kantetsu Domei) went even further by stating that "we ought 
to deal with the concession problem in a way that would 
completely annihilate pro-British elements in Japan, but 
because this government has failed to conclude a military 
alliance with Germany, it has lost both the trust of the 
people and our confidence in its ability to bring about a 
satisfactory solution" to Japan's foreign policy problems.27
Of particular importance to ultranationalists was the 
transformation of popular opposition to the Tokyo talks with 
Britain into broad support for a military alliance with 
Germany. According to their line of thinking, the proponents 
of the status quo —  identified variously as elder 
statesmen, government ministers, privy councillors, zaibatsu 
chiefs and Navy "renegades" such as Navy Minister Yonai 
Mitsumasa and Deputy Minister Yamamoto Isoroku -- were
betraying the national interest and responsible for the 
prolongation of Sino-Japanese hostilities.28
Ultranationalists believed that the most heinous 
manifestations of "status-quoism" were support for a 
compromise settlement with Britain over Tientsin and 
opposition to a military pact with Germany, and feared that 
the conclusion of a settlement with Britain over Tientsin 
would make the prospects of an alliance with Germany more 
unlikely.
The Character of the Anti-British Movement
One of the government's objectives in issuing its 
regulations easing public demonstrations at the beginning of 
July was to curtail the ability of ultranationalists either 
to target government officials for assassination, or to 
exploit anti-British sentiment for political ends other than 
simply applying pressure on Britain. Things clearly did not 
turn out entirely as the government had hoped. Active and 
growing in size, ultranationalist groups made considerable 
headway in utilizing anti-British sentiment to stigmatize 
the "Anglo-American faction" as disloyal,29 as well as 
revive the War Minister's flagging efforts to conclude a 
military agreement with Germany that the rest of the 
government had given up since the beginning of June as a 
realistic policy priority.
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As a result, ad hominem smear campaigns and the use of 
violence played an important part in stimulating anti- 
British sentiment. On 14 July, for instance, the League of 
the Prosecution of the Holy War (Seisen Kantetsu Domei) 
delivered Navy Deputy Minister Yamamoto Isoroku a letter 
demanding his resignation and accusing him and Navy Minister 
Yonai Mitsumasa of being in "the forefront of pro-British 
forces," "opposing the Holy War," "obstructing the New 
Order," "blocking the Imperial Way" and "colluding with 
imperial advisors and zaibatsu" to increase their profits by 
selling the country down the river.30 On 6 and 15 July, two 
plotters were arrested for attempting to assassinate the 
Navy Deputy Minister, Mitsui executive Ikeda Seihin and 
Imperial Secretary and Keeper of the Privy Seal, Yuasa 
Kurahei, the last being accused by his would-be assassin of 
"blocking the Emperor's rule," "favouring a pacifism 
destructive of the state," "fawningly following after 
Britain," "obstructing Army strategy" and various other 
"crimes. "31
These incidents were not isolated events attributable 
simply to the zeal or instability of character on the part 
of individual culprits. In a similar event occurring nine 
days later, another plotter was arrested for attempting to 
blow up court official Matsudaira Tsuneo in his car and 
planning an attack on Ambassador Craigie in front of the
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British Embassy.32 Meanwhile, local authorities in Wakayama 
and Ishikawa uncovered plots to assassinate other "pro- 
British" suspects, including the Home Minister and Chief of 
the General Staff, who were accused of "unnecessarily
prolonging the China Incident."33
As can be seen from these activities, ultranationalists 
were successful in ensuring that the anti-British movement 
became more radical and more prone to violence than the
government would have wished. Nevertheless, —  and in 
accordance with government intentions -- the movement as a 
whole generally remained under the leadership of "approved" 
organizations such as political parties, prefectural and 
local governments, teachers, newspaper publishers, business 
groups and reservist associations.34 Subject to greater 
government control than their ultranationalist counterparts, 
these groups were somewhat less interested in indulging in 
verbal or physical attacks on suspected "pro-British"
sympathizers, or concerned with manipulating opposition to 
the Tokyo talks simply to build up pressure for a military 
pact with Germany. To this extent, the government had some 
success in ensuring that the movement did not foment a
diatribe against Japanese foreign policy in general, or an 
ideological witch-hunt bent on "clarifying the national 
polity" (kokutai meicho) or "national renovation" (kokka no
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kakushin), or provide the backdrop for a successful effort 
to overthrow the government by force.35
The price that had to be paid for this limited victory, 
however, was a huge increase in the size of anti-British 
demonstrations, a permeation of anti-British feeling 
throughout the country and a radicalization of the anti- 
British agenda. The extent to which the movement was 
supported by elements within the government and military is 
debatable. But with anti-British organizations gaining legal 
legitimacy and expanding their popular following so rapidly, 
it became more difficult for politicians to ignore their 
demands. As a result, a highly volatile political situation 
was being created in which —  assuming the British did not 
completely capitulate to all Japanese demands over Tientsin 
—  Japanese negotiators had less to lose by not coming to 
agreement at all than by signing a document that could be 
interpreted by the Japanese public as a "sell-out" of the 
national interest.
Government Reaction to the Anti-British Campaign
Throughout early-July, the government responded to the 
burgeoning anti-British movement with a growing sense of 
paralysis, impotence and alarm. Worried about the huge 
rallies and ultra-rightist plots to attack "pro-British" 
officials, the Home Ministry's Police Department Chief
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(Keibokyokucho) admitted privately that "the government has 
lost control of the situation."36 The Home Minister accused 
the Army of funding many of the anti-British protests, which 
he believed were "being organized and led by the military 
police."37 The War Minister subsequently admitted that the 
movement had gotten out of hand and needed to be 
suppressed.38 But many "Anglo-American faction" officials 
believed that the Army was responsible for the instigation 
of anti-British sentiment, so as "to try to impede," in the 
words of Imperial Aide-de-Camp, General Hata Shunroku, "the 
start of Anglo-Japanese talks in Tokyo and conclude an anti­
communist alliance with Germany and Italy."39 In Home 
Minister Kido Koichi's opinion, the government was "in an 
impossible situation" and incapable of formulating a co­
ordinated response.40
As these and other officials grew alarmed at the size 
and activities of the anti-British movement, intra- 
departmental tensions between "pro-German" and "pro-British" 
factions reached near-breaking point. An agreement-in- 
principle had been reached in the 23 June Cabinet meeting to 
give priority to the search for a solution to the Tientsin 
Incident. But the War Minister refused to specify Army 
requirements for a settlement and continued to press for a 
military pact with Germany, an objective, he misleadingly 
informed other military officials, that was supported by
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Foreign Minister Arita. Possibly linked to these erratic 
actions were the disastrous Kwantung Army setbacks in 
northern Manchuria in early July. Facing•unexpected defeat 
at the hands of the Russians on the Chinese-Mongolian 
border, the Army was facing a situation in which the 
transformation of the Anti-Comintern Pact into a military 
alliance between Japan and Germany could be regarded as a 
pre-requisite for national survival. Any opportunity 
presented by the activities of the anti-British movement to 
further this objective could not consequently be 
disregarded.
For the "Anglo-American faction," these activities 
constituted a blatant disregard of the Imperial Will, a 
refusal to follow predetermined government policy and an 
incitement to popular revolt. Castigating the War Minister 
for insubordination, insolence and stupidity, the Emperor 
eventually refused even to see War Minister Itagaki Seishiro 
in person, with relations between the two becoming so bad 
that the War Ministry had to send intermediaries to the 
Palace to explain the War Minister's position.41 Home 
Minister Kido Koichi remained extremely concerned about the 
possibility of the anti-British movement turning into a 
revolution from below, while Foreign Minister Arita and Navy 
Minister Yonai remained unrelentingly opposed to Army 
pleas.42 In Deputy Navy Minister Yamamoto's words, "if the
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Army demand for a military pact with Germany is accepted, 
the Hiranuma Cabinet faces certain dissolution."43
Exacerbating the government's problems over Tientsin, 
Japanese military intelligence intercepted a number of 
telegrams from Chinese diplomats in London and elsewhere in 
early July to the Chinese Foreign Ministry that raised 
questions about the sincerity of Britain's desire to make 
compromises in the upcoming negotiations over Tientsin. 
According to an intercepted message dated 7 July, British 
Foreign Secretary Halifax now regarded the issue of silver 
deposits in the Chinese banks within the British Concession 
no longer as a "local problem" (Tenshin no genkin 
hikiwatashi mondai wa chihoteki mondai ni arazaru), and 
therefore not a subject into which Japan and Britain could 
enter into bilateral talks.44 It was correct to say that 
the silver and currency problems concerned Third Countries, 
particularly China (although that was not the country 
primarily on the Foreign Secretary's mind). But to say that 
such topics could not be considered an appropriate item for 
discussion in Anglo-Japanese negotiations over Tientsin 
contradicted assurances that, according to Japanese sources, 
were made on 18 and 20 June by Ambassador Craigie to the 
Japanese government which specifically promised that Britain 
would be willing to discuss these issues.45
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These revelations betrayed a change in the British 
government's position that was meant to have been kept under 
wraps. On 24 June, Craigie had recommended to the Foreign 
Office that London make "some attempt to reach compromise 
with Japan on.... (the) question (of currency)."46 The 
following day, the Foreign Secretary replied that "I approve 
generally" of the "line you suggest in your telegram... 
(about currency)."47 But, on 28 June, the Treasury warned 
the Foreign Office that "we regard these questions as 
matters which concern the Americans and the French as well 
as ourselves" upon which "we are not prepared to contemplate 
any concessions." The Treasury argued that any arrangement 
to hand over silver, restrict Chinese National Currency 
within the Concession, or that would allow the circulation 
of the puppet Federal Reserve Bank notes, would amount to "a 
complete and abject surrender to the view that His Majesty's 
Government must assist the Japanese and acquiesce in the 
elimination of British trade and business interests in 
China," as well as a "de facto recognition of the puppet 
government and all that goes with it."48
The Foreign Office immediately took its cue by agreeing 
to reverse itself. Calling "the promotion of their (puppet) 
currency... quite clearly an anti-Chinese act" that was 
"part and parcel of Japan's aggression on China," a senior 
Far Eastern Department official asserted that "for us to
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facilitate or cooperate in any way would be to aid and abet 
the aggressors" and something "not to be thought of at any 
price."49 On the basis of this and other advice, the Foreign 
Secretary informed Ambassador Craigie on 4 July that 
"currency" was a matter "of common concern between the 
Americans and French and ourselves," "that there is no real 
room for compromise," and that "we are not prepared to 
contemplate any concessions by ourselves alone." Halifax 
then instructed Craigie to frame Britain's position on this 
issue in a way that would "provide us with a good case 
should the negotiations subsequently break down on this 
issue" —  in other words, that would enable Whitehall to 
"adopt a concerted policy" with "the United States and 
French Governments" in such an eventuality.50
It was no doubt correct to argue that conceding to 
Japan's demands over the silver deposits and puppet currency 
amounted to "aiding and abetting" Japanese aggression. But 
the Foreign Office had only two weeks previously given the 
British Ambassador in Tokyo the go-ahead to seek a 
conference with Japan on Tientsin on the basis of a formula 
that satisfied the "military, political and economic 
(underlining added) requirements pertaining to the security" 
of Japan's "military forces."51 Apart from pulling the rug 
from under Craigie's shoes, this volte-face tended to 
confirm a long-standing Japanese belief that the British
190
were untrustworthy, as well as stoke fears that Britain 
would try to engineer a breakdown in the Tokyo talks over an 
issue (i.e. currency) that would oblige -countries such as 
the United States to give more support to the British 
position than they had been prepared to offer.
With the revised British stance discovered during a 
time when feelings within Japan against Britain were running 
so high, the Tokyo talks were put in serious jeopardy. But 
the situation was made more complex with the arrival from 
China of adverse Japanese intelligence reports about 
activities within the British Concession at Tientsin. 
According to local military police findings despatched to 
Tokyo by Consul-General Tashiro Shigenori on 3 July, links 
between British Concession Chinese Police officer Li Han- 
yuan and suspected anti-Japanese activists went much deeper 
than previously suspected.
According to the new allegations, Li had arranged to 
harbour Chinese Communist Party-affiliated "terrorists" in 
the British Concession during the spring of 1938. The 
Japanese claimed that he had also attended a meeting in 
December of that year in which it was decided to assassinate 
the Japanese Consul-General and blow up the Tientsin railway 
station, as well as funnelled money from the Kuomintang to 
Kuomintang-affiliated anti-Japanese resistance officials 
within the Concession on a monthly basis and arranged for a
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secret meeting between anti-Japanese resistance fighters and 
Ambassador Clark Kerr when the British Ambassador visited 
the Concession in February 1939. Together-with telegrams of 
7 and 12 July from Counsellor Horinouchi in Peking alleging 
links between the Chinese partisans and the supposedly "pro- 
Japanese" Tientsin Consul-General Ha-£feea^ t~ Jamieson, this 
report made British protestations of neutrality at Tientsin 
seem hollow, if not disingenuous.52
Playing into public preconceptions of British 
untrustworthiness, these developments could not have come at 
a worse time for those who wanted the Tokyo Conference to 
succeed. Having allowed and in some instances encouraged 
public opinion and the press to vent their anti-British 
opinions freely, the government faced difficulties in 
disregarding their demands, especially since they seemed so 
widely held. In addition, North China Army Commander-in- 
Chief Sugiyama Gen declared publicly in early July that 
"traffic restrictions (at Tientsin) should never be relaxed 
irrespective of the progress of the Anglo-Japanese talks."53 
On 10 July, there arrived in Tokyo to assist in the talks a 
North China Army military delegation that was headed by the 
reputedly hawkish Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General 
Muto Akira. The more "pro-British" Commander of the 27th 
Division at Tientsin, Lieutenant-General Homma, was 
excluded.
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None of this boded well for the upcoming conference on 
Tientsin. In the opinion of Home Minister Kido, the "central 
authorities have lost control."54 On -8 July, Foreign 
Minister Arita went further by saying that "this Cabinet is 
completely done for. It won't last much longer" (totemo domo 
kono naikaku wa dame da. Mo nagakanai zo) .55 With the 
government weak, divided and the personal safety of some of 
its members at risk, using the Tokyo Conference to make an 
unpopular compromise agreement with Britain over Tientsin 
seemed to be a growing political impossibility.
The Government Revises Its Position
As a result of the tumultuous developments of the first 
two weeks of July, the Hiranuma administration was forced to 
readjust its position on the Tokyo Conference. The strategy 
backed by Foreign Minister Arita fccr insist^ that the talks be 
limited to the problems arising out of Tientsin had already 
been undermined by the North China Army's insistence that 
all discussion of local issues be preceded by an agreement 
on principles applying to British policy throughout China. 
But with rising public clamour against the British, their 
policies in China, Britain's "obstruction" of Japanese 
efforts to "solve" the "China Incident," the continuing 
existence of foreign concessions and the possibility of a 
"backdoor" deal between the British and "pro-British"
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elements within the government that would somehow make an 
alliance with Germany more unlikely, the chances that the 
Conference would be focused primarily upon issues arising 
out of the situation at Tientsin diminished further.
One of the first indications of a possible policy 
change came with a statement on 3 July by the Chief of the 
War Ministry's Information Bureau. Arguing that a successful 
conclusion to the conference would be "impossible without a 
complete and thorough change in British attitude towards the 
China Incident" (jihen ni taisuru konponteki ninshiki 
oyobini... taido no zesei o mizaru kagiri, sono jitsugen wa 
fukano de atte) , the War Ministry statement went on to say 
that "the elimination of Britain's hostility in the British 
Concession in Tientsin" was dependent upon whether "Britain 
of her own accord abandons her attitude of assisting Chiang 
Kai-shek and co-operates in the construction of a New Order 
in East Asia."55 Asking Britain "to change her attitude" and 
negotiate "with sincerity" had been part and parcel of 
earlier statements such the War Ministry-General Staff 
joint-memorandum on the Tientsin Incident of 17 June.57 But 
whereas the earlier document equated "sincerity" with a 
British willingness to accept the relatively limited idea 
that the North China Army had a right of self-preservation 
within its area of occupation, in this statement, the War 
Ministry explicitly linked British "good faith" to a general
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change in Britain's policies towards China as a whole and 
specifically the end of policies that could.be construed as 
supportive of Chiang Kai-shek.
The War Ministry statement seemed designed to provoke 
tension. It was also opposed to the views of certain North 
China Army officers who had become sufficiently concerned 
about the possible adverse effects of a drawn-out stand-off 
at Tientsin to argue that an early resolution to the problem 
was more important than a clear-cut British commitment to 
change its China policies (genchi no gun no iken wa so wa 
tsuyokarazu, Shibayama Tokumu Kikancho wa en-Sho hoshin o Ei 
o shite hoki seshimuru o yo suru mo, jiken no ensei wa furi 
nari, Homma Shidancho mo doyo no mikata nari),58 But 
believing that the War Ministry had decided to disregard 
such views in favour of the more uncompromising stance of 
the General Staff in Peking, "pro-British" officials such as 
Imperial Aide-de-Camp General Hata Shunroku and Home 
Minister Kido Koichi were giving credence to press "rumours" 
that the War Ministry might be "plotting to conclude an 
anti-communist military alliance with Germany and Italy by 
obstructing the commencement of Anglo-Japanese talks on 
Tientsin" (Nichi-Ei kaidan no seiritsu o bogai shi motte 
Doku-I to no bokyo kyotei o teiketsu seshimen to no inbo
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Whether there was such a plot and exactly who or how 
many might have been involved is unclear. But egged on by 
public opinion and the enormous outpouring of anti-British 
sentiment, a growing coalescence of hard-line views seemed 
to be occurring between the War Ministry, the North China 
Army General Staff, the Asia Development Board, the Foreign 
Ministry East Asia Division and activist extra-governmental 
pressure groups. On 4 and 5 July, the Foreign Minister
received from Peking the most uncompromising expression of 
the North China Army General Staff's determination not to 
"end or even ameliorate the blockade" until Britain had
"recognized the new situation" in China. This meant in
particular ending its "pro-Chiang policies," adopting
"strict neutrality" and applying such principles both to the 
Tientsin problem and to other questions relating to China.60 
On 9 July, the War Ministry abandoned any pretence of a
commitment to a localized solution by saying that it
believed the "object of the negotiations should be to
engineer a transformation in British attitudes towards the
China Incident" (sono mokuteki wa Eikoku o shite tai Shina 
jihen taido o zesei seshime).61
Another blow to the idea of a compromise agreement 
occurred the following day, when the Asia Development Board, 
a joint military-civilian policymaking body directly under 
the office of the Prime Minister, issued a memorandum that
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placed the Tientsin problem within the context of Anglo- 
Japanese relations as a whole.62 Written to formulate a 
negotiating strategy for the Tokyo Conference, the document 
made three points of particular relevance:
1) The "new world order7' (sekai shin chitsujo) that 
Japan, Germany and Italy were seeking to establish was 
fundamentally opposed to the "international system based on 
the League of Nations" (kokusai renmei chushin no sekai 
chitsujo) supported by Britain and the Allied Powers.
U . c/
Specifically v the idea advanced by Ambassador
Craigie for an improvement of Anglo-Japanese relations 
through the resolution of particular points of conflict, 
this line of thinking emphasized that a policy of seeking 
British co-operation by making compromises over particular 
problems such as the issues arising out of the situation at 
Tientsin was likely to backfire unless a prior agreement 
could be obtained that would change the principles upon 
which British foreign policy was based.
2) Britain would go to considerable lengths not to come 
to such an agreement. This would probably include efforts to 
involve the United States in a more confrontational stance 
towards Japan if such a strategy could be engineered. If the 
Tokyo negotiations were inconclusive and drawn out, British 
accusations that Japanese actions at Tientsin and elsewhere 
were part of a general pattern aimed at expelling all
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foreign interests from China, establishing the Closed Door 
for trade with all Western powers and promoting racialistic 
acts aimed at destroying the prestige of the White Man would 
therefore be likely, according to this argument, to grow in 
intensity and shrillness.
3) Although ideologically opposed to Japan, Britain had 
nevertheless been "unable to prevent the development of a 
New World Order" (sekai shin chitsujo no zenshinteki shinten 
o soshi suru atowazu) or do anything but acquiesce in "the 
weakening and collapse of the international order based on 
the League of Nations" (Kokusai renmei chushin no sekai 
chitsujo... no jakka hokai). "To deal with its problems in 
Europe" (Eikoku wa tai Oshu mondai shorijo) —  in 
particular, "accomplishing its strategy of surrounding 
Germany and Italy" (tokuni Doku I hoi seisaku tsuiko) 
Britain will "have no choice but to devote all its energies" 
(kanzen no doryoku o shuchu sezaru o ezaru) to— Ear-epe. To 
that end, London "would probably be prepared to endure 
considerable sacrifices in the Far East for the sake of 
agreement with Japan" (kyokuto ni oite wa saidaigen no gisei 
o shinobu mo tai Nichi dakyo o sakusu beshi). With regard to 
Tientsin, Japan should therefore pitch her terms high and be 
prepared to use force should negotiations collapse.63
On 10 July, the newly arrived Japanese delegation from 
North China renewed the North China Army demand that the
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Tokyo Conference be limited to negotiations over a general 
agreement-in-principle applying to China. The Japanese 
military had never been supportive of the idea that detailed 
discussions concerning Tientsin be part of the Tokyo 
Conference. But the growing unpopularity of the idea of 
holding a conference in Tokyo at all prompted efforts by the 
North China Army once again to get talks on all local issues 
transferred to Tientsin, away from public view. Arguing 
that, with regard to Tientsin, talks in Tokyo should go no 
further than an agreement on the principle that the Japanese 
military has special responsibilities to preserve order and 
protect itself in occupied areas (Tenshin mondai kosho ni 
yorite wa... gun no chian narabini seizonjo fukaketsu no 
hani ni sadame) and an agreement to end all "pro-Chiang" 
policies, the North China Army was most anxious that 
negotiations in Tokyo be concluded —  or, in the event of 
British intransigence, broken off —  as soon as possible
64(kosho no tanki kaiketsu ni doryoku shi ensei o saku).
The Cabinet balked at the idea of leaving discussions 
on local issues to the Tientsin authorities. However, in a 
document entitled Outline Summary of General Principles to 
Govern Anglo-Japanese Negotiations (Nichi-Ei Kosho Yoryo 
Taiko) that was submitted to a 11 July Three Minister 
Conference between the Prime Minister, War Minister and 
Foreign Minister and approved by the full Cabinet the
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following day, it was agreed that discussions on Tientsin
could only take place once a prior agreement-in-principle
had been negotiated.65 According to such a timetable,
Britain would be required to observe an attitude of "strict
neutrality" in China and also end its "support" for the
Chiang Kai-shek government before detailed discussions on
Tientsin could begin.66 On 11 July, in a statement
emphasizing the role of the public in bringing about this
modification in government policy, an emissary from Prime
Minister Hiranuma informed Ambassador Craigie that:
"The Prime Minister, while personally of the opinion 
that the conversations in regard to Tientsin should be 
confined to local issues, had been greatly impressed by 
public insistence upon a change in (British) policy 
towards Chiang Kai-shek forming an essential part of 
the forthcoming discussions. He was in fact being 
inundated by expressions of opinion in this sense 
coming from all over Japan and by no means confined to 
reactionary societies of other organized units for 
expression of public opinion.... The Prime Minister 
(further believed) that even if we settled the Tientsin 
question as a local dispute a further incident would 
arise in some other part of China, so that the only 
sensible course, if worse was to be prevented, was to 
bring about a thorough-going understanding now between 
Japan and Great Britain."67
The final step in the authorization of the new strategy 
entailed acquiring Imperial sanction. But when Prime 
Minister Hiranuma went to the Palace on 12 July to explain 
to the Emperor the government's "principles first/details 
later" approach to the Tientsin talks, Hirohito objected. 
Fearing a rupture between Foreign Minister Arita and War 
Minister Itagaki, the Monarch asked that the two sets of
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talks be held concurrently (go kotoba ni yoreba, gensoku to 
saibu jiko to wa doyo heikoteki ni gisuru kotai ari to so de 
nakereba rikugun no kangaeru tokoro to gaimu no kangaeru 
tokoro to itchi sezaru. . . . ) . Yet even this last-minute 
intervention failed to galvanize the rest of the Anglo- 
American faction. Bothered by popular anti-British 
demonstrations and demoralized by the North China Army's 
refusal to consider lifting the blockade of the concessions 
at Tientsin, Foreign Minister Arita agreed in a 14 July 
Cabinet meeting with the Army demand that an agreement-in- 
principle be negotiated first.68
This was a major setback for the British Ambassador. 
With the North China Army insisting that even an agreement 
in Tokyo might not persuade them to lift the blockade at 
Tientsin, British "thoughts and plans for dealing with the 
Japanese at the forthcoming conference," according to United 
States Charge D'Affaires Eugene Dooman, were "compounded of 
confusion and irresolution."69 The British envoy was in 
effect rewarded for his efforts to find a negotiated 
settlement to the issues arising out of the Tientsin 
situation by being abandoned by London and by an increasing 
number of Japanese politicians who were either too scared 
about their own personal safety, or simply not in a strong 
enough position or in a sufficiently sympathetic frame of 
mind, to sustain what at best had been a somewhat lacklustre
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level of support. Craigie consequently found himself in the 
unfortunate position of having to embark upon a set of 
negotiations that were powerless to impose a solution at 
Tientsin and likely to end in rupture, recrimination and 
failure. As a result, the already-rapidly dimming chances 
for a negotiated solution to the Tientsin Incident were in 
danger of being snuffed out entirely.
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Chapter Seven: The Tokyo Conference (1) :The Arita-Craigie
Accord (15-24 July).
Between mid-June and mid-July 1939, Japan's terms for 
negotiating a solution to the Tientsin Incident had changed. 
In mid-June, the Japanese government supported the immediate 
convening of on-the-spot discussions at Tientsin if Britain 
agreed to the principle that Japanese armies in China had a 
right to uphold public order and preserve the security of 
their troops within their areas of occupation. In return, 
Tokyo would consider putting aside discussion of the North 
China Army's currency and monetary demands until after the 
blockade was lifted.
By aoar moving the negotiations to Tokyo, Foreign 
Minister Arita and Ambassador Craigie hoped to bring about 
the kind of localized agreement originally under 
consideration. But events during the following few weeks 
were to make this approach untenable. North China Army 
opposition to a Tokyo conference, growing anti-British 
activity throughout the country, information from Tientsin 
suggesting that more anti-Japanese activities had been going 
on in the British Concession than had been previously 
thought and a divided government in Tokyo vulnerable to 
ultranationalist pressure began to make anything less than a 
British capitulation to Japanese demands seem to be a 
political impossibility.
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These developments prompted Japan to tighten markedly 
its negotiating position. According to its new terms, 
Britain would have to negotiate a preliminary agreement-in- 
principle laying down parameters for the adjudication of all 
bilateral disputes throughout China. This agreement would 
have to be signed before any discussions over Tientsin could 
commence. The British minister of state for foreign affairs 
said that Britain could "have reason to hope" for "an end of 
stripping (of civilians), searching and other similar 
incidents" once negotiations started.1 But the non-committal 
nature of his remarks indicated that the convening of 
discussions would certainly not result in a lifting of the 
blockade at Tientsin, as had been discussed within the 
Japanese government, and might not even result in an 
amelioration of discriminatory acts against British subjects 
either.
On 13 July, Foreign Minister Arita informed Ambassador 
Craigie that "the blockade and inspection were authorized by 
the North China Army alone and imposed as a result of local 
needs and military considerations on the spot."2 A few days 
earlier, the Commander-in-Chief of the North China Army had 
said that "the presently enforced traffic restrictions 
should never be relaxed irrespective of the progress of the 
Anglo-Japanese talks held at Tokyo."3 When the Japanese 
Foreign Minister and British Ambassador initiated
discussions, they realized that, even if an agreement was 
concluded, their efforts might not have any effect in 
alleviating the crisis at all. .For a series of meetings to 
take place under these circumstances, resulting in the only 
accord to be produced by the Tokyo Conference, requires some 
explanation. That is the subject of this chapter.
From 'Belligerency Rights' to 'Special Requirements'
Although Tokyo had decided to negotiate an 'agreement- 
of-principles' before initiating discussions on Tientsin, 
the 'principles' upon which such an agreement should be 
based were unclear. Japan had for some time wanted a more 
forthright international recognition of its 'belligerent' 
status abroad. But getting countries such as Britain to 
recognize that Japan was involved in hostilities with 
another country towards which Third Countries should be 
neutral would have entailed a declaration acknowledging that 
the conflict in China was a 'war' . But if a 'state of war' 
existed, Britain could not, according to obligations incurred 
as a member of the League of Nations and a signatory of the 
Nine Power Treaty, remain 'neutral'. In the past, Britain had 
got round this problem with Japanese assistance by calling 
the conflict in China an 'incident' rather than a 'war' —  
and making what aid it gave to China contingent upon its co­
operation in accepting the distinction. But there was always
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a risk that Japanese efforts to obtain a British undertaking 
not to interfere in hostilities in China would deny London 
the legal technicality that had enabled the British to remain 
militarily uninvolved until then.
Since late-1938, Tokyo had also been trying to buttress 
its overseas position by getting the West to acknowledge a 
New Order in East Asia. But the nucleus of this construct 
could be traced to the belief that, from the "Versailles 
system of international relations" to the multitude of 
colonial interests that such a system had preserved, it was 
the activities of western countries that had been primarily 
responsible for preventing Japan from attaining its rightful 
place as Asia's leading power. Asking a country such as 
Britain to support this idea would not, therefore, be the 
equivalent of simply demanding greater co-operation with 
Japan in subjugating China. It would amount rather, as 
pointed out by Kurusu, the ambassador to Belgium, to 
"requesting foreigners to cooperate in their own expulsion," 
something they were unlikely to do (gaikukujin ni jiko 
tsuishutsu no tetsudai o motomuru gotoki ga kii na insho o 
atau).4
Emphasizing that 'changing conditions' had made 
existing international agreements 'inapplicable' , the New 
Order in East Asia stopped short of denouncing the interwar 
treaties entirely. In a somewhat sympathetic response,
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London said in January 1939 that such agreements were not in 
any event "immutable."5 But the value of this oblique 
expression of no-confidence in the diplomatic status quo was 
undercut by the intensity of opposition to the New Order 
proclamation emanating from the United States, which 
regarded it as part of a Japanese attempt to obtain economic 
pre-eminence in China and a violation of the principle of 
the 'Open Door' . Because this was the one part of the Nine 
Power Treaty that Washington remained prepared to uphold, 
any mention of the New Order in a bilateral Anglo-Japanese 
accord ran the risk of triggering the kind of US opposition 
that Tokyo wished to avoid.
While not a party to the Tientsin discussions, the 
United States was perceived by both Japan and Britain as 
likely to have a crucial impact upon their outcome. From 
Tokyo's viewpoint, Britain had become so dependent upon
America in Asia that London would sign virtually any
agreement with Tokyo if Washington indicated it would not 
adopt a more pro-British stance.6 But, if negotiations broke 
down on economic grounds, Tokyo realized that the United 
States would find it more difficult to remain neutral.7 A 
fear therefore existed that London would try to engineer and 
exploit a rupture in the Tientsin talks once they had
reached a "clear question of principle" of sufficient
concern to the "interests" of "the Americans" for them to
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feel unable to stay on the sidelines any longer.8 Globally 
isolated, Japan had become reliant on western markets for 
strategic materials and essential war items such as oil and 
scrap iron, and was vulnerable to the threat of Anglo- 
American economic retaliation.9
How Washington would react to the Tokyo talks was 
unclear. Since the expansion of Sino-Japanese hostilities in 
1937, the United States had indicated it was in principle 
opposed to Japanese encroachment in China, but unwilling to 
confront Japan on anything that did not directly undermine 
American interests. The Roosevelt administration had been so 
reluctant to associate itself with League of Nations members 
in any joint-effort to uphold Chinese sovereignty that the 
Chinese had sometimes criticized Washington for being even 
more dismissive of their interests than the British.10 In 
early July 1939, the State Department had informed Japan 
that Washington would remain "unconcerned" so long as Tokyo 
refrained from making demands that would "directly affect" 
and be "detrimental" to "American rights" in Japanese- 
occupied areas of China.11
These actions prompted some Japanese to believe that 
the British would not secure American backing during the 
negotiations. According to Shigemitsu Mamoru, Japan's envoy 
to London, the United States "had absolutely no desire to 
solve problems in China in jointtconsultation with other
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powers" (rekkoku kyodo ni yori Shina mondai o kaigi nite 
kettei suru iko wa zenzen naku) . On this basis, he said, 
"negotiations in Tokyo could succeed so long as they do not 
directly affect US interests" (Beikoku seifu wa (Tokyo) 
kosho ni oite Beikoku no chokusetsu no rieki ni kankei naki 
ijo wa Nichi-Ei kan ni kosho o kiwamuru koto).12 This view
was endorsed by the US Embassy in Tokyo, which was opposed
to jeopardizing US-Japanese relations either to put teeth
into multilateral commitments to China or other countries 
subjected to invasion, or for the sake of what they 
perceived to be simply pulling British chestnuts out of the 
fire at Tientsin in a bilateral dispute for which they 
believed Britain was largely to blame.13
The importance to Tokyo of ensuring that the United 
States remain uninvolved in this crisis resulted in the 
Japanese government displaying a circumspection in its 
expectations of Britain that its critics generally eschewed. 
On 9 July, the War Ministry said that Britain needed to
"deepen Anglo-Japanese understanding towards the China 
Incident" (Nichi-Ei ni okeru Shina Jihen ni kansuru ryokai o 
fukumuru ni hitsuyo nari).14 In a paper adopted by the 
Cabinet on 13 July entitled "Outline for Anglo-Japanese 
Discussions of the Problems Relating to the Tientsin 
Concessions" (Tenshin Sokai Mondai Nichi-Ei Kosho Oryo), the 
Foreign Ministry asked for a 'reversal' in British
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'attitudes' towards China.15 But, here too, the word 
'policy' was avoided. Britain simply had to "revise its 
frame of mind" (Eikoku o shite tai Shina Jihen taido o zesei 
seshime) (Foreign Ministry Information Office, 14 July),16 
or at most "eliminate its anti-Japanese attitude in North 
China" (Hokushi ni okeru tai-Nichi tekisei o haijoshi) 
(Cabinet, 13 July).17
With no mention of 'strict neutrality' or renunciation 
of support for Chiang Kai-shek, these demands fell short of 
even the more moderate public expectations of the British. 
But the Japanese government was concerned that its alignment 
behind popularly backed demands such as the reversion of 
British extra-territorial holdings to China, the severance 
of diplomatic ties between London and Chungking, an end to 
British loans to China or a denunciation of the 'Open Door' 
might exacerbate Japan's difficulties with the West. At the 
outset of the talks, the Navy Ministry had argued that 
"Anglo-Japanese military confrontation" (Nichi-Ei buryoku 
shototsu) or "general conflict" (zenmen buryoku) between 
Japan and the western powers must be "avoided at all costs" 
(zettai ni tachi itarashimezaru koto).18 This position was 
backed by the Foreign Ministry, the Imperial Household, most 
of the Cabinet and Privy Council and zaibatsu leaders.
Avoidance of a showdown with the West was also dictated 
by the exigencies of Japan's worsening military situation in
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North China. The Japanese Army had managed to impose control 
only upon 'points' (cities) and 'lines' (railways and other 
major transportation arteries that linked them) in areas 
under its 'control', which were surrounded by countryside 
dominated by increasingly active organizations of Chinese 
partisans and sympathizers. At Tientsin, Lieutenant-General 
Homma Masaharu was using a battalion of men to implement a 
blockade around an area containing more, western troops than 
those surrounding them.19 Meanwhile, the ability of North 
China Army Headquarters in Peking to send reinforcements was 
being eroded by partisan activity elsewhere in North China 
and pressure from the Kwantung Army, which since 1938 had 
been asking for a division of North China Army troops to be 
prepared for despatch to Manchuria to assist in operations 
against the Soviet Union.20
Reflecting these concerns, senior North China Army 
officers began to display in private a more cautious 
attitude towards the talks than they had publicly been 
prepared to admit. Arriving on 10 July for the talks in 
Tokyo, the North China Army delegation under Deputy Chief of 
Staff, General Muto Akira, advanced a "compromise proposal" 
(dakyo shitaru an) based on recognition of the "special 
requirements of Japan's troops to uphold public order and 
preserve themselves" (genchi chian iji narabini gun no 
seizonjo nado no hitsuyo yori tokushu no yokyu) and Japan's
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right to "suppress acts or causes harmful to our cause or 
beneficial to our enemy" as a "legitimate act of self- 
defence" (ware o gaisuru koi oyobi genin- wa gun no jieijo 
kore ga haijo o yosuru koto o shonin shi, kore ga bogai to 
narubeki issai no koi o kosei suru koto) .21 These were open- 
ended clauses that could justify virtually any type of 
action against China that Japan wished to take. But with no 
mention of interwar treaties, collective security, a 
'neutrality' undertaking or an end to British recognition of 
the Chiang Kai-shek regime, such formulations would enable 
London to argue that there were no adverse policy
implications in signing such an accord.
Tokyo still had to decide how far-reaching its demands 
of the British should be. The situation at Tientsin revealed
that, as in other parts of China, Japan and Britain were
becoming polarized over issues including trade, investment, 
currency and fiscal control. This caused tensions that were 
being intensified by the activities of public pressure
groups within Japan critical of what they suspected to be 
Britain's designs in the region, and the unwillingness of 
the Japanese government to take a sufficiently principled 
opposing stand. On the other hand, the British and Japanese 
governments were engaged in a diplomatic pas-de-deux in 
which British reluctance to impose upon Japan the punitive 
provisions of interwar treaties designed to uphold the
212
status-quo in China and elsewhere had been mirrored by 
Japan's aversion to putting Britain or its western partners 
in a situation where they might no longer feel able to 
refrain from imposing such provisions.
Any formulation that was too explicit in recognizing 
that a 'state of war' existed in China or in demanding for 
•Japan economic and political pre-eminence in the region 
risked bringing this carefully constructed entente to the 
ground. Without it, Japan and the West would be denied what 
had become a mutually convenient mechanism allowing both 
sides to 'agree to differ' over Japan's conduct during the 
Sino-Japanese war without actually saying so or having to do 
anything about it, especially on China's behalf. Preventing 
Japan's volatile public from undermining this modus vivendi 
was the one goal uniting Ambassador Craigie and Foreign 
Minister Arita when they opened their talks on 15 July.
Arita Makes His Proposal
At the start of their opening meeting, Arita submitted 
to Craigie Japan's agenda for the discussions. The talks were 
to be divided into "general questions," "problems relating to 
the maintenance of peace and order" and "problems related to 
economic matters."22 Arita did not explicitly insist upon a 
settlement of "general questions" prior to initiating the 
other negotiations, but said that "this matter would have to
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be cleared out of the way first" in order to assuage Japanese 
public opinion, which in his view still believed that it was 
owing to Britain’s "moral and substantial assistance to 
Chiang Kai-shek that the latter's continued resistance was 
due."23
In sketching out the objectives of a general agreement, 
Arita stressed that Japan sought an understanding to serve as 
a "background for discussion of all outstanding questions 
relating to Tientsin." Such an agreement, he said, would have 
"nothing to do with Great Britain’s China policy," the word 
for which (seisaku) was absent from this and other related 
government statements of the time. Instead, Britain would 
have to recognize that the "various difficulties which had 
arisen in Tientsin" between the two countries had arisen 
because Britain had "ignored" or "not fully observed" certain 
conditions fundamental to a harmonious modus vivendi with 
Japan in occupied China.24 Encapsulated in a draft document 
prepared by the Japanese government that Arita gave to 
Craigie during their first meeting, these conditions were as 
follows:
"The British Government fully recognize the actual 
situation in China, where hostilities on a large scale are in 
progreiss and note that, as long as that state of affairs 
continues to exist, the Japanese forces in China have special 
requirements for the purpose of safeguarding their own 
security and maintaining public order in the regions under 
their control, and they have to take the necessary steps in 
order to suppress or remove any such acts or causes as will 
obstruct them or benefit their enemy. The British Government, 
therefore, will refrain and cause the British authorities in
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China to refrain from all acts and measures which will 
interfere with the Japanese forces in attaining their above- 
mentioned objectives.”25
In this statement, the British wer-e being asked to
accept the following propositions: that there were large
scale "hostilities" (but no formal state of war) in China; 
that such "hostilities" were a predicament in which Japanese 
troops found themselves rather than a consequence of their 
own actions; that the Japanese Army in this situation had 
"special requirements" to provide for its "security" and the 
"maintenance of public order"; that Japanese forces had the 
right to "suppress" any action that "obstructed" them or
"benefited their enemy"; and that "British authorities" would 
"refrain from all acts and measures" that would impede 
Japanese forces in the pursuit of these objectives. The 
statement's most important claim —  that, "for the purpose of 
safeguarding their own security and maintaining public 
order," Japanese soldiers had a right to "suppress” or 
"remove" all "acts or causes as will obstruct them or benefit 
their enemy" —  could be traced to the 10 July memorandum of 
General Muto's delegation.
With no reference in the draft to Japan's 'belligerent 
rights' or British 'neutrality', Arita argued that the 
British were being requested simply to accept the factual 
existence of a particular state of affairs in China, not to
pronounce upon its legitimacy. London was not required to
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condone Japan's political or military objectives in the 
region, but only recognize that the Japanese Army had the 
right to protect itself and preserve order in a dangerous 
area of the world. In the words of a statement issued by the
/h f/3^J
-Ghinaa-— Affairs— Hff-i&e- (Koain) on 17 July, the proposal was 
"separate and distinct from questions of legal recognition" 
(horitsujo no shonin no mondai to wa hanarete) and sought 
merely "de facto British co-operation in the maintenance of 
public order and other regional issues" (chian iji sono hoka 
chihoteki jiko ni tsuki jijitsujo kore to kyochoteki taido ni 
ideshimuru no yo aru).26
For Britain to sign this statement, however, was not as 
straightforward as Arita made out. Although the Japanese 
draft supposedly had "nothing to do with British China 
policy," Arita's instructions from the Cabinet two days 
previously were to obtain Britain's "co-operation in the 
construction of a New Order in East Asia" and bring about the 
"abandonment of her attitude of assisting Chiang Kai-shek,"27 
in line with War Ministry recommendations of 4 and 9 July.28 
They were clearly policy-related. The Army's "special 
requirements" to uphold security and public order in China 
and to "suppress or remove any such acts or causes as will 
obstruct them or benefit their enemy" was not an explicit 
endorsement of the New Order in East Asia. But their open- 
ended nature caused many to believe that Arita was seeking,
216
through alternative phraseology, a regional predominance that 
amounted to the same thing.
Whatever the meaning of such provisions, the text of 
the document made clear that what the Japanese government had 
described simply as the need for enhanced "de facto British 
co-operation" in North China would require more than improved 
Anglo-Japanese collaboration on the spot. If London agreed 
that the Japanese Army had the right to "maintain public 
order in regions under their control," Britain would ipso 
facto be implying that Japanese troops were supporting a 
non-violent status-quo, threatened by a "state of 
hostilities" for which the Chinese were responsible. For fear 
of Japanese reprisals, Britain had been evasive about citing 
Japanese aggression as a cause of the conflict between China 
and Japan. But London's refusal to recognize the legitimacy 
of Japanese puppet regimes in Manchuria and other parts of 
China since 1931 nevertheless indicated that British policy 
was predicated upon the unstated assumption that it was 
Japanese military aggression, not internal Chinese unrest, 
that was primarily responsible for the "hostilities" 
mentioned in the Arita formula.
This might not have posed such a problem had the 
interpretation advanced by Arita —  that Japanese troops in 
China were besieged peacekeepers simply responding to Chinese 
acts of hostility —  corresponded to the historical record.
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But through methods such as narcotics promotion, smuggling 
and the emasculation of Chinese governmental powers, the 
Japanese Army had instigated violence, disorder and 
instability to further its ends. At Tientsin, such activities 
included a blockade, insulting treatment of Chinese and 
westerners at inspection points, surreptitious involvement in 
fomenting a price rise in essential foodstuffs within the 
besieged concessions, instigation of anti-British sentiment 
throughout the region, pressure on the Chinese to leave 
British • employment and engage in anti-British acts of 
violence and, by the North China Army’s admission, the 
"fanning of confusion within the British concession" 
(sokainai kakuran o shisaku su).29 These actions suggested 
not the preservation of order, but its opposite, through 
methods as destabilizing as those employed by suspected anti- 
Japanese terrorists operating in and around British and 
French enclaves.
There was another problem with this formula. An 
acknowledgement of the Japanese Army's "special requirements" 
to "maintain public order" would imply that Japan's military 
actually had the ability to create, impose and preserve such 
a condition. Such an inference, however, was belied by 
numerous reports from reliable sources in China, which 
indicated that the control of the Japanese military and its 
puppets did not extend beyond a few cities and the major
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transportation arteries that linked them.30 If Japan's 
suzerainty over China was largely bogus, a declaration that 
its Army had de facto control could, and according to the 
Chinese government should, be regarded as an attack upon 
China's extant sovereignty.31
In the light of these considerations, whether a 
distinction could be drawn between de facto and de jure 
recognition of Japan's occupation of China was questionable. 
For country A (Britain) to grant the occupation troops of 
country B (Japan) special rights to preserve themselves and 
uphold peace in country C (China) —  while at the same time 
believing that country C's insecurity had been primarily 
caused by country B's military aggression -- was the logical 
equivalent of a bank manager entrusting the security of his 
bank vaults to a group suspected of having previously 
engineered their robbery. For this reason, any such 
distinction —  especially if applied to the situation 
existing in North China in 1939 —  was likely to amount to 
little more than verbal semantics designed to camouflage what 
was in effect the approval of a hostile, and largely 
ineffective, military take-over of a foreign state.
For the Japanese Foreign Minister, these questions were 
less important than relieving the political pressure under 
which he was negotiating. Between 7 and 15 July, anti-British 
demonstrations increased dramatically, reaching sometimes
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over 50 a day.32 In mass-meetings that reached 100, 000 in 
Kobe on 9 July and 80,000 in Tokyo on the 14th,33 protesters 
demanded the expulsion of Britain from East Asia, the 
invasion of the Tientsin concessions by force and the 
immediate end to the Tokyo Conference, which was being 
attacked increasingly as an example of a "British plot" 
carried out on Britain's behalf by renegade "pro-British" 
government officials.34 From his point of view, the only way 
British concerns could be met without antagonizing the 
Japanese public to an intolerable extent was to frame a 
statement that was so ambivalent that London and Tokyo could 
interpret it completely differently.
As a result, Arita drew up a draft that substituted the 
illusion of an agreement for its reality. With no mention of 
the New Order in East Asia, a 'state of war' in China or the 
need for Third Countries to follow stricter 'neutrality' 
requirements, London could argue that it was signing an 
administrative document that violated no existing policies or 
international obligations. By contrast, the formula's 
'special requirements' clause gave Tokyo the opportunity to 
argue that the British were recognizing the legitimacy of 
Japan's military occupation.
Craigie’s counter-proposal
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In response to the Japanese draft, Craigie suggested an 
alternative. The draft went as follows:
"The British government fully recognize the situation 
created by the progress in China of hostilities on a large 
scale and note that, as long as that state of affairs 
continues to exist, Japanese forces in China have special 
requirements for the purpose of safeguarding their own 
security and maintaining public order in the regions under 
their control and are entitled to expect that the British 
authorities and British nationals will abstain from any such 
acts or measures as would benefit their enemy. The British 
government have no intention of countenancing such acts or 
measures and have already made it plain to the British 
authorities in China that this is their policy."35
In line with Arita's demands, the British government 
would "recognize the situation created by the progress in 
China of hostilities on a large scale," while refraining from 
equating such hostilities with a 'state of war' or indicating 
that Japan may have been at least partly responsible for 
them. The proposal also recognized that the Japanese Army had 
"special requirements" for maintaining security and public 
order in occupied China, irrespective of whether Japanese 
forces were genuinely interested in or capable of executing 
such functions. Craigie furthermore acknowledged that Britain 
and its authorities or nationals in China should not engage 
in any activities that would undermine the Japanese 
military's ability to carry out their "special requirements", 
or "benefit their enemy."
In return for these concessions, Craigie proposed two 
modifications to the Japanese draft. Instead of acknowledging 
that Japanese forces, in executing their "security" and
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"public order" functions, could "take the necessary steps in 
order to suppress or remove any such acts or causes as will 
obstruct them or benefit their enemy,-" Craigie simply 
proposed that the Japanese military was "entitled to expect" 
"British authorities" and "nationals" to "abstain from any 
such acts and measures." In addition, Craigie wanted to 
substitute the clause enjoining Whitehall to "refrain and 
cause the British authorities in China to refrain from" anti- 
Japanese acts with a vaguer formulation that contained no 
implication that the British government had been responsible 
for previous infractions of this nature, or that they had 
even taken place. The new version simply proposed that the 
"British government" had "no intention of countenancing" 
anti-Japanese activities and that the government would "make 
it plain to the British authorities in China that this is 
their policy."
Arita informed Craigie that he was unenthusiastic about 
these amendments. Earlier during their meeting, the Japanese 
Foreign Minister had stated bluntly that the Japanese draft 
was "virtually Japan's final position" (hotondo saigoteki no 
mono) and that there "was no room for compromise" (yuzuru 
yochi wa nai) ,36 On 15 July, the Home Ministry reported that 
it had uncovered a plot by members of a well-known ultra­
nationalist group to blow up three 'pro-British' officials, 
including Navy Vice Minister Yamamoto Isoroku, in Tokyo
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during the Arita-Craigie talks. In the suspects' depositions, 
a corrupt alliance of pro-British bureaucrats, zaibatsu 
chiefs and political parties was accused ■ of "deafening the 
emperor's ears" to the patriotism of "eighty million hearts 
beating as one." The Arita-Craigie discussions, according to 
this line of thinking, was the latest example of unpatriotic 
treachery that was impeding a unification of the Japanese 
nation-state around the Emperor (kokutai meicho), as well as 
a successful conclusion to "the Holy War in China."37
In these circumstances, acceptance of any modification 
could have incalculable political effects. For instance, 
Craigie's proposal to replace the clause allowing Japanese 
troops to take all "necessary steps in order to suppress or 
remove. . . . acts or causes as will obstruct them or benefit 
their enemy" in favour of a British promise to "abstain from 
any such acts and measures" merely reflected a desire to 
prevent London from having to approve in advance any action 
deemed necessary by Japanese forces for their self-defence 
and the prosecution of their war aims. But in view of the 
frenzied intensity of the opposition to the talks, acceptance 
of this proposal could have been interpreted by the military, 
ultranationalists and other elements of the public at large 
as a willingness to imperil national security in order to 
placate the British, with destabilizing effects for the 
government and dire consequences for those like Arita who
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were suspected of being members of the 'Anglo-American 
faction'.
Craigie's other demand raised different problems. The 
Ambassador's desire to substitute the phrase, "the British 
government.... will refrain.... from" with "the British 
government have no intention of countenancing" anti-Japanese 
activities in the occupied areas was based upon a desire not 
to accept responsibility for previous anti-Japanese acts. 
Trying to make this more palatable to Arita, Craigie argued 
that "the real genesis of past difficulties has not been the 
policy or action of this or that government or this or that 
authority, but the fact that we —  Japanese and British alike 
—  have never had an adequate opportunity to adapt the 
machinery of consultation and collaboration to the ever 
changing situation in China."38 Yet, for Japan, it was 
because of London's 'pro-Chiang' policies that Whitehall had 
not only countenanced, but insisted upon the hostile actions 
that Craigie was so keen not to lay at Whitehall's door. This 
could be seen from Whitehall's order to the British 
concession not to hand over the four anti-Japanese terrorist 
suspects.
These differences, however, were less intractable than 
they seemed. Craigie's desire to eliminate words 
incriminating British authorities for condoning past anti- 
Japanese actions in China did not stem from a belief that the
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government had been blameless in this regard, but a concern 
that London not be seen to capitulate to Japanese pressure. 
In addition, his argument for the removal of the clause 
granting Japanese forces the right to "take the necessary 
steps.... to suppress or remove any such acts or causes as 
will obstruct them or benefit their enemy" was based not on 
the belief that Japanese troops had no such right, but simply 
on a desire that Britain should not be seen to agree in 
advance to any Japanese interpretation as to what was 
"obstructive" to them and "beneficial" to their enemy and 
what was not.
Craigie's stance was therefore very conciliatory. In 
line with Arita's demands, he admitted that 'large scale 
hostilities' in China did not amount to a 'state of war', 
that they gave Japanese occupation forces special rights to 
preserve themselves and maintain public order —  irrespective 
of whether they had the right, interest or competence to do 
so —  and that the British authorities should do nothing to 
undermine Japanese forces in the pursuit of these objectives. 
In his stated desire to avoid giving Japan a "blank cheque" 
(hakushi ininjo)39 for future actions, he appeared concerned 
less about Japan's wielding of unlimited powers in China than 
by the possibility that Whitehall might be held 
internationally accountable for their legitimation.
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While not yet in complete accord with his counterpart, 
Arita seemed encouraged by the course of the meeting.40 The 
Foreign Minister, who had privately indicated as late as 14 
July that the talks "would probably be rough going,"41 seemed 
worried that anti-British demonstrations might derail the 
talks. He was particularly concerned that the rising tide of 
anti-British popular resentment might make life too unsafe 
for the negotiators to continue discussions, as well as 
prompt the British to insist upon a diminution or end of 
anti-British activity as the price for their continuing 
participation in the talks —  demands Tokyo would almost 
certainly have been incapable of meeting.42 Yet to Arita's 
apparent surprise and pleasure, Craigie helped to forestall 
such an outcome by "not mentioning a word" about the entire 
subject (Craigie wa daijin ni naikoku no hanei undo ni tsuite 
wa issho ichigen mo itte oranakatta) .43 In return for these 
proposed compromises, the Japanese Foreign Minister had yet 
to make a concession.
Because the two negotiators were not yet in complete 
accord, both drafts were sent to London. By sending his own 
version, Craigie showed that he was not willing to capitulate 
completely to Japanese demands. But the similarity of both 
documents indicated that Craigie would press London to grant 
Arita's overriding wish: a document that could be interpreted
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by the Japanese as a de facto recognition of Japan's 
belligerency rights throughout China.
Whitehall's Reaction to Arita's Formula
How to react to Japan's military operations in China 
posed a quandary for Britain. If Japan was to be recognized 
as a 'belligerent', the operations in which Japan and China 
were involved would have to amount to a 'state of war' . But 
since Britain was a League of Nations member and Nine Power 
Treaty signatory, recognizing hostilities in China to be a 
'war' would not ensure British neutrality, but oblige London 
to consider coming to China's assistance as a victim of 
external aggression. Two days before the opening of the 
Arita-Craigie talks, London warned Tokyo that the "various 
League resolutions on the subject of Sino-Japanese 
hostilities, to which His Majesty's Government has 
subscribed, would make it very difficult.... to give public 
definition of its attitude as one of neutrality."44 While 
the Japanese government admitted privately that hostilities 
had developed to a point where a "state of war virtually 
existed,"45 Whitehall was saying that making such an 
admission public might force Britain to implement the 
collective security provisions of interwar agreements that 
the West had evaded for so long.
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The Arita statement offered Britain a way out of this 
dilemma. By attributing China's declining security to the 
"existence of hostilities on a large scale," the formula 
recognized that Japanese troops were in a warlike situation. 
But by refraining from^ flp who the belligerents were or what 
had caused the "hostilities" to develop in such a fashion, 
discussion of the role of the Japanese military in their 
promotion was avoided. Few were unaware of Japan's 
responsibility for the conflict in which its troops in China 
were enmeshed. But in the absence of this or any other League 
of Nations statement explicitly admitting that these 
hostilities amounted to a state of war, London could argue 
that granting Japanese troops the right to uphold the 'public 
order' that the 'existence of hostilities on a large scale' 
now threatened was not, at least technically, in violation of 
League of Nations or Nine Power Treaty collective security 
covenants.
In response to the Arita and Craigie formulae, London 
issued a counter-proposal seeking accommodation with Japan 
while camouflaging more comprehensively the concessions 
Britain was prepared to make. Sent to Craigie on 17 July, 
this document stated that the British government considered 
that Japanese forces in China "naturally consider it 
essential" to safeguard their security and maintain public 
order in regions under their control and would "therefore
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look to" "third parties to abstain from any acts or measures" 
that would "obstruct Japanese forces or benefit their enemy 
by acts detrimental to the maintenance of public order." The 
document also said that, "while reserving all the legitimate 
rights that they enjoy with other Powers," the British 
government had "no intention of countenancing" acts that 
would "interfere with" the security of Japanese troops or 
"the maintenance of public order" in Japanese-controlled 
areas.
This document differed from the Arita and Craigie 
drafts considerably. Unlike either draft, it did not admit 
that Japanese troops had "special requirements" to uphold 
security and public order in occupied China, but simply that 
the Japanese forces "naturally consider it essential" that 
they should. Like Craigie, Whitehall did not admit that 
Japan's armies had a right "to take the necessary steps" to 
"suppress or remove any such acts or causes as will obstruct 
them or benefit their enemy." But whereas Craigie 
acknowledged that Japanese forces "were entitled to expect" 
Britain's abstention from such acts, Whitehall was only 
prepared to admit that Japan would "naturally consider it 
essential" that "third parties" should abstain from 
activities of this kind —  and then only if they were 
promoted "by acts detrimental to the maintenance of public 
order." Like Craigie, Whitehall "had no intention of
229
countenancing” —  but not, as Arita wanted, an obligation to 
prevent —  activities undermining Japanese military security 
or public order in the occupied regions. But London watered 
down this statement with the proviso that the "legitimate 
rights" the British Government "enjoys with other Powers" 
must not thereby be interfered with.46
Because the Whitehall document deviated further from 
the Japanese version than the Craigie draft that Arita had 
already rejected, the Japanese government was never likely to 
give it serious consideration. But Whitehall was loath to 
recognize the constraints under which the Japanese government 
was operating. Resolutely adhering to its belief that "there 
is no public opinion in Japan," that the "Japanese public 
have been instructed to demonstrate" and "that the nation, as 
one man, would be waving Union Jacks and shouting 'long live 
Great Britain' as early as tomorrow morning if the 
instructions went forth to do so,"47 London believed that 
Japan's government remained sufficiently in control of its 
people to be more responsive to British proposals than Arita 
had indicated.
Based more upon racial preconceptions than empirical 
analysis, such interpretations of Japan's domestic situation 
bore little resemblance to what was actually happening. In an 
effort to appraise Whitehall of this, Craigie informed London 
of a conversation between American Charge d'Affaires Dooman
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and Japanese military representatives in which the latter had 
expressed "astonishment" and "dismay" at the extent to which 
army propaganda had stirred public opinion. But incredulous 
that the Army could lose control over something it had 
initially encouraged, Whitehall dismissed the purveyors of 
such ideas as "credulous," "feted and flattered by the 
Japanese," "born (in Dooman's case) in Japan of Persian 
parents" (Oriental lineage presumably implying susceptibility 
to self-delusion), "not., entirely able to escape from the 
influence of their (the Japanese) by no means effortless 
charms" and "unable to sift the grain from the chaff."48
In addition, the impetus for Japanese compromise was 
being undermined by an unrelated development far from the 
public eye. Japanese intelligence had been intercepting 
diplomatic cables between the British Embassy and London, the 
American Embassy and Washington and the Chinese Embassy in 
London and Chungking.49 As a result of an intercept of a 
message from Washington to Tokyo dated 18 July, Tokyo 
received information that the State Department had ordered US 
officials in Japan not to intervene in the Tientsin 
discussions even if they concerned issues such as eliminating 
Kuomintang currency from North China. In contrast to previous 
statements emphasizing that the United States would not 
remain detached if the talks in Tokyo focused on issues 
involving the United States and other countries, this
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statement indicated that Washington might be even less 
inclined to intervene on Britain's behalf than Tokyo had been 
led to believe.50
The Arita-Craigie Meetings of 19 July
Foreign Minister Arita’s reaction to Whitehall's 
emendations was predictably unforthcoming. In two tense 
meetings with Ambassador Craigie that took place on 19 July, 
he rejected every change that the British government wanted 
to make. Craigie was informed that, unless London recognized 
the Japanese forces’ "special requirements" to preserve 
security and public order in occupied China, rather than "the 
view of the (Japanese) government" that they should exist, 
the "negotiations were condemned in advance to sterility." 
Arita also insisted that, in order to "give Japanese people 
some assurance that misunderstandings and difficulties on the 
same scale (as happened at Tientsin) need not be expected" in 
the future, the British government had to "cause" its 
authorities and nationals in China to "refrain from" (rather 
than merely refuse to countenance) all anti-Japanese 
activities.51 Britain would also have to support actions 
Japanese forces might take "to suppress or remove any such 
acts or causes as will obstruct them or benefit their 
enemy. ”52
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This was a bitter pill for the British to swallow. 
Arita's insistence that Britain "refrain from" anti-Japanese 
activities amounted, in Craigiefs words, to an admission that 
"our authorities" had "previously been in the habit of 
taking" "obstructive acts and measures" towards Japanese 
troops —  and were being forced to change behaviour at 
Japan's diktat. Furthermore, Arita's insistence that Japanese 
forces could eradicate "obstructive acts" or "acts and 
causes... as will... benefit their enemy" did not 
specifically relate to the supposed "special requirements" of 
Japanese occupying troops to uphold military security and 
preserve public order, but amounted virtually to signing away 
the right to object to any action Japanese forces wanted to 
take in oppressing Chinese inhabitants under their dominion.
In an attempt to head off the impasse, Craigie offered 
another compromise proposal. To save British face, it was 
suggested that Britain "abstain" rather than "refrain" from 
future anti-Japanese "acts and measures." In return, London 
would be prepared to recognize that Japan's army had "special 
requirements" to maintain military security and public order 
in China as well as the right to "take the necessary steps in 
order to suppress or remove any such acts or causes as will 
obstruct them or benefit their enemy," with the caveat that 
the British could "reserve their rights to object to any 
particular step or requirement."53
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Even this proposal did not find favour with Arita. He 
informed Craigie that, unless Britain agreed to "refrain" 
from anti-Japanese activities in the future, the document 
would "imply" that the "attitude of His Majesty's Government 
and of British authorities in regard to such matters was to 
remain precisely what it had been hitherto." This would 
"remove" "the whole point of the proposed declaration which 
was to give Japanese people some assurance that
misunderstandings and difficulties on the same scale (as at
Tientsin) need not henceforth be expected." In addition,
Arita said that a clause reserving Britain's right to object
to future measures by Japanese troops would "mar" the 
"efficacy and intention" of "the proposed declaration," which 
"was intended to be a question of principle."54 Craigie's 
last-ditch suggestion —  that such a right be recognized in 
a "formally agreed record" of the negotiations rather than 
the agreement itself —  was also rejected.55
Arita did offer some minor modifications to his draft. 
He simplified the clause that originally read "Japanese 
forces.... have to take the necessary steps in order to 
suppress or remove any such acts or causes as will obstruct 
them or benefit their enemy" to "Japanese forces.... have to 
suppress or remove any such acts or causes as will obstruct 
them or benefit their enemy" (thus removing the words "to 
take the necessary steps in order"). He also proposed to
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change the second part of the formula from "The British 
Government.... will refrain and cause the British authorities 
in China to refrain from all acts and measures which will 
interfere with the Japanese forces in attaining their.... 
objects" to the "British Government has no intention of 
countenancing any acts or measures prejudicial to the 
attainment of the above-mentioned objects on the part of the 
Japanese forces and will cause the British authorities and 
nationals in China to refrain from such action and 
measures.1,56
These modifications hardly alleviated British concerns. 
The removal of the words "necessary steps" did not dilute 
Tokyo's demand for an open-ended British commitment to 
support Japanese forces in "suppress (ing) or remov(ing) any 
such acts or causes as will obstruct them or benefit their 
enemy." The other amendment still required Whitehall to 
"cause British authorities and nationals to refrain from" 
anti-Japanese activity. As Craigie mentioned, such an 
agreement would grant Japanese authorities in China a "blank 
cheque" to do whatever they wanted in China and would imply 
that British expatriates in China .and/or the British 
government in London had been responsible for anti-Japanese 
activities that were now to stop as a result of Japanese 
diktat. To add insult to injury for the British, Japan was 
not even prepared to promise in writing that anti-British
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agitation in China would die down with the signing of such an 
agreement, a last-minute effort by Craigie and Whitehall to 
wring a concession from the Japanese.57
Craigie reacted angrily to Japan's position. 
Complaining that Arita was "unyielding" and "had scarcely 
taken a single step in my direction" whereas "I had gone a 
very long way to meet him" and that "a great opportunity to 
improve Anglo-Japanese relations was being wasted," the 
ambassador surmised that the negotiations had "reached 
bedrock," that Britain had "gone to the limit of concessions" 
and that London could make "a good case" to "world opinion" 
by calling off the talks.58 Finally confronted by the 
humiliating terms the Japanese were demanding, Craigie urged 
Whitehall that it "be brought home to them that there is a 
limit to our conciliation." Describing Arita as^ a "cleft 
stick," "constrained and preoccupied" and "clearly depressed 
at the course which the discussion had taken,"59 Craigie 
explained these setbacks in terms of anti-British 
demonstrations reaching such a pitch that the middle had 
fallen out of Japanese politics entirely.
There was some truth in this assessment. But absent 
from Craigie’s interpretation of events was a recognition of 
Japan's larger agenda. Arita had informed the Ambassador on 
at least one occasion since mid-June that Japan's ultimate 
aim in any negotiations on Tientsin would likely be either a
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British acceptance of the New Order in East Asia or the 
conditions whereby such a recognition would soon be 
facilitated.60 During their 19 July meeting, Arita reminded 
Craigie of this by criticizing the British for remaining 
uncooperative towards the establishment of the New Order (Toa 
shinchitsujo no kensetsu ni taishite Eikoku ga jurai 
torikitta seisaku wa keshite kyoryokuteki na mono to wa 
ienai).61 While Japan had agreed not to mention the New Order 
in East Asia in their statement, this was an indication that 
references to "special requirements" of Japanese occupying 
troops to "safeguard their own security," "maintain public 
order," and "suppress or remove" "acts or causes as will 
obstruct them or benefit their enemy" were euphemisms that 
amounted to the same thing.
At about the time that Arita was making these comments, 
Sir George Sansom, the British Embassy's Economic Counsellor 
and one of the longest-serving British diplomats in Japan, 
warned of a broad Japanese consensus behind the idea of a 
"'new order' in Asia" that would "involve the ultimate 
displacement of Great Britain in the Far East." Using words 
not very different from those used by Arita in his meeting 
with Craigie, Sansom —  who was on furlough in England during 
the summer of 1939 —  bleakly surmised that it was "open to 
serious doubt whether in present conditions we have any 
useful friends in Japan." From this perspective, trying to
improve Anglo-Japanese relations by solving "points of 
conflict" would do little more than enable Japan "by force 
and threats of force to dominate East -Asia, and in the 
process destroy the greater part of British interests in the 
region. "62
From as recently as 13 July, Arita had said that Japan 
was asking simply for a recognition of "the situation as it 
exists (in China)" (tan ni genjitsu no jitai)63 and an
undertaking that Britain's "policies relating to the China 
Affair" were "not guided by any hostile intention to harm
Japan."64 But being on bad personal terms with Sansom and 
intolerant of the advice he was offering, Craigie made no
reference to Arita's 19 July request for enhanced British co­
operation with the New Order in East Asia in his despatches 
to London. As a result, he was unwilling to appraise 
Whitehall of even the possibility that the New Order in East 
Asia was part of an ongoing political agenda shared 
throughout the Japanese political spectrum. This included 
even so-called "moderates" of the "Anglo-American faction," a 
group whose desire to solve the Tientsin crisis 
diplomatically almost certainly had less to do with a
willingness to coexist peacefully with Britain under existing 
international arrangements than a pragmatic desire not to 
involve their country, as yet without a military alliance
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with Germany, in a war with China, the Soviet Union, Britain 
and possibly the United States at the same time.
At this point, the problem as . viewed by both 
negotiators boiled down to a choice of wording that 
obfuscated the changes Britain was making without showing 
that Japan had compromised its position. For Craigie, Japan - 
- by pushing Britain to reveal that it had "completely 
surrendered to Japan" (Nippon no koatsuteki taido ni kuppuku 
suru ga gotoki insho o ataeru koto) in an agreement that 
London could not even pretend was "mutually agreed upon" 
(sogo seishitsu no mono) or "not forced down Britain's 
throat" —  had finally gone too far.65 For Arita, Japan had 
made a concession to the British by omitting all references 
to the New Order in East Asia in their proposal. According to 
such a perspective, attempts by Britain to obtain further 
concessions by quibbling at, objecting to, or redefining, any 
inconsistencies in the phrases he had substituted in its 
stead would be interpreted in Japan's highly charged 
political atmosphere as insincerity, a desire to carry on as 
before and a refusal to recognize "the actual situation in 
China" as it then existed.
Whitehall Agrees to Compromise
Although aware that recognition of Arita's formula 
might not serve Britain's long- term interests, London
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believed that the proposal was not in conflict with its 
immediate concerns. With Japan described as a "peacekeeper" 
in an area "destabilized" by "hostilities" rather than a 
"belligerent" engaged in "war," London could continue evading 
the choice of either pledging neutrality —  and thereby 
admitting that its multilateral undertakings to China were 
worthless —  or facing up to the reality that Britain was 
obligated to uphold China's integrity from the depredations 
of an aggressor state. By avoiding "dangerous arguments about 
belligerent rights and neutrality," said the Far Eastern 
Department, London could avoid the "vexed question of how far 
we could comply with the obligations of a neutral 
consistently with the resolutions adopted by the League," 
while ensuring that Britain continues to enjoy "the 
advantages that we and other League members derive from the 
absence of a state of war."66
This resulted in the adoption of a position towards the 
Tientsin talks that was slightly more dovish towards Japan 
than the stance adopted by Britain's reputedly 'pro-Japanese' 
envoy. For Craigie, it was certainly important to ensure that 
collective security undertakings of interwar treaties not be 
invoked on China's behalf. But it was also necessary to have 
an agreement with Japan that, in order to save British face, 
somewhat concealed the extent to which such obligations were 
likely to be compromised. But for London, which was grappling
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with a rapid deterioration of Anglo-German relations, a 
Europe edging towards war and cutbacks in military resources 
to the Far East that these developments had provoked, any 
attempt even to provide lip-service to such commitments could 
only be seriously considered if the United States was willing 
to adopt a more active role in Asia and show greater 
willingness to come to Britain's support.67
The news from Washington was not encouraging. On 17 
July, the State Department informed the British Ambassador 
that, while the United States remained "seriously concerned 
with the fundamental issues presented by the present 
situation in the Far East," since discussions in Tokyo were 
limited "to the question of administrative control of the 
British concession,"68 the government would remain 
uninvolved. In the words of a Far Eastern Department 
official, "American support means so much to us in every 
respect, but it seems that we may be left, for a time at any 
rate, to meet the situation by ourselves."69 Of paramount 
concern for the Foreign Office, therefore, was to ensure that 
negotiations do not "break down at this stage on questions of 
wording where an issue of principle is not so obvious as 
would be the case if.. (a) break were (later) to be
threatened over some such question as currency."70
As a result of these constraints, the Foreign Office 
reacted to Craigie's downbeat assessment of the talks by
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congratulating him on wringing from the Japanese 
"concessions" he realized were probably nothing of the sort. 
Managing to get no substantive change to .the first half of 
the Japanese formula of 15 July, Craigie correctly surmised 
that Britain was being asked to "swallow whole" any "special 
requirement" considered necessary by Japanese forces in China 
to pursue their activities and to "endorse" the "much too 
general clause" about allowing the Japanese Army to "suppress 
or remove any such acts or causes as will obstruct them or 
benefit their enemy."71 But determined to sign this 
agreement, the Far Eastern Department went out of its way to 
reassure its dubious ambassador that his success in getting 
Arita to remove the words "to take the necessary steps in 
order.." —  which came before "to suppress or remove any such 
acts or causes as will obstruct them or benefit the enemy" —  
was a real concession that implied that Britain was granting 
less of a blank cheque to Japanese forces in China than it 
really was.72
Even more questionable was another argument advanced by 
the Foreign Office in order to strengthen Craigie's flagging 
spirits. According to a 20 July telegram to the ambassador, 
the Arita formula, by only requesting Britain to "note," 
rather than "agree," that Japanese forces in China had 
"special requirements" to uphold public order and security 
and to "suppress or remove" "acts or causes" obstructive to
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them or beneficial to their "enemy," was not actually 
requiring the British to acknowledge the validity of any of 
these claims.73 Had London really believed-this argument, the 
Far Eastern Department would not have tried previously to 
water down this part of Arita's proposal by replacing the 
words obligating Britain to "note" the existence of such 
rights with a phrase merely requiring Britain to note that 
Japanese forces "naturally consider it essential" that they 
should.74 Especially after having failed to get their own 
less-incriminating version accepted, the Department's 
assertion that "noting" the existence of such rights did not 
amount to a "recognition" that they really existed smacked of 
semantic hair-splitting that verged on the disingenuous.
In an attempt to deflect attention from the magnitude 
of the concessions Britain was being required to accept, 
London made two suggestions. The first was to amend the 
second half of the Arita formula in such a way that Britain 
would not be "causing" its authorities in China to refrain 
from anti-Japanese actions, so as to remove the implication 
that such actions were "something we had previously been in 
the habit of doing." The second was to ask once again for a 
side agreement or "exchange of letters" between Ambassador 
Craigie and Foreign Minister Arita in which Britain's right 
to object to future Japanese military measures in China, as 
well as its "duty" to uphold the "position and obligations of
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other Powers" with interests in that country, would be 
acknowledged.75
These changes were largely cosmeticLondon1s proposal 
that British "authorities and nationals in China" be 
"instructed to refrain from" anti-Japanese activity was only 
a somewhat less blatant admission that they had been involved 
in such acts than was implied when Arita asked London to 
"refrain and cause the British authorities to refrain" from 
such activity (July 15 draft), or when the British government 
was asked to "cause the British authorities and nationals" in 
China to "refrain from" such acts (amended Japanese proposal 
of 19 July). It was also clear that Britain's suggested side- 
agreement was not an attempt to put limits on Japan's freedom 
of action in China so much as a paper mechanism designed to 
"reassure" the British public that there were caveats to 
Britain's acceptance of the accord. London hoped that, by 
relegating such scruples to a little-mentioned side document 
of minimal legal validity, Tokyo would feel that its 
signature to the document would not impair the illusion being 
propagated within Japan that such differences did not really 
exist.
The Signing of the Accord
With London anxious to avoid a rupture of discussions 
at this point, Tokyo could dictate the final terms. In a
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meeting with Craigie on 21 July, Arita agreed to remove the 
words obligating the British government to "cause" its 
nationals and authorities not to engage in anti-Japanese 
activity in China or acts "beneficial" to its "enemy, " but 
insisted that Whitehall not just "instruct," but "make it 
plain," to them that they should "refrain from such acts and 
measures." In other words, the British government had to 
acknowledge more openly than it would. have liked that the 
British in China had indeed been engaging in such activities, 
which were now to stop upon Japanese insistence.76
London's other proposal —  that there be a separate 
record of conversations or exchange of letters acknowledging 
Britain's right to disagree with Japan over what constituted 
legitimate acts of self-defence, or measures "obstructive" to 
Japanese forces in China and "beneficial" to their "enemy" —  
Arita also rejected. Instead, Craigie was told he could 
report back to London that "the first sentence of agreed 
formula is not intended to preclude the British Government 
from making representations" to Tokyo "in regard to any 
particular case if unfortunately the occasion arises for 
doing so." Under this arrangement, there would be no mention 
of "the position and obligations of other powers in China," a 
demand Arita turned aside on the less-than-reassuring grounds 
that he "regarded Britain's statement" about Third Powers as 
"self-evident."77 Meanwhile, Arita gave no assurances about
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ending the anti-British movement in China, saying only that 
his "personal opinion" was that the "agitation would quickly 
subside if (an) agreement were reached • in (the) present 
conversations. "78
Aware that Whitehall was not going to let negotiations 
break down at this stage of the proceedings, Craigie 
recommended that Britain sign the document. Warning London 
against "arousing all Japanese latent suspicions" with side- 
agreements mentioning the rights of Third Powers in China,79 
he advised against insisting upon stronger language than 
Arita proposed that would allow Britain to "agree to 
disagree" with Japan over interpreting the formula, or upon a 
stronger assurance that anti-British activities in China 
would cease. He also recommended that London accept Tokyo’s 
wording of the second sentence of the accord "making it 
plain" to "British authorities and British nationals in 
China" that they should "refrain from" anti-Japanese "acts 
and measures."80
Whitehall agreed to all of Arita's final terms and 
instructed Craigie to sign the document. The British 
Ambassador met the Japanese Foreign Minister late on July 22 
to initial the agreement, after a meeting of the Japanese 
Cabinet earlier that day had ratified the minor changes that 
Craigie had managed to insert into Japan's original proposal. 
It was then agreed that the formula would be made public on
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the evening of 24 July (23 July was a Sunday), for 
publication in the press the following day.
Army Reaction to the Agreement
At the outset of the Tokyo Conference, there had been 
indications that the Army was going to sabotage the talks. 
During the previous two weeks, demonstrations erupted blaming 
the decision to proceed with the Tokyo Conference for Japan's 
failure to conclude an alliance with Germany.81 With the Army 
suspected of colluding in these demonstrations, there were 
rumours in the press, Imperial Household and the Home 
Ministry that the military was "trying to obstruct the Anglo- 
Japanese talks" as part of a "plot to impose an anti­
communist alliance with Germany and Italy" (gun ga shiite 
Nichi-Ei kaisho no seiritsu o bogai shi motte Doku-Ii to no 
bokyo kyotei o teiketsu seshimen to no inbo naru to rufu 
suru) .82
As the talks commenced, there were grounds for such 
fears. At a Cabinet meeting on 14 July, War Minister Itagaki 
rejected Arita's request for a lifting of the blockade if 
Britain agreed to sign his "statement of principle" (Arita wa 
Itagaki ni Eikoku ga nanraka no keishiki nite daiichi gensoku 
o daitai shonin shitaru toki wa Tenshin no kakuzetsu o tettai 
suru no yoi ariya to ukagaitaru tokoro, Itagaki wa sore wa 
komaru to no koto),83 This stand obliged the Foreign Minister
247
to inform the British that, in return for signing an 
agreement in which they might have to give away almost 
everything, they could expect virtually nothing. To 
complicate matters, the War Minister, despite being sternly 
reprimanded by the Palace (on 6 and 12 July)84 for continuing 
to pursue an alliance with Germany, made a dramatic appeal in 
a Five Ministers Conference on 18 July to reconsider 
strengthening the Anti-Comintern Pact. The grounds this time 
were that continuing Kwantung Army setbacks on the Sino- 
Mongolian border now made such an agreement a matter of 
urgent national security.85
From the middle of July, however, there were signs that 
the anti-British movement was beginning to get out of hand. 
Senior government officials and military officers were 
targeted for assassination.86 According to a subsequent 
account of a naval aide-de-camp, the Navy Ministry —  fearing 
an armed attack by fanatical armed units —  had "prepared for 
a possible siege by installing arms, ammunition, provisions, 
lights and an independent electric power plant and had made 
arrangements for digging wells."87 As the would-be assassins 
revealed their schemes, it became clear there was a movement 
afoot to "complete the work" of the failed coup of 26 
February 1936 which had sought to overthrow the entire
O Q
government.
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In a situation in which even his own security could not 
be assured, an apparently chastened War Minister informed the 
Home Minister, the Prime Minister and the- Cabinet Secretary 
in a private meeting on 14 July that "the anti-British 
movement has gone too far" (jitsu wa mo hanei undo ga amari 
ni ikisugite) and that "the Army was extremely worried about 
the situation" (rikugun de wa hijoni shimpai shite irun 
da).89 Because the Army had been suspected of "passing money 
under the table" (kane o dashi)90 to foster the activities 
Itagaki was complaining about, he might have been trying to 
lull the Cabinet into a false sense of security by feigning 
an attitude he did not really hold. But in marked departure 
to what seems to have been previous Army practice, the War 
Minister said that "public opinion needs to be calmed down" 
(kokuron o ochitsukenakereba ikenain da) and the 
demonstrations "suppressed" (danatsu).91
Whatever War Minister Itagaki's intentions, his actions 
indicated to the rest of the Cabinet that he would not regard 
the holding of the Tokyo Conference as a resignation issue. 
Once the final shape of the agreement became known, the Army 
also realized that it would not have to make any substantive 
concessions. Japanese occupation forces would retain full 
autonomy with regard to the blockade while the British were 
being required to legitimize claims of Japanese troops in 
China that were much more far-reaching than anything that had
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been admitted in the past (i.e. suppression of acts or causes 
as would "obstruct” them or "benefit" their enemy).
At a press conference prior to the publication of the 
agreement, Prime Minister Hiranuma gave further assurances to 
the military. He announced that Britain's recognition of the 
"actual situation" in China was an endorsement of the "new 
political realities" from which Whitehall had been determined 
to "avert its eyes" (Shinseiken o mitomeru to iu tokoro made 
issokutobi wa ikanu toshite mo, shinseiken ga dekizaru o enai 
genjitsu no jitai ni me o somukeru koto wa dekinai wake 
da).92 This included the "special relationship between Japan, 
Manchukuo and China" (Eikoku ga kono gensoku ni shitagatte 
Nichi-Man-Shi sankoku no sogo kankei o ninshiki shi).93 He 
also stressed that "the success of the Tokyo Conference would 
have absolutely no impact, adverse or otherwise, on policy to 
strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact" (Tokyo Kaidan no seiko ni 
yotte bokyo kyotei kyoka hoshin no ueni eikyo o ukeru koto wa 
zettai ni nai).94 Therefore, although the government would 
"clamp down hard on anti-British demonstrators" (Kokunai no 
haiei undo ni taishite wa... seifu no hoshin ga.... undo wa 
genju ni torishimeraneba naranu),95 Hiranuma reassured the 
Army that ultranationalist groups advancing military goals by 
terrorizing opponents or insufficiently enthusiastic 
advocates of a Berlin-Tokyo alliance could continue 
unchecked.
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The Marketing of the Accord
To neutralize domestic critics, ■ the accord was 
portrayed in terms very different to what the negotiators 
suspected it really meant. A document that Craigie had until 
as late as 20 July been criticizing as requiring Britain "to 
give the Japanese military in China a virtual carte blanche 
to take any action they thought fit"96 was recast in his 
memoirs as part of a "reasonable solution" in which "the 
rights and interests of Britain, China or other Powers" were 
"not prejudiced" and which provided "a breathing space during 
which exacerbated feelings may calm down"97 (anti-British 
demonstrations in fact continued at fever pitch until almost 
the end of August when talks broke down completely). The Far 
Eastern Department informed Craigie that "we must not be 
understood as undertaking to do anything in implementation of 
the formula which would entail infraction of any of our 
treaty obligations to third Powers."98 But it realized it was 
signing an accord that would likely be used to further the 
New Order in East Asia, a dramatically reduced role for 
western interests in the area and a situation in which the 
obligations and rights of western powers as defined under 
interwar treaties would be to all intents and purposes 
eliminated.
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Japanese politicians were involved in a similar process 
of dissimulation. On 15 July, Arita had stressed that the 
preliminary agreement would serve merely - as a "background” 
document having "nothing to do with Great Britain's China 
policy."" But on the 22nd, Arita was informing his Cabinet 
that "the British and the Japanese were completely of one 
mind" (Nichi-Ei iken mattaku ittchi shi) about signing a 
"memorandum of understanding mandating the British government 
to end its anti-Japanese, pro-Chiang Kai-shek policies" in 
China (Eikoku seifu no hannichi s.hoen seisaku hoki ni kansuru 
oboegaki).100 Meanwhile, the Prime Minister "confidentially" 
expressed (via the British envoy) his "extreme 
appreciation"101 of a statement by Prime Minister 
Chamberlain, according to which Britain was only being asked 
"to view Japan's difficulties with more understanding" but 
not "fundamentally reverse"102 its foreign policy in China. 
At the same time, Hiranuma was proclaiming to his own public 
that British interests in China impinging on "the special 
relationship between Japan, Manchukuo and China"103 would not 
be recognized under the terms of the pact.
When one of Japan's dailies ' criticized Chamberlain's 
comments for being "in conflict with Japan's understanding of 
the purport of this agreement,"104 the stark dissimilarities 
between London and Tokyo's explanations of the accord did not 
escape public comment. But once Japan's Cabinet decided to
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refrain from publicly demanding British recognition of the 
New Order in East Asia in favour of a private commitment in 
this regard, the content of the agreement was likely to be 
less important than the range of interpretations that could 
be read into it. What Craigie and his superiors learnt 
somewhat painfully through the course of the negotiations was 
something the Japanese Foreign Minister seemed to have 
realized from their outset: that if the British wished to
continue evading their collective security obligations to 
China without formally renouncing them, Whitehall would have 
to sign a document that could be plausibly interpreted in 
Japan and the rest of Asia as a de facto British "sell out" 
in the Far East.
Western diplomats quickly criticized Japan for bending 
the terms of the accord to their own advantage. Because Prime 
Minister Hiranuma called a press conference (22 July) before 
the publication of the Arita-Craigie text (24 July), the West 
awoke on 23 July to find that the British had signed an as 
yet unpublished agreement that henceforth allowed for British 
rights in China only if they "did not conflict with the 
special relationship between Japan, Manchukuo and China" that 
the British, by signing this agreement, had "recognized."105 
This caused consternation outside Japan, particularly amongst 
the diplomatic corps in China. Exclaiming that "someday there 
will have to be written a new dictionary of the English
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language," the American ambassador to Chungking berated the 
way Japan "allowed the character of the formula to leak to 
its own public before the time agreed upon- by both sides for 
its publication" and "placed upon it the interpretation it 
wanted."106
These criticisms had some merit. In equating the Arita- 
Craigie accord with a recognition of the New Order in East 
Asia, Prime Minister Hiranuma was definitely seeking to read 
into the agreement as much as he possibly could and arguably 
more than he really should. But whether Hiranuma's 
interpretation was more misleading than Craigie's claim (made 
a few days later to the American Charge d ' Affaires) that the 
document did "not promise anything involving infraction of 
His Majesty's Government's obligations to third parties"107 
is open to doubt. As the international community was 
gradually realizing, an agreement that the British Ambassador 
himself had privately criticized as being too far-reaching in 
its acceptance of Japanese "special requirements" in China 
was a British surrender in all but name.
What one diplomat went so far as describing as a 
"tripled damned formula"108 causing "let down... to the point 
when even the British public do not believe the statements of 
their own officials"109 was, in the last resort, a device 
that allowed Japan, in the words of the Chinese ambassador in 
London, "to enjoy the rights of belligerency without having
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to make a formal declaration of war."110 The agreement was 
deliberately structured to be so vague that both sides could 
knowingly advance diametrically opposed interpretations of 
its text. Through this mutually-agreed-upon process of 
distortion and misrepresentation, Japan would be given an 
even freer hand to subjugate China while Britain could once 
again rest soundly knowing that collective security 
obligations it had incurred as a signatory to the League of 
Nations Charter and Nine Power Treaty would not be invoked 
when it was China's integrity that was at stake.
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Chapter Eight: The Tokyo Conference (2): Police and Security
Once the Arita-Craigie agreement was signed, the 
Japanese and British delegations opened two sets of talks 
dealing with specific economic and security issues arising 
out of the situation at Tientsin. Ostensibly held to uphold 
public order, the police and security talks were specifically 
aimed at ensuring that arrangements for clamping down on 
Chinese activists that were being implemented or discussed 
before the outbreak of the Incident would not again be put 
off track.
With the Army-directed anti-British campaign in China 
at its height, the discussions in Tokyo were occurring at a 
difficult time. Japanese armed forces at Tientsin and Peking 
were engaged in a number of destabilizing activities that 
ranged from inciting an anti-British movement which was 
sometimes violent to the promotion of narcotics. In addition, 
there was no letup in Japan's assault on China. As a result, 
police proposals for Tientsin were being advanced in, and 
affected by, a local and regional context in which the 
pursuit of 'public order' was subordinate or even contrary to 
Japan's other military goals. This chapter will examine 
Japan's police proposals, as well as the draft agreement 
concluded at the beginning of August in which they were 
codified, with a view to evaluating the extent to which the 
situation in which they were produced might have hindered
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their conformity with the stated objectives of the Arita- 
Craigie accord.
The Prioritization of Police Discussions
With the conclusion of the 24 July accord, the Tokyo 
discussions entered a new phase. Until then, negotiators had 
at Japan's insistence focused attention upon drafting a 
general formula under which Britain would recognize that 
Japanese troops on Chinese soil could maintain "public order" 
and "security" in the areas in which they were located and 
"suppress" or "remove" "acts and causes" as would "obstruct 
them or benefit their enemy."1 As was clear from the text of 
the agreement, the object of these efforts was to obtain a 
backhanded British recognition of an occupation that most of 
the international community, including Britain, had regarded 
as illegitimate.
To pave the way for the lifting of the blockade of the 
concessions, it was agreed that the next round of talks, 
which were to last from 24 July to 17 August, should examine 
how the Craigie-Arita formula could be applied to specific 
problems between Japan and Britain arising out of the 
situation at Tientsin.2 But it was not difficult to see that 
what both Japan and Britain classified as "local" issues had 
ramifications that went well beyond Tientsin. As the Chinese 
pointed out, the mere decision to negotiate matters
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concerning "Chinese territory and Chinese sovereign rights" 
without China's participation or approval was technically 
illegal.3 To utilize such discussions in order to eliminate 
Chinese currency and anti-Japanese dissent amounted even in 
British legal opinion to an erosion of the authority of a 
government that Britain recognized to be the legitimate 
ruling entity of a sovereign nation wrongfully under attack.4
Particularly problematic was the act of entering into 
discussions with another power over the fate of Chinese 
nationals upon their own soil. As concession-holders, neither 
Britain nor Japan had been granted judicial authority over 
Chinese living or working in their enclaves,5 but were 
obliged under extra-territoriality laws to deliver "Chinese 
offenders" to "the Chinese authorities" "on due requisition" 
by them.6 For Britain and Japan to enter into negotiations 
with each other over the arrest, internment, interrogation, 
handover and suppression of such people therefore presumed a 
power over Chinese citizens that even senior Whitehall 
officials believed had not been legally acquired by the 
negotiating parties.7
In a decision that would divert attention from such 
broader —  and troublesome —  issues, both countries agreed 
to downgrade discussions by opening up the Conference to 
panels of lower-level military, police and consular 
officials, including representatives from Tientsin. On the
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Japanese side, Foreign Minister Arita ceased to take further 
direct part in the talks and was replaced by the more 
intransigent Kato Sotomatsu, Minister-at-Large to China. 
Assisted by officials from the Foreign Ministry,8 Kato headed 
a joint military-civilian delegation that included prominent 
senior and middle level officers from the North China Army 
General Staff and the Special Services and military police 
detachments at Tientsin, together with a consular 
representative from the Japanese Concession.9 Not included in 
the delegation was General Homma Masaharu, Commander of the 
27th Division which was responsible for instituting the 
blockade.
A similar process of decentralization occurred within 
the British delegation. While Ambassador Craigie remained in 
overall charge of the negotiating team, he delegated much of 
his authority on police and security matters to his Military 
Attache, Major-General Piggott, who was to be assisted by a 
consul from Tientsin and the British Concession's Municipal 
Police Chief.10 A passionate Japanophile, Piggott —  although 
successful in gaining the ear of Ambassador Craigie —  was 
out-of-step with most of his other colleagues, especially in 
London.11 But because Far Eastern Department officials 
realized that discussions were likely to become deadlocked 
upon economic issues, they were no less keen than Piggott in 
'going the extra mile' to 'buy time' by making agreements
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upon police and security matters first. It would then be 
possible to let the conference break down upon issues such as 
currency, over which Britain was more ■ likely to garner 
international (particularly American) support.12
While the talks were to proceed far from the public 
eye, tensions wrought especially by the increasing 
politicization of Japanese public opinion were to have a 
considerable effect upon the negotiating agenda. In 
particular, growing anti-British sentiment had reached such a 
height that any sign of disagreement at the conference table 
was likely to be exploited by ultra-nationalists to organize 
massive public demonstrations against the talks and advance a 
political agenda (i.e. alliance with Germany) that neither 
government wanted. If only to create the illusion of early 
progress, the prioritization of police and security 
discussions was useful as a ploy to "calm" the "exacerbated 
feelings" wrought by months of organized Anglophobia.13 In 
the interim, both delegations could develop more punitive 
guidelines for the disposal of Chinese 'undesirables' at 
Tientsin that could be implemented whether the conference 
subsequently broke down or not.14
As both delegations were aware, these discussions were 
likely to have an immediate and perhaps devastating effect 
upon incalculable numbers of Chinese in and around the 
concessions who were either fighting for national survival by
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any means or simply trying to preserve a sense of national 
identity in troubled times. Yet because Japan had already 
succeeded in getting the British, like themselves, to view 
the Chinese as the cause of their problems rather than the 
victims of their actions,15 there was little compunction on 
either side about negotiating mechanisms by which Chinese 
rights might be further curtailed. It was in this spirit that 
both delegations convened on the morning of 24 July for their 
first meeting in the new phase of discussions.
The Opening of the Talks
After it was decided in plenary session during the 
afternoon of the first day that discussion of economic issues 
would be put off, both delegations spent the majority of 
their time between 24 July and the first few days of August 
discussing police and security issues.16 Attention was 
focused upon evaluating a report prepared by a 'public 
safety' subcommittee that was drawn up after an all-day 
sitting on 25 July and refined a few days later upon the 
arrival of the British Municipal Council police chief from 
Tientsin.17
Led by General Muto Akira from the North China Army 
General Staff and Military Attache Piggott from the British 
Embassy in Tokyo, this subcommittee, which was comprised of 
consular, police, military police (kempei) and "special
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services" J&ofek©-) representatives from Tientsin, produced a 
series of recommendations designed to rid the British 
Concession of the faintest whiff of anti-Japanese sentiment. 
Closely reflecting the desiderata of Japanese delegates from 
China, these proposals included measures to expedite and 
facilitate the handing over of internees, the arraignment of 
"anti-Japanese" suspects, the weeding out of suspected 
Chinese nationalists from the British Municipal Police Force, 
the regulation of radio stations, the searching of ships 
entering and leaving the British "bund," the surveillance of 
public meetings, the censorship of the media, the clampdown 
upon "anti-Japanese" literature of all kinds and even the 
promulgation of more pro-Japanese teaching in the schools.18
The justification for many of these proposals was a 
Japanese concern about the adverse security implications of 
allowing the British Concession to continue to exist in its 
present form. A large political, economic and communications 
centre surrounded by an increasingly hostile countryside, 
Tientsin had become the target of nationalist groups linked 
both to Chungking and the communist-led Eighth Route Army.19 
Like other foreign areas, the British enclave at Tientsin was 
peopled predominantly by Chinese20 and there were concerns 
that the small number of British officials in charge of the 
Municipal Council and its police force21 could no longer 
ensure that the Concession would remain unaffected by anti-
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Japanese activity prevalent in surrounding areas. The 
possibility either of an outrage within the Concession or the 
Concession being used to plan acts of sabotage elsewhere 
could under such circumstances not be discounted.
The British Concession, however, had already severely 
curtailed the activities of the Chinese. Despite the absence 
of legal entitlement, the authorities had restricted import 
and ownership of weapons, the media, school curricula, public 
meetings and any non-violent Chinese nationalist activities 
directed against Japan. Japan criticised the enclave for 
being used as a haven by criminals who had not been 
apprehended elsewhere. But the British had (until the Cheng 
murder) been developing procedures for handling all types of 
suspect that gave the Japanese an increasingly important role 
in their apprehension and examination. It was becoming more 
difficult for every type of prisoner to avoid being handed 
over to the puppet Chinese courts. No doubt partly as a 
result of these measures, the Concession remained freer of 
all types of anti-Japanese activity than surrounding areas 
supposedly under Japan's 'control', with no recorded anti- 
Japanese act of violence within its boundaries until April 
1939.
There was little evidence, therefore, that the British 
Concession was from a Japanese viewpoint a 'security risk', 
or about to turn into one. Yet this did not prevent Japan
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from demanding a stricter surveillance regimen and a greater 
role in its implementation. For instance, one of Japan's 
proposals was for a Japanese military liaison officer and 
police squad to be billeted within the British Concession. 
The liaison would be responsible for ensuring that the 
British Municipal Council maintain a "strict register" of 
"all persons residing in the British Municipal area" and in 
conveying to the British authorities from the Japanese 
gendarmerie "any information at their disposal as to 
irregularities in households so that raids may be made."22 
The upkeep of such a census was intended to 'flush out' anti- 
Japanese activists in hiding by tabulating not just the 
lessees but also the renters and even transitory occupants of 
concession properties. The police squad would ensure that 
information provided to the British by the Japanese to 
apprehend suspects would immediately be used to carry out 
'block raids', the mechanism for apprehending suspects agreed 
upon with the British in March.
A similar pattern could be seen with regard to Japan's 
censorship proposals. As a result of measures such as traffic 
inspections and proclamations urging foreigners to leave the 
British and French Concessions, anti-Japanese literature and 
posters had largely disappeared from both areas as early as 
the beginning of September 1938 .23 Of the relatively few 
complaints about British censorship and control that did
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emerge from the Tokyo discussions in July, perhaps the most 
tangible criticisms emanated from Major Ohta, the military 
police delegate, who said that anti-Japanese literature —  
including school textbooks —  was still being secretly 
printed and circulated, and that "anti-Japanese oral teaching 
apart from books" was taking place in the schools.24 But even 
this allegation was unsubstantiated and none of his charges 
was mentioned in surviving Japanese police reports or 
consular surveys of intra-Concession anti-Japanese activities 
at the time —  which consistently mention 1938, not 1939, as 
being the problem year in this regard.
If the British Concession authorities were indeed as 
effective as the lack of Japanese criticism implied, many of 
Japan's proposals were from a security standpoint redundant. 
There seemed little reason —  from the perspective of 
preserving either public order or the safety of Japanese 
occupation officials —  to insist, for example, that Japanese 
police within the concession direct prepublication censorship 
of newspapers and films since, according to British claims, 
they had already been cleared of anti-Japanese content (hakko 
seraruru shimbun wa hakko maeni sono naiyo ikanara Nippon 
kempei ni oite kenetsu itashitaki).25 Nor was there much 
point in having Japanese police attend Chinese public 
meetings when all but the most innocuous had been banned 
(Sina jin shukai.. no okonawaru beki bawai Nippon kempei-tai
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wa hakkenin o shite kobukyoku keisatsukan totomoni 
shusseshime taki),26 or inspect schools already terrorized 
into deleting anti-Japanese content from .their curricula,27 
or direct searches for weapons that both sides realized were 
probably elsewhere.28
Treatment of Political Suspects
With regard to the talks' most contentious issue —  the 
treatment of political suspects —  Japan's insistence on 
reform stemmed less from a dissatisfaction with previous 
arrangements than a desire to ensure that previously incurred 
undertakings would be implemented in a more consistent 
manner. Until April 1939, the British authorities had been 
interning suspects believed to have been involved in anti- 
Japanese activities outside Concession boundaries. With the 
incarceration of Ssu Ching-wu and his accomplices in late- 
1938, the Japanese started complaining that internment was 
not a sufficient deterrent to prevent criminals suspected of 
having engaged in such activities from using the British area 
as a haven to plan other anti-Japanese acts. But, by the end 
of March 1939, the British had indicated that internment 
would be scrapped in favour of handing over all violent 
political culprits —  whether the presumed offence had taken 
place in the Concession or not.
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With the murder of collaborator Cheng Lien-shih within 
the British Concession in April 1939, this did not happen and 
Britain interned, for the first time, culprits suspected of 
being involved in the commission of a violent anti-Japanese 
act within the Concession. For London, internment in this 
case was conceived as a temporary stage until Japan produced 
a little more documentation that would facilitate their final 
transfer into Japanese custody. But for Japan, what finally 
broke the camel's back were:
1) Britain's decision to intern rather than immediately 
hand over the suspects who had been arrested for a violent 
crime that they had reconstructed in front of Japanese and 
British officials;
2) Whitehall's determination that the confessions 
obtained through interrogation of the suspects by the 
Japanese military police were not an adequate basis for the 
suspects' final transfer to the de facto authorities;
3) the role of Chinese officers within the British 
Municipal Police, implicated by others as being sympathizers 
or paid agents of the Kuomintang, in persuading the suspects, 
having returned to the British Concession from Japanese 
custody, to withdraw their confessions on the pretext that 
they had been obtained under duress (i.e. torture); and
4) Britain's continuing insistence that the confessions 
of these suspects be corroborated by further evidence from
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the Japanese police, which could then be used by nationalist 
sympathizers within the British Municipal Police to alert 
other suspects and gang members still at large about who was 
targeted for arrest and how much the Japanese knew about
• . . .  o g
their activities.
The Japanese were particularly at Britain's
refusal to accept the confessions by the suspects of 
complicity in the Cheng murder obtained whilst in Japanese 
police custody as a sufficient evidentiary basis to justify 
their handover to the local court. Even under old procedures, 
it was common practice in British-administered areas 
throughout China to accept confessions as evidence that would 
justify the handover of British-held detainees to the de 
facto or Japanese authorities as long as there were no 
physical torture marks. In other words, the ground for
refusing to accept confessions produced as a result of
Japanese interrogation was not the possibility that torture 
might have been applied, but only the existence of bodily 
marks indicating that it definitely had. Even in the opinion 
of certain British officials, the statements of the four 
suspects when they retracted their confessions —  in
particular, that they were "kicked in the face" and
"irrigated" with "kerosene" etc. —  were "far from 
convincing" because noone had attested to any physical marks 
of such acts upon the suspects' bodies at the time.30
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Trying to portray in the best possible light a decision 
with which he disagreed, Ambassador Craigie attempted to 
assuage Japanese anger by saying that the question of whether 
the suspects were tortured was not the problem that was 
holding up their transfer. According to Craigie's argument, 
the process was really being stymied by the fact that English 
law did not permit the use of confessions uncorroborated by 
other evidence as a basis to hand over suspects for trial.31
The Japanese found this line of reasoning no less 
hypocritical than the first. As they argued, the reason why 
Britain had agreed that the suspects should be submitted to 
Japanese interrogation was to determine if the initial 
suspicion, held by British as well as Japanese authorities, 
that the detainees were involved in the crime for which they 
were suspected was not completely groundless. For the British 
then to say that the confessions could not be accepted as 
evidence invalidated the reason why Britain agreed to the 
Japanese interrogations in the first place. Such an argument, 
the Japanese also reasoned, illegally arrogated to the 
British a judicial function —  i.e. the power to decide 
whether Chinese suspects should go to trial —  that legally 
belonged to a Chinese court, not the British Concession 
authorities.32
The Muto-Piggott Subcommittee Proposals
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Britain's decision to intern the Cheng suspects led to 
an unravelling of mechanisms by which both countries hoped to 
increase their control and surveillance over Chinese 
'undesirables' within the British Concession. But what had 
stymied the process was not any markedly pro-Chinese feeling 
on the part of the British government. Nor had the enclave 
become a haven for anti-Japanese 'terrorists' over whom the 
British could no longer exert control. The problem really lay 
in the fact that, as long as Britain interned rather than 
handed over suspects, these people remained out of Japanese 
hands. As long as they thus remained in limbo, others could 
find out and protest the grounds upon which Japan or its 
puppets were demanding that such people should be handed 
over. By virtue of Britain's lack of legal jurisdiction over 
Chinese within the Concession, this gave the Chinese 
government some influence in impeding or preventing such an 
outcome should they decide to take up any particular case.
Japan criticized internment in terms of being a 
"judicial and administrative power" that the British had no 
"right to exercise" under its mandate as a Concession 
holder.33 But its underlying motivation in making such a 
criticism was not to protect Chinese rights, but simply to 
prevent the Chinese government from exercising its 
prerogatives as sovereign of China. Although without any 
basis in law, the practice of internment gave Chungking a
270
period of time to protest Britain's handover of Chinese 
suspects to Japan before they had actually been transferred 
to Japanese custody, by which time the value of any protest 
would become meaningless.
The object of the Muto-Piggott subcommittee was to 
fashion proposals that would close this 'loophole' (or, from 
a Chinese viewpoint, 'window of opportunity') irrevocably. 
Operating under the assumption that internment would be 
discontinued, the committee proposed to divide up political 
suspects into two categories: "serious" offenders, who would 
be immediately handed over to the Japanese, and "minor" 
suspects, who would be expelled, possibly with Japan 
discovering in advance when and where such an expulsion would 
take place. But according to the new proposals, "serious" 
offenders would, in addition to those suspected of "violent" 
anti-Japanese activities, also include those suspected of 
"communist violations," a very loose definition that could 
probably be construed to justify the handover of virtually 
anyone. In this atmosphere, proposals such as that advanced 
by General Muto in a 26 July meeting of the subcommittee for 
the handover of "all suspects, even those suspected of" 
peaceful activities such as "distributing anti-Japanese 
leaflets" did not seem particularly extreme.34
As things turned out, this proposal did not receive the 
subcommittee's official endorsement. But under the new rules
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that were drawn up by the panel, suspects would be handed 
over for interrogation not on the basis of "evidence" but 
simply on "strong suspicion" (tsuyoki gimon)35 that they 
might have committed an anti-Japanese "offence," and handed 
over for trial upon the flimsy basis of there being "reason 
to believe" that their activities were "directed towards" 
"terrorist acts" and other acts of violence.36 In many of 
these cases, the British police would no longer conduct even 
preliminary investigations of their own.
Generating a further erosion of any type of "due 
process" for the defendants, the Piggott-Muto proposals
differed past practice in two important respects. The
first was the acceptance of a long-standing Japanese position 
that the decision as to whether "strong suspicion" of 
"activities" "directed towards terrorist acts" actually 
existed would be arrived at "on a case-by-case basis on the 
spot" by the British and Japanese police chiefs acting alone. 
In deciding whether suspects were involved in these acts —  
which by common consent could include such non-violent and 
quite possibly innocuous activities as being a member of 
"communist-leaning" (kyosanteki) or "anti-Japanese leaning"
(konichiteki) organizations (they did not even have to be 
specifically communist or openly anti-Japanese)37 —  these
officials would not be guided by a formula "defined in
advance by negotiators in Tokyo", or (as occurred with the
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Cheng murder suspects) second-guessed by senior officials in 
China or London as a result of Chinese government protests.38
The second difference concerned the use of the
Japanese-induced confession. Under the new rules, the 
"British Municipal Council Police" would "be prepared to 
regard as evidence" for the "handover for trial by the 
Tientsin District Court" confessions made to the Japanese 
gendarmerie. The British also promised that, in spite of
their refusal to hand over the Cheng murder suspects because 
they might have been tortured in ways that left no marks, 
their authorities would "not accept subsequent retraction of 
such confessions on the ground that they were made as a 
result of ill-treatment" unless there was actual "physical 
evidence of such ill-treatment." According to Ambassador 
Craigie, the British would now have to hand over any suspect 
who had confessed to the Japanese and would never ask for
such confessions to be corroborated (according to the
Japanese translation of his remarks, "wagaho wa genju naru 
shoko o yokyu sezu"). In other words, the Japanese could be 
assured that the British authorities would henceforward 
invariably hand over suspects on the basis of confessions 
made in Japanese custody, regardless of whether or not they 
were procured under duress (assuming there were no bodily 
marks), or whether the content of the confessions were 
actually true or independently substantiated.39
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The Fate of the Cheng Murder Suspects
This ruling did not directly relate to the four 
suspects still in British custody wanted for the murder in 
April of puppet official Cheng Lien-shih. But at the end of 
July, the British suggested that Craigie be shown in 
confidence the police records that were withheld from the 
British authorities in Tientsin upon which Japan's case 
against the suspects had been built. Since Craigie had been 
arguing as far back as May that British and Japanese 
authorities at Tientsin had established a prima facie case 
against the four suspects, the Japanese were being invited to 
assume that what would probably be a sympathetic (pro- 
Japanese) review of the case would be passed off in London as 
the 'impartial' corroboration of the suspects' confessions 
that was needed to clear the way for their handover. 
Therefore, the 'findings' that might have seemed to a more 
independent adjudicator unsubstantiated allegation or rumour 
could now be submitted without the need for verification and 
with a good chance of acceptance.
This was largely what happened. The only piece of firm 
"additional evidence" that seemed to have come Craigie's way 
was received from Major Ohta, head of the Japanese military 
police at Tientsin, in a meeting on 27 July. This consisted 
of testimony from another witness indicating that one of the
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suspects who had "confessed to complicity in the murder" was 
paid to act "as a lookout at the time of the murder." At the 
same meeting, Ohta also promised to . "provide further 
particulars" about a "statement" of "a member of the same 
gang who had been arrested earlier in the year. . which had 
implicated the four men."40 But, as Craigie found out in his 
next encounter with Kato, Muto and Ohta on 29 July, this 
statement was not forthcoming. The Japanese therefore did not 
provide any information verifying their allegations against 
three of the four men, including one of the two men who had 
actually "confessed to complicity in (the) Cheng murder" 
whilst in Japanese custody.41
The problems caused by Japan's lack of disclosure was 
compounded by the unsatisfactory nature of existing 
information on the case. Firstly, as was revealed by Craigie 
in a despatch on 30 July, the Japanese Military Police were 
uncertain about the person who shot Cheng. According to the 
testimony of the two suspects who had "confessed" to 
"complicity" in the crime, the assassin was a guerrilla 
leader (Wang Wen) who was still at large, something that 
Japanese authorities did not deny. In addition, the British 
police were still unsure about whether the car the suspects 
were meant to have used to escape was used for this purpose 
since it was "parked in the wrong direction of traffic."42 A 
further problem arose at the end of August when someone
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confessed to British authorities in Hong Kong to have 
actually committed the murder. According to his testimony, 
all four suspects had nothing to do with the crime.43
In order to get around some of these difficulties, the 
Japanese agreed to a suggestion made by Craigie that only two 
of the suspects be charged with "complicity in the crime" and 
two with "membership of a terrorist gang."44 This meant that 
the British would have to hand over both culprits who had 
confessed to being complicit in the crime simply on the basis 
of one independent "source" implicating only one of them. By 
allowing the other suspects to be handed over solely on the 
basis of being a "member of a terrorist group" (whatever that 
meant), the British were proposing a procedure —  with 
reference not just to the Cheng suspects but future detainees 
as well —  that would enable the Japanese, when conducting 
interrogations, not even to have to show that suspects were 
linked to the crimes for which they were supposedly being 
questioned in order to get them handed over.
This was not all. In describing the reasons why the two 
detainees who were not implicated in the Cheng murder should 
be handed over, all Craigie said was that "there seems to be 
no reasonable doubt" that they "were members of the same gang 
(as the others) and in receipt of pay from (the) leader."45 
This was not at all clear. The only records Craigie received 
of "previous terrorist activities" from his Japanese
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counterparts related just to the two men who had admitted to 
complicity in the murder. While Military Police Chief Ohta 
had shown Craigie "a diagram of (a) terrorist organization in 
the British Concession,"46 there is nothing in Craigie's 
writings to suggest that the Japanese provided him with 
evidence showing that the two men to be charged simply for 
being members of a "terrorist group" belonged to this, or 
another similar organization, or had engaged in other crimes 
or anti-Japanese activities.
The result of Craigie's "verification" process was, 
with reference to the murder of Cheng Lien-shih, not much 
more than one paltry piece of arguably relevant information 
directed against one of the four detainees. But once Japan 
agreed to modify the charges against the defendants as 
Craigie suggested, he immediately recommended the transfer of 
all four detainees on the grounds that his inquiry had 
produced the "independent" corroboration of their alleged 
"terrorist" activities that London had sought (which, as we 
have seen, implicated at most only one of the suspects). As a 
senior Far East Department official pointed out, this 
amounted to a "pretty slender" basis upon which to justify 
the handover of all four men.47 In effect, Britain was being 
asked to sanction an action that had once been declared to be 
"offensive" to the British "sense of justice" by disregarding 
the notion of "due process" to an extent that probably would
have been unthinkable had the defendants been either British 
nationals or other Caucasians under British authority.
Determined that negotiations on Tientsin break down on 
economic and not "law and order" issues, Whitehall was in no 
mood to allow such problems to bring about a premature end to 
the Conference. On 11 August, the British Embassy in Tokyo
informed the Japanese that "the Lord Chancellor and the Law
r
Officers of the Crown are satisfied that sufficient prima 
facie evidence has been produced by the Japanese authorities 
to make it obligatory on the British authorities in the 
Concession to hand over, in accordance with the regular 
procedure, the four men.., two on a charge of murder and., 
two on a charge of membership of an illegal gang."48 By 
allowing this statement to be issued, London effectively 
admitted the "corroborating" evidence attained by Craigie in 
his "verification" process was "genuine," and that the four 
men should therefore be handed over immediately to the local 
authorities for trial.49
The Cheng murder suspects were not the only internees 
within the British Concession whose fate was to be decided by 
these talks. Ssu Ching-wu and four accomplices detained 
within the Concession in the autumn of 1938 were suspected of 
involvement in violent anti-Japanese activities outside the 
Concession's perimeter. But whereas the information Britain 
received linked at most two of the Cheng suspects to an act
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of violence, both Ssu and his four accomplices had been 
suspected of violent crimes. Yet, according to an arrangement 
brokered by Craigie at the end of July, it was agreed that 
only Ssu Ching-wu would be handed over to the de facto 
authorities while his accomplices would be "unobtrusively" 
expelled. 50
Why Japan acted the way it did concerning Ssu Ching-wu 
and his associates is unclear. But it was clearly 
inconsistent from the point of view of preserving security 
and public order to demand (in the Cheng case) the handover 
of two people who had neither confessed to involvement in the 
murder nor were clearly linked to other crimes of violence or 
even a particular "terrorist" organization while allowing (in 
the case of Ssu's associates) the expulsion of three men who 
were both linked to specific acts of violence as well as 
identified to be members of a particular "terrorist" group.51 
To get priorities mixed up in such a fashion indicated either 
that issues of local security were not really of particular 
concern to the Japanese, or that the question of which sort 
of detainee was interned in the British Concession had much 
less to do with local security and public order issues than 
the Japanese negotiators in Tokyo liked to make out.
The Purge of the British Municipal Police Force
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In a further attempt to accommodate Japan, the British 
delegation agreed to purge the British Municipal Police Force 
of many of those the Japanese suspected of being nationalist 
sympathizers. For fear of disabling the force entirely, the 
British did not agree to get rid of every Chinese officer 
Japan had wanted to evict.52 But amongst those the British 
did agree to relieve of their duties was Li Han-yuan, the
most senior Chinese officer within the force.
In making its case against Li and his associates, the 
Japanese delegation argued that they had been aiding and 
abetting nationalists in the pay of the Chinese National 
Government,53 as well as "assisting terrorists" within the
Concession since the beginning of 1938. According to Japanese 
police sources, Li had attended anti-Japanese intra- 
Concession meetings with anti-Japanese activists (including 
those where assassination of pro-Japanese officials was 
discussed), agreed to facilitate their residency in the area, 
served as the conduit through which money was transferred 
from Chungking to finance terrorist groups within the enclave 
(to the tune of $500 per month)54 and organized a meeting
between certain anti-Japanese leaders and British Ambassador 
Clark Kerr when he visited the Concession in February 1939.55 
The Japanese further alleged that Li was responsible for
ensuring that the Cheng murder suspects were inadequately 
interrogated by the British Municipal Council Police
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immediately after they were arrested and then persuaded to 
withdraw the confessions they subsequently made to Japanese 
interrogators.5fcl The Japanese stressed that the grounds for 
withdrawing the confessions —  that they had been procured by 
torture —  were irrelevant.
Because there was some doubt within British quarters 
concerning the truthfulness of the Cheng murder suspects' 
retractions, it should not have required much for Japan to 
convince Britain of the alleged links between Li Han-yuan 
and/or the other Chinese police officers and the Cheng murder 
suspects and possibly other anti-Japanese activists. Nor 
would the British have needed much evidence to conclude that 
these officers might have deliberately contributed to the 
breakdown of a procedure designed to transfer this type of 
suspect to the de facto authorities. But despite producing 
"documents" and "diagrams" of "terrorist organizations" 
supposedly implicating the Cheng suspects,57 the Japanese 
refused "for reasons of State" to "produce relevant evidence" 
to back what the British felt were "flimsy" allegations 
advanced "without production of any proof" against the police 
officers.58
As far as the British were concerned, Li Han-yuan was a 
"first-class officer," with advanced officer training at 
Scotland Yard, whose dismissal had even been opposed by 
General Piggott when he travelled to Tientsin in March. A
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Chinese with openly admitted nationalist sentiments, Li may 
have been involved in at least some of the activities alleged 
by the Japanese police. But it is also possible that, largely 
as a result of the work of such highly trained and trusted 
subalterns as Li, the British Concession remained freer of 
violent and non-violent anti-Japanese activity than the 
surrounding areas supposedly under Japanese 'control'. If 
this was true, the links Li formed with anti-Japanese 
individuals and groups, which as far as Japan was concerned 
made him an abettor of terrorism, could actually have been 
part of a strategy of controlling elements that might 
otherwise have been even more unruly than they actually were. 
Yet despite the possibility of Li's having made the British 
Municipal Police force a surprisingly effective 'terrorist- 
prevention' organization, it was agreed that he would go on 
"indefinite leave" to London and then resign from his post at 
Tientsin.59
Once the British had agreed to suspend Li, the Japanese 
said that, instead of the nine other Chinese officers they 
originally wanted relieved of their duties, it would be 
"satisfactory" if only "two or three of these men were 
permitted to resign," and that it could "be left" to the 
"discretion" of the British Consul as to "who should go."60 
Whether Li was a security risk could be argued either way. 
But had the Japanese delegation sincerely believed that these
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other men represented a security threat and felt unable, for 
fear of leaks, to reveal to the British any evidence against 
those who were targeted, it should have- been specific in 
which officer(s) represented the biggest security threat, who 
should be fired first and how many should eventually go. But 
the delegation instead agreed to leave such decisions to the 
judgement of a British official who was not aware that any of 
the officers represented a security risk, and who was not 
going to receive evidence from the Japanese indicating which 
officer in their opinion was more or less 'suspect'.
The Japanese delegation tried to explain this change of 
tack by arguing that who or how many officers were to be 
dismissed was ultimately less significant than the importance 
such an act would have in warning "remaining (Chinese) 
members (of the British police) that they must place their 
professional duties before their national sentiment."61 Such 
an argument might not have been devoid of a security 
rationale. But it is likely that the officers to be dismissed 
as well as those who were to remain had in all likelihood 
already quashed whatever partiality they might have felt for 
the national cause when they participated in British-directed 
sweeps of anti-Japanese activists within Concession 
boundaries.62 It is therefore questionable whether the 
professionalism of these men was something that the Japanese 
were ever terribly concerned about.
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The Negotiations and the Anti-British Campaign
The Arita-Craigie accord had laid down that discussions 
concerning problems arising out of the Tientsin situation be 
conducted with a view to enhancing public order and improving 
the military security of Japanese troops. With regard to 
Tientsin and the surrounding areas, Japanese forces —
sometimes as a result of their own actions —  were in an 
increasingly dangerous position that was clearly of concern 
to them. But the North China Army was also involved in
activities aimed at making the British Concession
"ungovernable."63 In the words of a situation report from the 
27th Division, drafted at the same time as the British and 
Japanese negotiators in Tokyo were holding 'security' talks, 
the military at Tientsin was engaging in efforts to "capture 
the hearts of the Chinese populace" (Shina taishu no seishin 
o haaku shi) by "more aggressively inciting anti-British 
sentiment" (ko-Ei shiso o ima isso kochosu) than ever.64
The existence of an agenda clearly at odds with the
principles supposedly underlying the Arita-Craigie accord was
in part the product of a series of decisions made earlier in
the summer by the upper echelons of the North China Army. On
29 May 1939, the North China Army General Staff had informed
0
Tokyo that, to institute an effective blockade, it wanted to 
"preserve security outside the concession" (sokaigai no chian
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iji ni manzen no chui o harau totomoni) "while at the same 
time instigating disturbances within" (sokainai kakuran o 
kitosu).b5 Japanese forces had been making- life inconvenient 
for the Chinese and exerting pressure on foreigners to leave 
the British Concession during earlier blockades of the 
Concession starting the previous year. But with the 
strippings, searchings and slappings of westerners and 
Chinese at Concession entry points, an anti-British newspaper 
blitz and intimidation of Chinese in British employment 
during the summer of 1939, the North China Army was engaging 
in activities that were more clearly than ever relegating the 
administrative goal of upholding 'security' below the 
political goal of emasculating British power.
While not openly endorsed in Tokyo, many of these 
activities were less-than-wholeheartedly rejected by the 
central authorities. In reaction to the North China Army 
Order of 13 June to "implement a policy of intra-concession 
disturbances" (sokainai kakuran o shisakusu), the Army 
General Staff in Tokyo simply said that "the use of force" 
was "unauthorized" (jitsuroku koshi o mitomezu).66 This 
indicated less a disapproval of the North China Army's 
suggestions than tbcfe an unwillingness openly to endorse them 
if matters got out of hand. By not authorizing "the use of 
force," the General Staff was indicating that it would look 
askance upon an invasion of the British and French
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Concessions, but not necessarily upon any anti-British 
activity short of such a drastic outcome. Meanwhile, in a 
telegram to frher Tientsin, the Foreign Ministry East Asia 
Bureau had urged local officials to do whatever was necessary 
to get Chinese to "scorn the British" (bu-Ei shiso ni itten 
shi) and "depend on Japan" (Nihon izon shiso ni ten suru).67
The Japanese public regarded the outbreak of the 
Tientsin crisis and the widening of Sino-Japanese hostilities 
as the consequence of allowing Britain to continue to exist 
as an imperial power in China. To them, there was no 
contradiction between enhancing Japanese security in China 
and the diminution or elimination of British authority in 
China. But the Tokyo negotiations were revealing that, 
contrary to such an assumption, the Japanese military and de 
facto authorities were doing such a poor job in containing 
lawlessness and anti-Japanese activities in their own areas 
of 'control' that Britain's record in this area, while not 
perfect, was comparatively good. Imposing more restrictions 
on Britain was either —  as would be the case if the Japanese 
military censored meetings, schools and textbooks within the 
enclave —  likely to have no effect in enhancing Japanese 
security or, if Chinese officers within the British Municipal 
Police Force were dismissed, likely to endanger security and 
public order by vitiating the effectiveness of what seemed to
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be a better 'counter-terrorist' force than anything Japan had 
to offer.68
From the multitude of Japanese-sponsored activities 
that were concurrently happening, it was becoming apparent 
that, whatever the British were doing at Tientsin, the 
Japanese military was determined to show that Britain was not 
quite in control of its concession, as well as to ensure that 
the area continue to be perceived as a hotbed of terrorist 
activity, actual or potential. In particular, Japanese forces 
wanted the Concession to continue to be viewed as an example 
of the obstructive role Britain was supposedly playing in 
impeding Japanese efforts to end the war. By this means, it 
was possible to provide sustenance to the anti-British 
movement in Japan —  which was important for resuscitating 
the War Ministry's pursuit of a military alliance with 
Germany —  and divert attention from both Japan's escalating 
military involvement in China and the adverse public order 
consequences of the non-military activities of the Occupation 
authorities that were in part a product of such escalation. 
One of the most important of these was the promotion of 
narcotics.
The Negotiations and Narcotics
Initiated by Britain and other powers well before Japan 
had become an imperial player, the drug trade was revived
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and expanded by the Japanese military as it advanced into
China. According to the Chinese, the Japanese were 
"systematically encouraging opium poppy growing and the abuse 
of narcotic drugs in the territories they occupy" by
immediately setting up an "opium sales monopoly whose sole 
function is to sell the largest possible quantity of 
opium."69 In part to develop a source of revenue for a puppet 
regime chronically unable to raise money in other ways, the 
North China Army had presided over a huge increase in poppy 
growing and narcotics manufacture in North China —  East 
Hopei in particular —  and had even formally rescinded recent 
Kuomintang anti-narcotics laws in an act that resulted in 
"all persons" held under such regulations being "promptly 
relieved from custody."70
Because one of the most important mechanisms by which
the drug trade was expanded was through utilizing the extra­
territorial status of foreign enclaves, in particular the lax 
treatment of foreign criminals by consular courts, the 
narcotics issue was especially relevant to the situation at 
Tientsin.71 An important city situated close to poppy-growing 
areas in East Hopei with more foreign settlements than 
anywhere else in North China, Tientsin had become a major 
centre for the manufacture,72 retailing and export of 
narcotics.73 As a result of a business directed, according to 
the British Consul-General, by the Japanese Special Services
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Chief, the Mayor of Tientsin and the President of the de 
facto government, "unlimited amounts of opium" were 
"available for sale" within the city, where the "manufacture 
of heroin" was also being carried out "on an enormous 
scale. "74
The Japanese Concession at Tientsin played a central 
role in this process. With most syndicates immunizing 
themselves from Chinese law by incorporating as Japanese
firms, the settlement used its extra-territorial status to 
become "the headquarters" of Japan's narcotics industry in 
China and "the nerve centre of heroin manufacture and
addiction in the world."75 With "whole sections of the 
Concession.... honeycombed with narcotic drug dens,"
"laboratories manufacturing various types of heroin powder," 
"literally hundreds" of opium and heroin "smoking joints" and 
retail outlets, and large numbers of "peddlers and hustlers 
for opium dives" "openly plying their trade along the 
streets,"76 the Concession was one of the main areas
responsible, according to a League of Nations estimate, for 
the manufacture of "90% of all the illicit white drugs of the 
world."77
With at least one tenth of the entire Tientsin
population becoming addicts as a consequence,78 these
developments had come to threaten the 'public order' that,
according to the Arita-Craigie accord, the police and
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security talks were meant to 'preserve'. Since most of the 
victims were "low-paid labourers, coolies and beggars" making 
up the bulk of the "large population of homeless Chinese of 
the labouring classes,"79 this was an issue that diplomats 
had been loath to deal with. But with eyewitnesses attesting 
to addicts —  some of whom were "children of two and three 
years of age" —  being reduced "to a mass of decomposed and 
gangrenous flesh, with holes in their bodies that you could 
put your whole fist into"80 and then —  having been deprived 
by "the operators of narcotics joints" of "the last copper of 
their worldly possessions" —  having their bodies "disposed 
of" into the river by "professional 'body dumpers',"81 the 
scale and severity of the problem had reached a point where, 
even from a non-Chinese perspective, total immunization had 
become impossible.
The situation within the British Concession was an 
example of this. There is no evidence to show that the scale 
of narcotics' manufacture and consumption in this area was 
comparable to what was happening in the Japanese Concession a 
few miles upstream. But the constant flow of dead addicts 
floating down the river from the Japanese area,82 together 
with substantial amounts of drugs peddled on the British bund
p *3
necessitating "two or three (police) raids a night" 
were constant reminders of a growing social problem affecting 
all areas of Tientsin.
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The British were sometimes responsible for making the
situation worse. Government sources reveal that "crews of 
British ships" were "smuggling opium from Tientsin... on
their regular runs" (9,800 taels to Weihaiwei alone between 
October 1938 and March 1939) 84 with neither the Concession 
authorities nor London doing anything to stop them. In 
addition, an English officer in the British Municipal Police 
Force later testified that undercover narcotics factories 
within the British Concession were illegally producing up to 
50-60 lbs of morphine and 2-3 tbs of heroin a week. Three 
libs of heroin was enough to provide for up to X,000 
addicts.85
Had the commitment to "public order" on the part of the 
Tokyo negotiators been genuine, there would at least have
been an effort to enforce existing Chinese anti-narcotics 
laws more strictly. In a somewhat tentative fashion, Consul 
Herbert offered to facilitate such action when he suggested 
during a meeting in Tokyo on 26 July that drug pushers 
arrested in the British Concession be handed over to the 
Japanese for interrogation and trial rather than pay the
small fine to the District Court that noone believed 
constituted a real deterrent. But his Japanese counterpart 
demurred on the grounds that "those involved in such offences 
are minor criminals in the same league as gambling miscreants 
and do not constitute a problem for us" (a(hen) kyuin, tobaku
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no gotoki bihanzainin ni taishite wa mochiron kore o mondai 
to sezu) .86
Judging from the rapid fashion in which this matter was 
dropped, there was a consensus between the delegations that 
the narcotics issue should be treated as no more than an 
insignificant addendum warranting the minimum of their 
attention. But the readiness of both sides to acquiesce in 
the 'disorderly' status quo that their disregard of this 
problem helped perpetuate and worsen was an indication of 
just how far the discussions at Tokyo had departed from their 
original brief. Making no attempt to rein in the activities 
of narcotics pedlars, while insisting upon the handover, 
expulsion or termination of employment of those suspected 
merely of harbouring or promulgating pro-Chinese opinions 
constituted perhaps the clearest proof to date that 
'security' and 'public order' had become euphemisms for 
administrative procedures at Tientsin that were likely to 
benefit collaborators who were criminals at the expense of 
law-abiding citizens who were not.
The Draft Agreement
With Japanese and British delegates working largely 
hand-in-glove, it did not take long before both sides were 
able to draw up a draft accord. On 1 August, the Japanese 
Foreign Ministry declared that all outstanding 'law and
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order' issues had been solved.87 But as Minister Kato 
informed Craigie the following day, Tokyo was not prepared 
formally to sign the document until agreement on the rest of 
the Conference agenda had been reached. Kato also told 
Craigie that there would be no easing of the blockade at 
Tientsin until that time.88 With the anti-British movement 
gaining in intensity, especially in Japan, Tokyo was putting 
extra pressure on the British by holding up an accord that 
both sides wanted implemented in a last-ditch attempt to 
force London into a larger agreement that would include 
currency and other matters.
Compared to what was said in negotiations, the text of 
the draft agreement was at first sight somewhat respectful of 
the British. In line with the periodic assurances of the 
Japanese delegation to the effect that Japan had "no 
intention of infringing British authority over the 
Concession" (Eikoku sokai no tokken o shingai suru ishi wa 
mattaku nashi),89 British control over the Concession, 
together with the executive functions of the Municipal 
Police, was officially reconfirmed.90 It was also agreed that 
the Japanese police officers to be assigned to the Concession 
—  a smaller contingent than originally proposed91 —  would 
function as plain clothes "observers" with no formal 
executive powers. Responsibility for media censorship, 
surveillance of meetings, inspection of schools, search and
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seizure of prohibited materials and the arrest, 
incarceration, handover or expulsion of political and/or 
criminal suspects would —  at least in theory —  still remain 
with the British Municipal Police.92
In reality, the document was proposing a substantial 
reduction in British authority. The forced dismissals of the 
Chinese officers from the British Municipal Police, together 
with the billeting of a Japanese police squad within the 
Concession, were the most obvious infringements of British 
power. A further intrusion was the new procedure laid out by 
the draft agreement for the handover of anti-Japanese 
suspects. Under the new rules, the British police would have 
to decide at the time of the suspect's apprehension whether 
to hand him/her over immediately to the de facto court, an 
action that would be taken if they found "evidence" at the 
scene of apprehension that suspect "committed a criminal 
offence" or that his/her "activities were directed towards 
terrorist acts." If there was "strong suspicion" that the 
suspect was "guilty of anti-Japanese terrorist activities," 
he/she would be handed over to the Japanese for further 
interrogation. If it was "merely evident" that the suspect 
committed an "offence" of a "minor political nature," he or 
she would be expelled. With no provision for detention within 
the British Concession beyond three to five days, the option
of internment would to all intents and purposes be 
eliminated. 93
This procedure in theory at least allowed the British 
authorities to retain the right to decide whether anti- 
Japanese suspects should be handed over or expelled. 
According to the revised procedures, the British Municipal 
Police would no longer be able to investigate violent 
suspects whilst in British custody, thereby preventing the 
British from framing their own case concerning the guilt or 
innocence of detainees. Although not explicitly mentioned in 
the draft accord, the divestiture of this important function 
from the British police at Tientsin seems to have been fully 
discussed and agreed upon in previous discussions, with 
Craigie saying specifically to his Japanese counterparts that 
the British "would not conduct a preliminary investigation of 
anti-Japanese terrorist suspects, but would immediately hand 
them over to the Japanese military authorities."94
Another important understanding underlying the draft 
agreement concerned Japanese-induced confessions. In a 
previous meeting, Craigie apparently said that, while the 
British would still need corroboration of the Cheng suspects' 
confessions, the procedure to be adopted with reference to 
future cases would be 1) that Britain would accept the 
principle that Japanese-induced confessions constituted 
"evidence" sufficient to justify their handover to the local
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court; and 2) that Britain would not ask for corroborating 
information to "validate" such confessions (wagaho wa genju 
naru shoko o yokyu sezu).95 According to the new procedures, 
Britain would now have to transfer anyone suspected of more 
than 'insignificant'' offences on the basis of confessions 
obtained by the Japanese, without any corroboration. In 
effect, the British authorities were being put in the 
position of 'rubber stamping' decisions concerning most 
suspects arrested within the Concession that had been made 
elsewhere. The notion of 'due process' had virtually 
disappeared.
With the agreement only in draft form, what was 
actually to be implemented remained to be seen. But the 
accord, together with the discussions leading up to it, acted 
as a catalyst in advancing a process that had been under way 
for some time. Britain retained authority over its 
concession, but with its powers emasculated. Japanese control 
over the concession became more overt, with Minister Kato at 
one time informing Craigie. that the Japanese Army's right to 
"take the necessary steps" to "preserve" itself under the 
Arita-Craigie accord could include military penetration 
"inside the Concession," with "no interference on the part of 
the British military authorities" to be tolerated.96 The 
agreement was designed to ensure that China would never again 
be able to derail the imposition of measures worked out
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earlier in the year for the apprehension and transfer to 
Japanese authorities of anti-Japanese suspects within the 
British Concession. Finally, having the provisions in draft 
form meant that, if the document remained unsigned in Tokyo 
in the event of the other talks breaking down, they could 
still be implemented by officials at Tientsin after the Tokyo 
Conference, whether it was successfully concluded or not.97
Chapter Nine: The Tokyo Conference (3): The Talks Break Down
In contrast to the negotiations leading up to the 
signing of the Arita-Craigie accord on 22 July and the draft 
police agreement of 4 August, talks on currency issues 
arising out of the situation at Tientsin —  which took place 
between 24 July and 18 August 1939 -- rapidly became
deadlocked. Having set out Japan's position regarding 
prohibition of fapi, the circulation of Federal Reserve Bank 
currency and the right of the Provisional Government to 
inspect Chinese banks within the Concession, Japanese 
negotiators1 were rebuffed by the British on 27 July. No 
major efforts were subsequently made by either side to be 
more compromising, with negotiators in Tokyo doing little 
more than awaiting receipt by the British delegation of 
final instructions from London about how to proceed.2 
Arriving on 17 August, these amounted to a refusal to soften 
Britain's initial position at all, resulting in the 
conference's permanent adjournment.
For a number of Japanese, these developments came as a 
shock. According to a US military attache in North China, 
Japanese military officers had been encouraged to "read into 
the (Arita-Craigie) formula a complete surrender on 
(Britain's) part, which now promised them all they wanted."3 
For those who held such expectations, anything less than a 
British capitulation to Japanese demands was likely to be 
regarded as a hostile act. Somewhat unsurprisingly, 
therefore, a chain of events that has evoked increasing
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interest amongst western historians as a possible example of 
renouncing appeasement has been portrayed in Japan as the 
latest act of British treachery towards the Japanese and 
Asia in a series of events stretching back to the onset of 
western imperialism in the mid-nineteenth century. But 
whether Britain's actions really caused the currency talks 
to fail, or reflected a mutual realization that compromise 
solutions were no longer (if ever) in either country's 
interest, has remained unexplored.
Putting the spotlight upon Japan rather than Britain, 
this chapter examines the failure of the currency talks 
within the context of Japan's economic position in North 
China, its relations with other- powers and its domestic 
political situation. As mentioned earlier, Japan's economic 
situation in North China was unlikely to be decisively 
affected by any agreement concerning the economic conduct of 
a small British-controlled enclave such as the Concession at 
Tientsin. As the economic talks progressed, it also became 
apparent that a negotiated settlement risked goading a 
Japanese public distrustful of Britain and disappointed at 
Tokyo's failure to conclude a military alliance with Germany 
into dangerous forms of direct action, including 
assassinations and coups d'etat. For these reasons, it is 
argued that of greater significance to the breakdown of the 
Tokyo Conference than the hardening of Britain's position on 
currency —  or even the supposed toughening of American 
policies towards Japan that was presumed to underlie it —
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was the increasing irrelevance of a negotiated solution to 
Japan's larger national concerns.
The Hiranuma Statement
The outcome of the economic talks was put into question 
less than twenty-four hours after the signing of the Arita- 
Craigie agreement. On 22 July, before discussions had 
commenced, Prime Minister Hiranuma Kiichiro convened a press 
conference in which he stated that the recently concluded 
pact amounted to a British recognition of a special 
relationship between Japan, Manchukuo and North China. Going 
on to say that British interests in China would be respected 
only if Britain did not undermine this relationship, 
Hiranuma stated that future British credits to the Chiang 
Kai-shek regime (Sho seiken ni taishite kore ijo kureditto o 
settei shite) or continuing British support of the Chinese 
fapi (hohei no ijisaku) —  would violate the terms of the 
understanding that had just been negotiated (konkai no 
gensoku o kettei shita ijo.. kara mite gaii riteki no koi to 
mirubeki de aru).4
Coming without warning, this statement was doubly 
surprising because British aid to China was so paltry. By 
the summer of 1939, total British assistance amounted to a 
five million pound donation made in March of that year to a 
fund managed by a consortium of Chinese and British banks to 
uphold the value of the Chinese national currency5 and a 
three million pound pledge for an export guarantee facility
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for the purchase of British goods by China —  of which only 
about 140, 000 pounds had been used by July.6 This was not 
much more than about one-tenth of the assistance provided 
China by the Soviet Union, which in the previous eighteen 
months had advanced three credits worth a total of 250 
million (US) dollars.7
There were also few indications that Britain wanted to 
raise these aid levels in the future. The currency 
stabilization fund was a modest and belated attempt to 
support the fapi that had been so poorly administered that 
its assets had almost completely disappeared as a result of 
a badly planned effort to preserve China's currency in June. 
When in early July the Chinese government requested an extra 
British donation of between five and ten million pounds, 
Whitehall said that it would be "very difficult to give 
further support" to the fund and that the extent^ Britain 
would "give any help to China" would depend on whether "the 
Chinese government" would appease Japan by "refraining from 
giving too much publicity in connexion with (British) 
assistance." This meant that an agreement that stood to 
benefit Britain by providing Chinese underwriting for 
British government guarantees for money raised in London for 
the export of British goods to China might also have "to be 
deferred."8
Had Tokyo really wanted an economic agreement with 
Britain, these issues would probably have been discussed in 
private by the two countries prior to the Hiranuma press
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conference. But as the British Ambassador —  who did not 
even know about the existence of the export credit facility 
until the end of July —  pointed out, this was not done. 
Instead, the activities of what had become a moribund 
financial institution (the Anglo-Chinese fapi stabilization 
fund) and a modest and virtually dormant credit mechanism 
were now being described by Japan as "obstructive" "acts or 
causes" beneficial to the "enemy" that the Arita-Craigie 
agreement had authorized Japanese forces to "suppress or 
remove" at will.
Like the Tientsin currency questions, neither of these 
issues had much relevance to the creation of a viable 
Japanese financial position in China. Furthermore, as was 
indicated by Whitehall's unsympathetic reaction to Chinese 
requests for more substantive aid, these were issues that 
the British government in serious talks might have been 
willing to settle largely on Japanese terms. Yet by 
proclaiming out-of-the-blue that these questions would be 
viewed as an acid-test of British sincerity in implementing 
the principles of the Arita-Craigie accord, Japan seemed to 
be putting Britain in a position where it had either to 
incur international opprobrium by complying with Japanese 
demands or break off negotiations entirely.
Although some within the Japanese government thought 
that Britain might give in even under these conditions,9 
putting the British on the spot in this fashion raised the 
question whether Japan's interest in obtaining an agreement
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was superseded by a desire to eliminate the possibility that 
a compromise solution could ever be found. The British had 
been informed before the conclusion of the. Arita-Craigie 
accord that the Japanese government had accepted the North 
China Army's contention that all its demands over Tientsin 
were dictated by considerations of military security that 
could not be changed. With the 22 July Hiranuma statement, 
it seemed that a negotiated settlement on any economic issue 
to do with China had become as much anathema to Tokyo as it 
was to the military authorities that the British Ambassador 
and his colleagues had hoped that Tokyo's so-called 
"moderates" would hold in check.
Denunciation of the United States-Japan Trade Treaty
Four days after the Hiranuma declaration, another 
development far away from Tientsin occurred that would also 
have an impact on the course of the Tokyo talks. On 26 July, 
the United States informed Japan that their 1911 Treaty of 
Commerce and Navigation "contains provisions which need new 
consideration." This convention, which had replaced earlier 
"unequal" accords on tariffs, trade, consular representation 
and navigational rights with an agreement granting both 
countries Most Favoured Nation trade status, was as a result 
of "new developments", no longer deemed to be adequately 
"safeguarding and promoting American interests." As 
specified by the treaty, the 1911 agreement would therefore 
"expire six months from this date."10
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Issued only two days after publication of the Arita- 
Craigie accord, the US treaty abrogation notice seemed timed 
to reflect American displeasure over the course of "Anglo- 
Japanese conversations" on Tientsin. The American public had 
been made restive by press reports about Americans and other 
Westerners being stripped, beaten and discriminated against 
in various other ways at Tientsin and elsewhere in China.11 
By not defining what the "new developments" prompting the 
abrogation declaration really were, it was possible for the 
administration to give the impression that Washington was 
concerned about Japan's promotion of anti-Western sentiment 
in China12 and that it recognized that more forceful 
counter-measures needed to be taken.13
The extent to which such considerations really 
determined Washington's action was, however, debatable. The 
26 July treaty termination notice came as a bolt from the 
blue from a country that had previously been extremely 
reluctant even to threaten economic sanctions against Japan. 
For over two years, the US administration had offered little 
more than diplomatic protests to numerous measures designed 
to keep US and other western interests out of China.14 These 
included withdrawing berthing facilities at Chinese ports, 
denying access to inland transportation, setting up monopoly 
development companies, encouraging smuggling, issuing 
fraudulent puppet currencies, attacking expatriate western 
enterprises and their Chinese employees and imposing 
exchange control regulations in North China —  an action
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that, by forcing foreign trade to be conducted through 
Japanese-controlled banks in puppet FRB currency at an 
inflated "official" rate, impoverished the region by 
"reducing" American and other "non-Japanese trade" "to an 
extremely low level".15
There were numerous reasons for Washington's inaction. 
But crucial to this phenomenon were three related 
developments: expanding US-Japan trade ties; bilateral trade 
balances heavily in the United States' favour; and the 
creation of a network of influential US economic interests 
opposed to the imposition of any trade sanction upon Japan. 
In other words, Japan's invasion of China had produced such 
a vast and expanding Japanese dependency upon US energy and 
heavy metals' supplies —  by one estimate, the United States 
was providing over 50% of Japanese war materials16 —  that 
influential sectors of the US economy were profiting 
enormously from the same Japanese military expansion into 
Asia that the US government was professing to oppose.
The United States remained committed by multi-lateral 
treaties to the goals of free trade, the Open Door and 
Chinese national sovereignty. But in areas such as North 
China, a region in which (unlike Japan) America never had 
more than a minimal economic stake, implementation of such 
objectives had become less important than ensuring that the 
difficulties encountered by others would not force the 
United States into defending them. At Tientsin, Japanese 
restrictions on foreign trade and investment —  of which
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America had little —  was therefore of less concern to the 
United States than the possibility that, by getting out of 
hand, the blockade of the British and French Concessions 
would make it more difficult for Washington to continue 
turning a blind eye to Japan's transgressions.
This did not mean that there was no economic tension 
between the two countries. For some time, the State 
Department had voiced disquiet over the 1911 Treaty of 
Commerce and Navigation because its Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) clause applied only to goods and services entering and 
leaving American and Japanese ports and left "the broader 
obligation of general commercial Most Favoured Nation 
treatment undefined." The United States, therefore, was 
"prevented.. from taking various actions such as export 
embargoes or tariff discrimination against Japan," whereas 
Japan could continue "discriminating against American trade 
in China" and other third countries at will.17
It was with the limited intention of removing such 
impediments that the US Congress decided to force the issue. 
On 18 July 1939, Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg 
introduced a resolution into the Senate requesting that, in 
order "to be free to deal with Japan in the formulation of a 
new (trade) treaty" and better "protect American interests 
as new necessities may require," the administration "give 
Japan the six-months' notice required by the treaty of 1911 
for its abrogation."18 For Vandenberg and the business 
interests he represented, the intention behind the
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abrogation move was not the creation Of conditions that 
would result in the imposition of trade sanctions against 
Japan when the treaty expired, but the signing of a more 
favourable trade agreement —  possibly containing provisions 
such as a widening of MFN to apply to US goods entering 
third countries such as China.19
The tabling of the Vandenberg resolution provoked a 
quick response from the Roosevelt administration. For some 
time, the State Department had been constrained by strict 
neutrality laws and a strongly isolationist Congress in its 
attempts to develop strategies to oppose "aggressor 
governments" by "methods short of war but stronger and more 
effective than mere words."20 Because Japan's Most Favoured 
Nation trade status "constituted a technical barrier to the 
institution of trade reprisals against Japan,"21 one of the 
few means by which Washington could pressure Tokyo that fell 
"short of war" but was "stronger than mere words" was 
illegal so long as the US-Japan Treaty of Commerce and 
Navigation remained in force.
Because the United States had so much to lose by taking 
economic reprisals, the termination of the commerce treaty 
was unlikely to lead automatically to the imposition of any 
curbs on US-Japan trade. But in a treatyless situation, 
decisions as to when, how and to what extent Japan's Most 
Favoured Nation status would be revoked would be removed 
from Congress and devolve entirely upon the Executive. As a 
result, the Roosevelt administration was interested not in
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using the threat of treaty abrogation to pressure Japan into 
signing a more favourable trade agreement, but to clear 
legal obstacles to measures such as the .suspension of 
Treasury purchases of Japanese gold, the imposition of 
countervailing duties on Japanese goods and embargoes on 
Japanese purchases of war materials in US markets22 —  
actions that, without a treaty, the Executive could take or 
threaten without Congressional approval.
Although surprised by this action, Tokyo quickly 
recognized that, had the United States been genuinely 
interested in "safeguarding" its economic interests, the 
treaty termination notice would have been preceded by 
numerous warnings and not taken in such a "hasty and abrupt 
manner."23 But Tokyo also realized that, while this action 
had little to do with America wanting to confront Japan more 
forcefully over its policies in China, the US administration 
was unlikely to resubmit itself to Congressional oversight 
by entering into a new trade agreement —  however co­
operative Japan might be.24 In other words, the extent to 
which Japan violated or respected US interests in China had 
little impact in bringing about, and would have no impact in 
overturning, an internal political decision that would, at 
the expense of Congress, strengthen the hand of the 
Executive in relations with Japan.
Because such reprisals could include embargoes of 
strategic products such as oil and scrap iron, the impact of 
treaty termination could eventually prove serious for Japan.
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According to the Finance Ministry, an embargo on these 
materials would be a "drastic blow" (odageki) that "would, 
in six months, force the Army and Navy to. reduce their 
strength by one-third in order to keep going" and put Japan 
"in an impossible situation" (totei tachiyukazaru), with 
incalculable consequences for "the future of the China 
Incident" (Ni-Shi jihen no zento).25 But since the actions 
of the Japanese military in China were irrelevant to the 
timing and had little to do with the cause of the abrogation 
notice, Tokyo knew that the imposition of US sanctions on 
Japan —  which could not happen until the existing agreement 
expired in six months, and might not occur even then —  
would in no way depend upon the course of Anglo-Japanese 
discussions on Tientsin.26
This was not, however, the way the US action was
interpreted elsewhere. Looking for any sign that the United 
States might be leaving its isolationist perch, Chinese 
leaders summed up the hopes of many US allies by describing 
what was really little more than an opportunistic manoeuvre 
by the Roosevelt administration vis-a-vis Congress as a 
"great and illustrious action", validating China's 
"unswerving faith" in the American "sense of justice", that 
was a "decisive step" presaging a "more definite and 
positive attitude" by the US government "to do what is in 
its power to stop international lawlessness and restore
peace" in Asia. The US action was also described as crucial
in "relieving an exceedingly critical and dangerous
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situation" precipitated by the Craigie-Arita accord by 
giving much "needed stimulus and support" to a British 
policy that would otherwise have become craven in its 
appeasement of Japan.27
London's reaction to the US announcement was hardly 
less jubilant. While never greatly interested in advancing 
China's cause, the British government had for some time been 
grappling with the problem of how better to satisfy the 
"quite extraordinary intense emotions" generated by 
"indignities inflicted on whites"28 at Tientsin and 
elsewhere in China than appeasing a group of vanishing or 
illusory Japanese "moderates". With Whitehall eager to 
capitalize on "the immense advantage that might be taken" 
from the US action to "stiffen its attitude in the present 
(Tokyo) negotiations,"29 the temptation to portray the US 
treaty-termination notice as an international call-to-action 
a message to America's beleaguered allies in Asia that 
Washington had finally resolved to "help those who helped 
themselves" —  was overwhelming.
The hardening of Britain's position was almost 
immediate. In the House of Commons, Prime Minister 
Chamberlain declared that a "successful outcome" of the 
talks in Tokyo "would be extremely difficult, if not 
impossible" should "anti-British agitation" —  from which 
British negotiators had averted their eyes until the signing 
of the Arita-Craigie agreement —  "go on unchecked."30 
Meanwhile, Whitehall prepared to denounce Britain's own
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commercial treaty with Japan and issue a statement that, 
Prime Minister Hiranuma's comments notwithstanding, the 
Arita-Craigie accord would not presage the end of British 
credits to China.31
Content that the treaty termination notice might 
galvanize other countries to mount more determined 
resistance to Japan than its own, Washington was unwilling 
to pour cold water on public speculation that US policy 
might be more idealistically motivated than it really was. 
On 2 August, the United States informed Japan that America 
would be "concerned" if "negotiations over the Tientsin 
situation" were "permitted to embrace broader questions" and 
that "adverse reaction" might occur if "any currency 
measures" were implemented as a result of the discussions.32 
But with no mention of reprisals or economic sanctions being 
a potential consequence of US displeasure, it was not clear 
that the words "concern" and "adverse reaction" meant 
anything more than simply the negative press coverage or the 
kind of indifferent diplomatic "protest" that had been so 
unsuccessful in curbing Japanese incursions in the past.
This message did not cause much of a stir in Tokyo. All 
the Japanese Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs said upon 
hearing the US representations was that "he assumed that the 
American Government had no objection to the broader aspects 
(of the Tientsin issues) being discussed but would object if 
any arrangement relating thereto were carried out 
without..(Washington's) prior assent."33 By condoning
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discussion of but not agreements to currency issues raised 
in the talks, Washington was understood to have given the 
Japanese government the go-ahead to do what it. seems to have 
already decided: to use the Tokyo Conference to air
differences with Britain rather than resolve them.
This was a convenient arrangement for both countries. 
By agreeing not to pursue compromise with Britain, Tokyo was 
reassuring Washington that Japan would not try to bolster 
its financial position in China through high-profile 
international agreements that might obligate countries such 
as America to comment publicly about problems that they
would otherwise prefer to leave well alone. In Japan, where 
doubts had been percolating about the effectiveness of any 
bilateral agreement with Britain, deep-seated Anglophobia 
had been whipped up to such a frenzy that —  short of a 
British capitulation to Japanese demands -- the future of a 
divided administration, as well as the physical safety of
its ministers, seemed to depend upon the resolve of 
government officials to eschew, not embrace, the idea of an 
agreement with the British.
Currency Circulation
Substantive discussion on economic issues relating to 
Tientsin began in earnest on 27 July 1939 and continued
through early August. Although addressed first, the question 
of preventing Chinese fapi from circulating within the 
British Concession was dealt with in a fairly cursory
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fashion. From the start, Japanese delegates had difficulty 
in proving that the currency's elimination from the enclave 
would have much of an impact in eradicating the notes 
elsewhere.34 The British Concession had become so isolated 
from the rest of North China that, for those other areas in 
the region in which f api was used, what the Concession 
authorities did or did not do had become largely irrelevant.
The Japanese tried to get round this by arguing that 
the British were "holding out" against a puppet currency 
that was otherwise successfully establishing itself.35 But 
regardless of their questionable validity, Japanese claims 
about the increasing circulation of its Federal Reserve Bank 
currency were simply regarded by British negotiators as 
proof of their contention that developments in North China's 
currency situation depended upon what happened outside, not 
inside, Concession perimeters. In addition, the British were 
able to provide first-hand information showing that, 
contrary to Japanese claims, fapi was still being used in 
the interior and also in other extra-territorial areas36 —  
i.e. right under the noses of the Japanese military.
Another argument advanced by Japan was that, by using 
fapi, the British were responsible for a trade depression 
and the encouragement of smuggling.37 But the precipitous 
drop in North China's trade started in 1937, the year of 
Japan's invasion of the region, and well before Japan and 
its puppet authorities established the Federal Reserve Bank 
notes. The scale of the smuggling, which was usually
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transacted between North and Central China and carried on 
for the most part far from the British Concession, was 
primarily a reaction to Japanese attempts, to obstruct 
traditional trade with non-yen bloc areas. The extent to 
which fapi was used in such activities was less the result 
of Britain's refusal to ban the notes at its Tientsin 
concession than a lack of confidence in Federal Reserve Bank 
currency, which was inadequately backed and not exchangeable 
on international markets.
For reasons little to do with the British Concession at 
Tientsin, even this, however, was beginning to change. On 17 
July, the Japanese military extended exchange control 
regulations, first imposed on select export items in March 
1939, to all exports from the region. Under this system, 
transactions had to be financed in Federal Reserve Bank 
currency purchased at its highly inflated official rate, 
with exporters providing verification of purchase from 
Japanese-approved financial institutions.38 Intended to 
eliminate fapi in export transactions while providing extra 
foreign exchange backing for the puppet currency, these 
regulations helped ensure that the already-depreciating fapi 
became so depressed in value that, by August, it was trading 
at a discount with Federal Reserve Bank currency for the 
first time.39
Getting exporters to buy Federal Reserve Bank notes at 
an inflated rate invited further contractions in North 
China's foreign trade, a potentially devastating development
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for an area no longer self-sufficient even in food. But 
having abandoned economic development in favour of simply 
making North China less of a financial burden on Japan, 
occupation authorities were primarily interested in 
discouraging speculators from using fapi to purchase puppet 
notes on the black market at a discount and then exchange 
them for yen at their much higher official rate. By helping 
to push the value and circulation of fapi to a point lower 
even than that of its puppet counterpart, exchange control 
promised to be more effective in discouraging such 
speculation than any agreement with Britain over banning the 
Chinese currency within its Tientsin concession.
The widening of exchange controls was the latest in a 
series of unilateral actions that played a significant role 
in tightening Japan's grip over China. Yet, while 
cumulatively far-reaching, the incremental implementation of 
these measures —  which had included the blockade of ports 
and rivers, the running down of Chinese customs, Japanese- 
inspired smuggling and the expansion of the narcotics trade 
—  had meant that foreign countries were generally able to 
ignore them. It was perhaps no coincidence that, as efforts 
to 'solve' currency problems away from the negotiating table 
in Japan's favour seemed to be gaining ground, the strategy 
of using the Tokyo currency talks with Britain to air rather 
than resolve differences became more pronounced.
Silver Ownership
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During the first week of August, as warnings from
Britain, the United States and France about the adverse 
international impact of a ban on fapi within the British
Concession reached their height, the focus of Anglo-Japanese 
discussions began to change. Attention shifted from the
question of currency circulation to the disposal of silver 
stocks within the vaults of Chinese banks inside the British
Concession. Because of the relatively modest value of the
assets at stake, this issue —  like the proposed ban on fapi
—  was marginal to a solution of the currency situation in 
North China.40 But as an entirely Chinese matter, this issue 
could be more easily exploited by Japan because it was 
difficult for Britain to justify any intervention whatsoever 
on its part.
Exactly who should dispose of the silver deposits 
within extra-territorial areas in North China was a 
complicated question that had its origins in the creation of 
China's unified currency system in November 1935.41 At that 
time, the Bank of China and the Bank of Communications, 
Chinese banks which had branches within the British 
Concession and other foreign enclaves at Tientsin and
elsewhere, were granted custody rights over the silver
deposited within their vaults. Instead of being freely 
exchangeable and convertible as currency as was previously 
the case, these deposits were to form part of the reserve 
fund for the new paper currency, to be controlled by the 
Central Government's Currency Reserve Board.
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This had the effect of creating two competing claims to 
the deposits. Since, prior to currency reform, the specie 
had constituted part of the area's local exchange 
transactions and represented the wealth and earnings of the 
North Chinese populace, there had always been considerable 
feeling within North China that the deposits belonged to 
North China, should remain within the area and be utilized 
entirely according to local needs. On the basis of this 
view, and in order to depress the legitimacy of the 
Chungking regime's claim to be the sovereign of China, Japan 
argued that the controlling authority over the deposits 
should reside with existing North China governing 
institutions —  i.e. the Provisional Government.42
In rebutting these claims, the British attempted to 
subordinate historical antecedent to a concept of legal 
right. According to this argument, when the Tientsin 
branches of the Bank of China and the Bank of Communications 
were designated reserve depositories for the new national 
currency, the silver under their custody had become State 
property that the Chinese National Government had the 
authority to dispose of in whatever fashion it wished. Since 
the National Government remained in British eyes the 
legitimate governing authority over the Chinese population 
at Tientsin and elsewhere, Britain could not allow the 
deposits to be transferred out of the Concessions according 
to the wishes of an unaccredited regime (i.e. the 
Provisional Government) to what both Chungking and London
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regarded as a rogue entity: the Japanese controlled Federal 
Reserve Bank.43
There were a number of problems with this, approach. The 
idea that currency unification gave a Southern-based regime 
of uncertain prospects ownership over internally-based 
assets in the North was debatable and always likely to 
generate considerable local opposition. The Nanking 
government, which had tried to get the Tientsin assets 
transferred to the custody of the Chinese central bank 
almost as soon as currency reform was enacted, was rebuffed 
in 1935 by the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, the regional 
ruling body in North China at that time, which refused to 
hand over the deposits for fear of "losing" them to the 
South. As a result, the Kuomintang refrained from pressing 
its claim further, even after Japan had invaded the region 
and the Hopei-Chahar Political Council had been replaced by 
regimes even more beholden to Japan.44
The other problem with the British position was the 
assumption that its Concession authorities had the right to 
take any action in this matter at all. Unlike a ban on fapi, 
which could affect foreigners and foreign business dealings, 
the transfer of Chinese assets from one Chinese banking 
institution to another was an internal matter in which 
British interests were not involved. Although Britain did 
not claim to have an a priori right to intervene in Chinese 
affairs, it did argue that it had an obligation to ensure 
that the will of the legal sovereign be executed. But this
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argument had been severely undermined by Britain's decision 
to act in another internal matter —  handing over Chinese 
criminal suspects within its Concession —  according to the 
dictates of local puppet authorities against the wishes of 
the accredited government in Chungking.45
By raising questions about the legality of British 
actions in China, this issue put Britain in a vulnerable 
situation. Thwarting the will of the legal sovereign by 
handing over criminal suspects to the puppet regime, while 
refusing to let the same puppet regime transfer local silver 
deposits inside the Concession to a place of its choosing, 
betrayed an inconsistency in application of what even 
Britain believed to be its legitimate extra-territorial 
functions. Insupportable according to any reading of extra­
territoriality, the contradictory nature of such actions 
invited the charge of unwarranted interference in China's 
internal affairs and gave would-be Chinese as well as 
Japanese critics opportunity for castigating the British on 
the grounds of hypocrisy.
The precarious nature of Britain's position was not 
lost upon British negotiators. Realizing as a result of the 
findings of a joint-subcommittee that there was "some doubt" 
as to "the strength of the Chinese National Government's 
title" to the silver, Ambassador Craigie warned London that 
the British Municipal Council at Tientsin had "no locus 
standi for forcibly preventing transfer" of the silver if it 
were "done by legal process or voluntary arrangement."46
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With Japanese delegates threatening to get the Tientsin 
District Court to issue an order for the transfer of the 
silver, Craigie was anxious to avoid the situation whereby 
Britain, having agreed to execute District Court warrants 
for the handover of Chinese criminal suspects, would not 
obey Court orders concerning another issue in which British 
interests were equally uninvolved.47
Japan was quick to exploit the British dilemma. On 3 
August, Ambassador Kato informed Craigie that Britain's 
"over-legalistic" support of China's National Government's 
claim to the silver amounted to no more than a specious
attempt to uphold the non-existent powers of a regime that 
had long lost all "physical means of disposing" of the
specie. Arguing that any Chinese Government "faculty to 
influence" the matter had "lapsed since 1935," Kato warned 
Craigie that Britain's continuing adherence to a "mistaken 
conception" of its "legal rights and obligations" would lead 
to "inadmissible obstruct(ion)" in an "area where Chinese 
residents were under the jurisdiction of Chinese law". He
further argued that, by opening Britain to "the charge of 
partiality" from Japan and "the people of North China who 
genuinely regarded the silver as their property", such 
action would give both Japanese and Chinese anti-British 
activists "the very ammunition they required" to continue
their protests.48
With no discernible increase of anti-British activity 
in China, these warnings seemed overblown. Concentrated
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mainly in Peking (Headquarters of the North China Army), 
demonstrations in other areas were, according to British 
consular reports, small-scale (usually in . the 100s and 
never more than 5, 000), intermittent and haphazard, with 
only two reported incidents at Tientsin from the start of 
the Tokyo Conference until at least October.49 Nor did 
Britain's position over the silver seem particularly 
objectionable from a Chinese point-of-view. Regardless of 
the merits of the Chinese National Government's claim to the 
silver in question, at issue was not the transfer of such 
assets out of North China, but whether they should be sent 
to Peking. There was little if any indication from non- 
Japanese sources that Britain's desire to keep the silver 
within its Concession at Tientsin as opposed to sending it 
to the Peking-based puppet regime was out of accord with 
local sentiment. If, therefore, there was anything that 
could have served as a catalyst in turning the small-scale, 
Japanese inspired side-shows that passed for an anti-British 
movement in North China into anything more genuine or 
substantial, this issue was not it.
Within Japan, however, the situation was quite 
different. Years of ultranationalist activity and popular 
distrust of Britain had ensured that, amongst the Japanese 
public, the anti-British movement had become not simply a 
creation of Japan's leaders but a mass force, acting with 
considerable autonomy, that politicians ignored at their 
peril. A summer of massive popular demonstrations against
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Britain had culminated in July in assassination attempts on 
suspected "pro-British" ministers and the uncovering of 
plans to overthrow the government.50 In an .atmosphere of 
such Anglophobia, little corroboration was needed for 
allegations that Britain was illegally interfering in China, 
overstepping the bounds of extra-territoriality, promoting 
the claims of a bogus government, or seeking to use the 
Tokyo Conference to engineer the involvement of Third Powers 
on Britain's side to gain sufficient political momentum to 
make a breakdown in negotiations inevitable.
The Anti-British Movement and Relations with Germany
Britain had hoped that the signing of the Arita-Craigie 
agreement would have calmed the political environment within 
Japan sufficiently for both countries to enter into the next 
phase of the Tokyo Conference in a spirit of give-and- 
take.51 But this did not happen. Contrary to such 
expectations, the signing of an agreement during the Tokyo 
Conference seemed to reinvigorate anti-British activists, 
with perhaps as many as one million people taking part in 
rallies, demonstrations, poster campaigns, xenophobic 
newspaper editorials and other manifestations of organized 
Anglophobia, including monster meetings of up to 150,000 
between 31 July and 16 August.52 By early August, according 
to a police official, the movement had "spread throughout 
the country" with such rapidity that it had become 
"extremely difficult to rein in" (haiei undo wa zenkokuteki
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ni okonaware kore ga torishimari kankyu ni kushin o 
haraitari) .53
In another worrisome development for . Britain, the 
demands of the anti-British movement seemed to be virtually 
as uncompromising as ever. The Arita-Craigie accord had 
engendered a certain willingness to "subject" the 
discussions in Tokyo "to careful scrutiny" (nao jubun kaidan 
o kanshi suru o yosu) rather than sabotage them entirely, 
with certain ultra-rightist youth leagues declaring that the 
agreement had actually produced "partial British 
concessions." There was also a decline in the number of 
plots and assassination attempts upon suspected supporters 
of the Tokyo talks. But this only seemed to promote a 
growing confidence that the traditional agenda of Anglophobe 
zealots —  "the complete expulsion of British influence from 
China" —  could be engineered by diplomatic rather than 
military means.54 in addition, it became clear that any move 
away from violence could result in the elimination of those 
obstacles -- in particular the need for secrecy and the 
possibility of a police backlash —  which had prevented the 
anti-British movement from becoming even bigger than it 
already was.
What were clearly unconducive conditions for the 
finding of middle ground in negotiations over Tientsin were 
further complicated by growing popular pressure —  often 
from groups particularly vociferous in their opposition to 
Britain -- for a military alliance with Germany. In the
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words of a colonel in the War Ministry, "the success of the 
anti-British movement" in bringing about "encouraging 
developments in the Anglo-Japanese talks" . had actually 
"galvanized public demonstrations in favour of a military 
alliance with Germany and Italy."55 By the end of July, the 
combined efforts of anti-British organizations, junior 
military officers and other ultranationalist groups had 
created, according to the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, "such 
an acutely radicalized situation" (seneika shi kitaru moyo 
nari) that the government would have to reopen discussions 
with Germany for "the conclusion of an anti-communist 
alliance", whether it wanted to or not (zehi hikyo teiketsu 
o hitsuyo to suru).56
In principle, the Japanese government -- already the 
signatory with Germany of an anti-comintern pact —  was 
supportive of upgrading bilateral relations to the level of 
a military alliance. But negotiations between the two 
countries for the conclusion of such an agreement had been 
broken off in early June because the Hiranuma administration 
was unwilling to commit Japan to an alliance that incurred 
an automatic military obligation to its Axis partners in the 
event of a conflict between those countries and powers other 
than the Soviet Union.57 Because Berlin was unprepared to 
conclude an agreement solely directed against the Soviet 
Union, Japan remained diplomatically isolated and unable to 
count upon even German support should the Japanese 
themselves become embroiled in war.
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Japan's diplomatic isolation did not put the country in 
imminent danger of being attacked by another power. But 
without the certainty of foreign military assistance, 
managing conflicts with other countries on the Asian 
subcontinent forced the Japanese Army to put a greater 
amount of reliance than it might otherwise have been 
prepared to invest in diplomatic rather than military 
solutions. The blockade of the British and French 
Concessions at Tientsin was an example of a conflict that 
was not expected to get out of hand. But for the Japanese 
Army to compromise its field autonomy threatened in other 
situations to be both humiliating and ineffectual.
This was particularly the case with the widening 
military clashes between Japanese and Soviet forces on the 
Manchurian-Mongolian border near Nomonhan. Military setbacks 
incurred largely as a result of Kwantung Army chauvinism 
from the end of May and outright disobedience of General 
Staff orders to limit the fighting in late-June58 had forced 
the Army Minster in Cabinet to seek non-military means of 
solving the dispute. But after receiving a tirade from the 
Navy Minister for "starting the incident behind the 
Cabinet's back, only to ask for help once the military had 
bungled in the field",59 Army Minister Itagaki had to endure 
the further embarrassment of being informed by the Foreign 
Minister, who had agreed on 18 July to seek a negotiated 
settlement, that any attempt to solve the problem "by
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diplomatic means would in the present circumstances be 
extremely difficult".60
Relying upon the Foreign Ministry for something that it 
was unable to provide paved the way for the Soviet Union in 
late-August to inflict such a massive defeat upon Kwantung 
Army forces that the Japanese would have no alternative but 
to sue for a negotiated settlement upon Soviet terms.61 
While noone suspected such an outcome for Japanese troops 
when economic discussions over Tientsin were at their most 
intense (i.e. between 27 July and 8 August), it was becoming 
apparent even at the end of July that the alternative to an 
alliance with Germany was the unprepossessing option of 
subjecting military matters to the scrutiny of an unpopular 
Cabinet riven by "personal antagonism, jealousy, and group 
rivalry".62 As a result, middle-level officers within the 
War Ministry, some of whom were suspected of renewing links 
to ultranationalist demagogues and coup plotters, started 
openly calling for the War Minister to resign unless Tokyo 
and Berlin concluded an offensive and defensive military 
alliance as Germany had demanded.63
In his 22 July press statement 'outlawing' British aid 
to China, the Prime Minister went out of his way to assure 
the public that the continuation of the Tokyo Conference did 
not denote any diminution of government resolve in 
concluding a military alliance with Germany.64 That the 
Japanese public was willing to countenance prolonging Anglo- 
Japanese discussions when prospects for their overriding
326
objective of an alliance with Germany had become uncertain 
indicated that, contrary to Craigie's initial hopes, 
negotiations with Britain had become too superfluous to be 
considered seriously as a counterweight or alternative to 
any Japanese-German rapprochement. Instead, the fate of the 
Tokyo Conference had become dependent upon the Hiranuma 
government's ability to accomplish the seemingly ever more 
contradictory political goals of ensuring its survival, 
preserving Cabinet support for the "moderate" option of an 
anti-Soviet rather than an unrestricted military alliance 
with Germany and containing the popular hostility that such 
a stand was likely to engender.
Anti-Communist Pact or Unlimited Alliance?
Although negotiations between Japan and Germany for the 
conclusion of a military alliance had started in 1938, 
conversations had broken down in early-June 1939 when the 
entire Japanese government, including the Army, agreed that 
Berlin's insistence on a treaty that went beyond 
"strengthened anti-Communism" (bokyo kyoka) made the 
conclusion of a wider agreement impossible. Germany 
responded by breaking off talks, an action that gave the 
impression in Japan that the main responsibility for the 
failure to conclude a treaty lay with Berlin, not Tokyo.65
There were, however, unresolved problems with Japan's 
position which indicated that the government was less united 
than it may have seemed. From the start of negotiations,
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Japan had stressed the importance of not having to offer 
military assistance to its allies in the event of their 
involvement in a conflict with countries other than the 
Soviet Union. But whereas in June, Japan defined its non­
commitment in terms of the "impossibility" of ever providing 
"military assistance" in a conflict in which the Soviet 
Union was not a protagonist,66 in January, the official 
position was that, "even if the Soviet Union is not 
involved", Japan would nevertheless have "an obligation" "to 
consult and reach agreement concerning military assistance" 
(i.e. that such an eventuality could conceivably occur).67 
The draft treaty itself only called for "aid and assistance" 
from Japan in a conflict between Japan's Axis partners and 
other non-communist powers.68 But since "aid and assistance" 
did not necessarily mean military involvement, even the need 
to have an accompanying secret agreement clarifying the 
limits of Japan's military obligations was not clear.
Reflecting less "a coolly calculated diplomacy of 
national interest"69 than a poorly patched-up compromise 
between the sharply differing views of the War and Navy 
Ministries, the government's position on the treaty question 
did not command unified support for very long. In only a 
matter of weeks, growing Army discontent at Japan's military 
isolation and increasing popular pressure in the wake of the 
anti-British movement during June and July for a revival of 
military talks with Germany helped create a domestic 
situation of such turbulence that a new initiative on the
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alliance question had become a security as well as a 
political imperative. In such conditions, the government —  
which had already been the target of coup plotters and whose 
members had been the object of assassination attempts —  was 
in no position to risk antagonizing the public further 
simply in order to preserve a makeshift decision made in 
early June to pursue one type of alliance with Germany but 
oppose another.
Two developments reinforced the determination of the 
pro-alliance proponents. The first was in late^July when the 
Japanese Ambassador in Berlin was informed that Germany was 
giving Japan no more than a month to make an up-or-down 
decision about whether to sign a treaty or not, without a 
secret text of Japanese obligations and disclaimers.70 The 
second was a statement by the Chief Secretary of the German 
Navy Ministry to the Japanese Naval Attache in early August 
that "in a conflict between Germany and Italy on the one 
hand and France and Britain on the other, it would probably 
be sufficient for Japan to display no more than an attitude 
of friendly neutrality towards us."71 Since the treaty draft 
made no specific mention of military co-operation,72 it was 
possible that, as the Chief Secretary had indicated, Berlin
was less concerned with the absence of Japanese military
C e^e  ^  kj
backup than the loss of that would accompany the
discovery of a secret document stating unequivocally that 
such assistance would never be given.
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In the tense political atmosphere within Japan, this 
was enough to get the Army to reconsider its position. On 3 
August, the War Minister, the Chief of the General Staff and 
the Inspector General of Military Education agreed that the 
Army would press for the immediate conclusion of an alliance 
with Germany and be prepared to drop the idea of a secret 
agreement if Berlin still feared the results of inadvertent 
public disclosure.73 After assuring his colleagues that he 
would resign if these terms were not met, the War Minister 
informed the Five-Minister Conference on 8 August that 
"changing political conditions" (especially events at 
Nomonhan and Washington's declaration of intent to end the 
US-Japan trade treaty) "had now made an offensive and 
defensive alliance with Germany an absolute necessity" and 
that Japan should be willing to give up its insistence upon 
a secret qualifying agreement.74
To prevent the War Minister's resignation, the issue 
was put off until a future Five-Ministers Conference.75 But 
fears of reprisals from the United States provoked the 
implacable opposition of the Navy and Finance Ministers to 
an offensive and defensive alliance,76 with only the War 
Minister prepared to drop the idea of a secret agreement 
limiting Japanese liability. Relations between the War 
Minister and his Cabinet colleagues had already been 
severely strained with the uncovering of information in 
late-July suggesting that the supposedly Anglophile Home 
Minister Kido Koichi had been the target of an Army-inspired
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assassination plot.77 With the Navy Minster indicating on 18 
and 26 July that he would resign if the government accepted 
Army demands,78 the Army's insistence upon .coming to an 
unconditional alliance with Germany had brought the Cabinet 
to the edge of an abyss with all escape routes blocked. On
10 August, Itagaki wrote that "the situation is so critical
that the Army Minister will not hesitate to resign as a 
final measure" and predicted that the impact of this upon an 
enflamed public opinion and the souped-up chauvinism of
younger army officers would be to "strengthen the foundation 
in Japan" for such a pact in the future.79
This situation did not bode well for a successful
outcome to the Tokyo Conference. The Cabinet had become so 
dysfunctional that the reopening of the alliance issue was 
not a prescription for closer ties with Germany, but a 
catalyst for setting in motion a chain of events that would 
make the Hiranuma administration's downfall a virtual 
certainty. With its continuing inability to satisfy the 
popular desire for an alliance with Germany, the government 
—  which remained weak, divided and unpopular —  was put 
increasingly in a position where it had less to lose by 
letting the Tokyo Conference break up in deadlock than by 
risking public order, political stability and the physical 
safety of its ministers in concluding an agreement with a 
distrusted rival. In the absence of an alliance with 
Germany, such an agreement (whatever its content) was likely
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to be criticized as a "sell-out" of Japan's national 
interests.
Japan's final position on Tientsin
As prospects for an alliance with Germany dimmed, 
chances for a successful conclusion to the Tokyo Conference 
grew slimmer. But intercepted telegrams between America and 
Japan,80 as well as Britain's public reaction to the US 
notice of intent to abrogate its Commerce Treaty with Japan, 
indicated that the British government —  largely as a result 
of its somewhat ill-conceived attempt to curry US favour —  
was also preparing to harden its negotiating position. 
Therefore, although domestic pressures upon the Japanese 
government meant that it had lost virtually all interest in 
a negotiated solution to the conference, London's 
proclamation of its own intransigence conveniently offered 
Tokyo an opportunity to heap upon its rival most of the 
blame for the eventual breakdown in talks that the Japanese 
were already planning for.
In what seems to have been an attempt to outmanoeuvre 
the British, Minister Kato made a pro forma compromise offer 
to Ambassador Craigie in a conversation on 2 August. In an 
off-the-record meeting that could be disavowed in the 
unlikely event of a positive British response, the Japanese 
envoy expressed his "personal feeling" that, should Britain 
meet Japanese demands concerning the export of silver 
deposits from its Concession at Tientsin, Japan would
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reciprocate by being "flexible" in allowing Chinese fapi to 
continue to circulate within the enclave. With nothing in 
Japanese sources to indicate foreknowledge o,r approval of 
this action by the Minister's superiors, the sincerity of 
the offer was further brought into question by the dogmatism 
of Ambassador Kato's anti-British statements on this very 
issue in a meeting with his British counterpart only three 
days earlier.81
At about the same time this offer was made, an order 
was issued from the Japanese-controlled Tientsin District 
Court for the transfer of the silver deposits within the 
British Concession to the North China government's central 
bank.82 As Ambassador Craigie had feared, this put Britain 
in an awkward position. Should its Tientsin authorities 
ignore the order, the British government would be 
obstructing the ruling of a Chinese court over a purely 
domestic problem —  something well beyond the scope of 
Britain's extra-territorial mandate. It was true that the 
order of the Tientsin District Court —  an entity not 
recognized by the Chinese National Government —  was 
contrary to the will of the Kuomintang-controlled Supreme 
Court. But if Britain intervened on this basis, it would be 
in the position of supporting the judicial arm of a 
government that had never been able to impose its authority 
on North China, whose will the British Concession 
authorities had in fact already disregarded by obeying
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Tientsin District Court orders to hand over Chinese criminal
83suspects.
In addition to these developments, there was a marked 
intensification of Japanese criticism concerning the 
question of British aid to China. At the beginning of 
August, the British government, in response to a question in 
Parliament, had been forced to admit the existence of a 
modest credit guarantee facility for British exporters to 
China along "lines of agreements made with other foreign 
governments" (i.e. China was not a special case), but that 
Whitehall's failure to resolve "certain technical and legal 
questions" (i.e. fear of Japanese reaction) resulted in no 
guarantees for exports to China actually being made.84 What 
therefore amounted to a statement that the British were not 
engaged in offering assistance to China —  and it could be 
argued that such export guarantees would in any event have 
amounted to aid for British exporters, not China —  was 
transformed by the hothouse political environment in Japan 
into "evidence" of Britain's supposed desire to "violate the 
spirit of the Arita-Craigie agreement" by providing the 
means for such assistance to continue.85
Utilizing public anger towards Britain over the China 
aid issue, Minister Kato tried to pressure the British into 
accepting Japanese terms on Tientsin. In a meeting with 
Craigie on 2 August, Kato stressed that the public distrust 
engendered as a result of recent publicity about Britain's 
export promotion fund to China had become so intense that
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simply the continuing lack of an agreement between Japan and 
Britain over the export of silver from Tientsin would have 
the effect of "inflaming public opinion" and stimulating the 
anti-British movement in Japan and China to dangerously new 
heights.86 Alluding to the limited time the North China Army 
representatives of the Japanese delegation could remain in 
Tokyo, Kato informed his British counterpart a few days 
later that public "speculation as to Britain's real 
intentions" towards the economic situation in China had 
grown to such proportions that an immediate settlement (i.e. 
in no more than one more meeting) of economic differences 
between the two countries over Tientsin had become the only 
way of saving the Tokyo Conference from collapse.87
With public anti-British sentiment reaching new heights 
in Japan, Kato's warnings had a significant impact upon the 
British Ambassador. As recently as 29 July, Ambassador 
Craigie had described Japan's proposal for the handover of 
silver deposits within the British Concession as an "unjust 
and illegal action" "unconducive to peace and order" in 
Japan or China, which could have better been improved "had 
the people (of both countries) been told the truth instead 
of exaggerated stories about the sum involved and alleged 
obstruction by British authorities."88 But anti-British 
demonstrations in Tokyo and Kobe (100,000 and 150,000) on 31 
July and 6 August, as well as a rally in front of the 
British Embassy on 7 August, coincided with statements from 
Craigie (on 12 August) that a refusal to implement the
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Tientsin District Court order to hand over the silver in the 
British Concession would constitute a "breach of Chinese 
laws" and could be interpreted as a violation, of the Arita- 
Craigie agreement's commitment to uphold public order in 
China.89
Partly a response to the findings of the joint- 
subcommittee into the silver ownership issue at the 
beginning of August,90 Craigie's change-of-heart did not 
simply represent a cave-in to popular pressure. But since
L-& c ^
mid-July, the British envoy had^extremely worried about its 
impact.91 With anti-British activities continuing unabated 
after the Arita-Craigie accord was signed, it is likely that 
the British Ambassador embraced the option of making 
economic concessions less because of any new-found doubts 
about Kuomintang ownership rights over silver stocks within 
the British Concession than a desire to avoid further public 
antagonism by "playing into the hands of those" who want "to 
bring the negotiations to naught."92
The growing elusiveness of compromise
Largely because it was unclear whether there was anyone 
in Japan who wanted the negotiations to succeed, Craigie's 
arguments were viewed with increasing scepticism in London. 
Declaring that it was "open to serious doubt whether we 
(had) any really useful friends in Japan," Commercial 
Counsellor Sir George Sansom argued in a 2 August memorandum 
to the Far Eastern Department that Anglo-Japanese
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differences —  the solution of which would in his opinion 
involve the renegotiation of post-war treaties and an easing 
of restrictions upon Japanese trade with the British Empire 
—  had become too fundamental for any major improvements in 
relations to be expected simply by "making concessions on 
minor points." On this basis, Sansom warned that any 
compromise with Japan over Tientsin was less likely to 
diminish the atmosphere of mutual distrust than confirm the 
belief of "the (anti-British) forces now dominant" in the 
country that they could take from Britain by agreement what 
they would otherwise have to obtain by force.93
Whether the Foreign Office completely agreed with 
Sansom's gloomy assessment is unclear. But unwilling in any 
event to take the major steps that Sansom believed necessary 
to improve relations, the British government had decided -- 
rightly or wrongly —  that Washington's recent decision to 
abrogate its commerce treaty with Japan represented the 
dawning of a new US resolve to support those who stood firm 
in opposing Japanese transgressions. In this situation, 
Sansom's warnings about small-scale concessions serving as a 
stepping-stone towards the goal held by "all Japanese" of a 
"New Order in Asia" —  the implementation of which he 
believed would involve "the ultimate displacement of Great 
Britain in the Far East"94 —  provided political 
justification for a no-compromise strategy with Japan that 
London had already decided upon.
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As evidence of this change-of-tack, a high-level 
interdepartmental meeting on 31 July decided that the 
"prospects for settling any.. differences with Japan" were 
so dim that it might actually be beneficial "to force a 
rupture" on British terms.95 A few days later, the Cabinet 
agreed to denounce the 1911 Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty 
should "negotiations at Tokyo.. render this step 
desirable."96 The decision to refrain from issuing an 
immediate denunciation was not intended to bolster Craigie's 
hand in negotiations on Tientsin so much as to prevent Japan 
from subsequently using this action to blame Britain for 
sabotaging the talks. With London interested in persuading 
"other British subjects besides those from the United 
Kingdom" that Japan's "anti-British agitation (in China)" 
was directed against them as well, postponing a formal 
denunciation would also provide more time for Whitehall to 
portray a Japanese-inspired movement of only limited success 
as sufficiently threatening to White-Controlled Asia for a 
"simultaneous denunciation of other Japanese commercial 
treaties or modi vivendi.. in force with various Dominions 
and India" to be triggered once the treaty was abrogated.97
Any hopes that London was interested in preventing the 
breakdown of the Tokyo Conference were all but dashed on 10 
August. Responding to the idea of a f api-f or-silver 
compromise by implying that the issue should not even have 
been an item of discussion, Whitehall informed Craigie that 
it was consulting with other powers about the situation,
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that its final instructions would take some time and that 
Japan must meanwhile curtail its anti-British agitation.98 
This was followed by telegrams on 15 and 11 August in which 
Craigie was informed that the British Government would 
refuse to execute the order of the Tientsin District Court 
to hand over the silver within the British Concession and 
that there was "no compromise which we can propose" upon 
this issue.99
Incensed by what he termed "the Far Eastern 
Department's apparent Bourbon-like inability to learn 
anything from past events/'100 the British envoy responded 
that a refusal to negotiate pending the cessation of anti- 
British activities "would play straight into the hands of 
those who are fomenting agitation with the object of 
bringing negotiations to nought."101 Craigie was concerned 
that London's opposition to the extradition of silver from 
the British Concession at Tientsin could be construed as 
based upon "purely political and unsound legal grounds."102 
He therefore warned London that what would be portrayed in 
Japan as a violation of Britain's extra-territorial status 
would also strengthen the position of those "opposed to any 
agreement with Great Britain —  good bad or indifferent."103
To defend the government against the charge of 
Anglophilia, the Japanese delegation was by this stage 
probably as keen as Craigie to curtail any opportunity for 
agitators to use the lingering stalemate in Tokyo to 
heighten suspicion of British motives. But the high level of
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public anti-British rhetoric had less to do with Anglo- 
Japanese differences over Tientsin than popular frustration 
over Tokyo's inability to conclude an alliance with Germany. 
By threatening the government with the stigma of being "pro- 
British", agitators were using Britain's resistance to 
Japanese demands to further a political agenda that had 
nothing to do with Tientsin. Whether such popular unrest 
would subside depended —  contrary to Craigie's belief —  
not on Britain's willingness to compromise in Tokyo, but 
either on the conclusion of an alliance with Germany, which 
was something the British had assumed that the talks on 
Tientsin were meant to prevent, or a change in the 
international situation that would make such a goal no 
longer an overriding popular priority.
Aware of Britain's incapacity to influence events in 
Japan, Whitehall instructed Ambassador Craigie to play for 
time while it formulated final instructions upon how to 
handle Japanese demands.104 With his strategy for improving 
relations with Japan in tatters, the British envoy tried to 
make the best of a bad situation by pointing out to the 
Japanese that their own actions (such as currency controls, 
blockade of the ports and efforts to diminish Chinese 
exports) had been much more successful in undermining 
Chinese fapi than anything that could be expected from an 
agreement with Britain to export silver from its Tientsin 
Concession.105 Craigie also urged Japan to make use of the 
time it would take for London's final instructions to arrive
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by signing the already-negotiated police agreement 
authorizing the Cheng suspects' handover, while clamping 
down on anti-British agitation in China and .loosening the 
blockade of the Concessions at Tientsin.106
With Japan uninterested in any British compromise, 
these efforts were predictably ineffective. Making no 
pretence even of wanting to improve Japan's regional 
economic position, Ambassador Kato bluntly informed Craigie 
that the main reason for getting the silver transferred from 
the British Concession was not to strengthen puppet 
government currency but to undermine the political 
credibility of the Kuomintang.107 Asserting that the interest 
of other Powers in the Tokyo Conference was "minimal" 
(hikakuteki kei), the Ambassador also declared that 
Washington's denunciation of the US-Japan Commerce Treaty 
was an "internal matter", denoting (as Craigie himself felt) 
no heightened US desire to support those who opposed Japan, 
or even to downgrade US-Japanese relations at all.108 In a 
final snub, the plenipotentiary said that Japan could do 
nothing to rein in anti-British agitation —  including the 
spluttering, army-sponsored movement in North China109 —  and 
asserted that the public would "smell a rat" (Eikoku no sei 
no ketsujo o kocho shi) if a police agreement were signed 
separately.110
More bad news for the British delegation was to follow. 
On 15 August, a Japanese wire service reported that London's 
final instructions to its delegation in Tokyo "would be so
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sincere as to assure a satisfactory solution of both police 
and economic questions." As the latest of "many leaks from 
the Japanese side", this induced an angry complaint from 
Craigie that Japanese negotiators were attempting to 
influence the public by "giving away confidential 
information."111 But because all insiders to the talks by 
then knew that London's final instructions were extremely 
unlikely to satisfy Japan, of real concern to the British 
envoy was not simply the leaking of confidential 
information, but the deliberate stoking of unreasonable 
expectations through propagating false rumours. In this way, 
the public anger that was likely to occur once London's 
position did become known could be focused more sharply on 
Britain than might otherwise have been the case.
The extent of government involvement in this 
disinformation campaign is unclear. But in addition to 
knowing by this time that Britain was highly unlikely to 
accept Japan's terms, the Hiranuma administration faced the 
near-certain prospect that the War Minister would resign at 
the next Five-Minister Conference over the Cabinet's failure 
to agree to a military alliance with Germany. The day after 
publication of the misleading report of British intentions, 
there was a large anti-British rally of about 35,000 
demonstrators in Yokohama, just outside Tokyo.112 To prevent 
such discontent from being channelled into more violent 
protest should the Army Minister resign, it had become vital 
for a government already distrusted as a result of its
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supposedly Anglophile leanings to wind up the Tokyo 
Conference immediately with the blame for its failure 
squarely on British shoulders.
The Suspension of the Tokyo Conference
Needing to decide simply upon how to exit the 
negotiations, Japan had its task made easier with the 
receipt of Whitehall's final policy position on 18 August. 
Going so far as to declare that no discussion of Japan's 
"economic proposals" could "lead to any useful result",113 
the communique stated that "agreement between His Majesty's 
Government and the Japanese Government alone was 
impossible." Since the beginning of August, London had asked 
Tokyo for extra time to formulate its position so that it 
could consult with Washington and Paris. But according to 
Britain's 18 August statement, a settlement on Tientsin was 
now not just dependent upon prior consultation with key 
allies such as the Americans and French, but the active 
"contribution" of all Nine Power Treaty signatories.114
In addition to dismissing Japanese demands, this 
statement rejected the basis upon which both countries had 
agreed that negotiations should proceed. At the end of June, 
London had authorized its envoy in Japan to open bilateral 
talks in Tokyo about all aspects of the situation at 
Tientsin. As Ambassador Craigie made clear at the time, 
these involved economic matters. Both countries then agreed 
to a schedule of negotiations that included economic talks
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between the two countries once a general statement of 
'principles' had been signed. It was clearly understood that 
there would be no other parties to the discussions and that 
-- with the exception of China (which diplomatically did not 
seem to count) —  no other country wanted to be involved in 
them. In light of these developments, declaring that an 
agreement on Tientsin could not be obtained by Britain and 
Japan alone implied that the fate of the Tokyo Conference 
depended upon an input from Third Parties that countries 
such as the United States had been at pains to eschew.
Insult was added to injury as far as the Japanese were 
concerned by Britain's unexpected reference to the Nine 
Power Treaty, the 1922 multilateral pact upholding the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of China. In October 
1938, the Japanese government had declared the precepts of 
this agreement no longer 'relevant' to the actual situation 
in East Asia, where there was supposedly a 'New Order' in 
which Japan had pre-eminent rights of domination and 
exploitation.115 Britain —  which like many other powers had 
yet to relinquish the privileges and concessions it had 
wrung from the Chinese over the years -- had responded to 
this statement by saying (14 January 1939) that it also did 
not regard the Nine Power Treaty as "eternal" and that it 
would be willing to listen to any "constructive" suggestions 
that Japan had to make.116
Because the ending of such a covenant would have 
involved an international conference, neither country
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formally entered into negotiations to scrap the pact. But 
the Japanese realized that agreeing in discussions such as 
those over Tientsin that local Japanese t.roops had an 
obligation to preserve "security" and uphold "public order" 
represented a practical step in deactivating the treaty. 
Based on the idea that China's occupiers had "tutelage" 
rights over a region that was no longer considered part of a 
unified state, the presumed right of Japanese troops to 
uphold security and public order was extended from being a 
basis of discussions over Tientsin to form the cornerstone 
of an agreement of "principles" (the Arita-Craigie accord) 
applying to all occupied areas of China.117
In Japan's tense political situation, bringing up an 
international covenant that Britain had gone to such lengths 
to ignore was the diplomatic equivalent of raising a red rag 
to a bull. The military contingent of the Japanese 
delegation had already withdrawn from discussions in protest 
at London's "insincerity" (sei aru kaito o yuzu) and 
"duplicitous diplomacy" (ni-men gaiko), accusing the British 
government of trying to sabotage the Conference by 
engineering the entry of Third Countries (dai sankoku no 
kainyu o kito suru) into the talks.118 With receipt of 
Britain's final terms, the Japanese Foreign Ministry had 
little difficulty in declaring that it was London's revival 
of the Nine Power Treaty that had made an "agreement on 
Tientsin impossible" (Tenshin mondai.. ryokai ni kushimu
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tokoro nari) and brought the Tokyo Conference to a "complete 
breakdown" (kanzen ni ketsuretsu jotai ni ochiri).119
The truth, however, was not so . simple. The 
inconsistency of British attitudes towards the Tokyo 
Conference has tended to obfuscate the limited nature of 
Japan's own interest in what was also an objective of the 
Conference: the forging of workable solutions at Tientsin.
As British negotiators had argued, Chinese fapi was being 
used far too extensively outside Tientsin for Tokyo's demand 
for its suppression within the British Concession to have 
had much of a wider financial effect. Likewise, the silver 
Japan wanted transferred out of the British Concession to 
the puppet central bank would have been too small to reverse 
the shortfall in reserves that was plaguing the circulation 
of Federal Reserve Bank currency. Furthermore, actions that 
the British might have taken to improve local order -- such 
as eliminating currency-counterfeiting rings discovered by 
the Japanese military to be operating out of the British 
Concession at Tientsin120 —  did not seem to have been even 
discussed in Tokyo.
Japan justified its economic demands over Tientsin in 
terms of furthering public order and stability. But its 
negotiating position was based on the impractical 
assumptions that a) a currency with national backing and 
international convertibility (Chinese fapi) could be 
replaced with an alternative that had neither (Federal 
Reserve Bank notes) ; and b) that the actions of a foreign-
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administered area of limited economic influence (the British 
Concession at Tientsin) could play an important role in 
bringing this about. As a result, the implementation of such 
demands probably would not have had the orderly or 
stabilizing effect that Japan said, but exactly the 
opposite.
It would probably be going too far to conclude from 
this that the instigation of chaos had become a Japanese 
objective in North China. But the involvement (mentioned in 
a previous chapter) of the occupation authorities with local 
narcotics and terrorist groups121 indicated that the right to 
uphold public order and security was less important to Japan 
as an end in itself than for its implied message that such 
functions no longer belonged to the Chinese government. In 
refusing to go along with demands that would have denied the 
Chinese government control over its economic affairs as 
well, Britain, it could be argued, showed signs of at least 
a belated awareness that Japan was less interested in 
solving local problems than deepening British complicity in 
the process of relegating China's legal status to that of a 
permanently divided occupation zone —  i.e. the New Order in 
East Asia in all but name.
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Chapter Ten: Aftermath (August 1939-June 1940)
The Tokyo Conference ended in failure on 18 August. But 
the Cheng suspects were handed over on 5 September and local 
agreements on 12 August and 16 September between Japanese 
and British officials at Tientsin paved the way for the 
unofficial implementation of the most important items of the 
4 August draft police accord. Currency talks were 
unobtrusively resumed in October, resulting in an agreement 
in March 1940. In June, the blockade was finally lifted.
Crucial to these developments was the sudden and 
unexpected dissipation of the anti-British movement in 
Japan. Having nothing to do with Tientsin, this occurred 
with the 23 August announcement that Germany and the Soviet 
Union had concluded a non-aggression pact. But with the 
break-up of the Tokyo Conference, discussions became 
localized and discreet, another factor that made the search 
for compromise solutions less politically costly or 
personally dangerous. There are few indications that the 
agreements eventually signed were successful in improving 
security at Tientsin, or extending Japanese economic 
suzerainty in North China. Like the Arita-Craigie accord and 
the New Order in East Asia proclamation, they represented 
not much more than an ongoing Japanese attempt to undermine 
Chungking's authority over the region and increase Britain's 
dependency on Japan by weakening its control over the 
Concession. Once they were signed, the incentive to continue
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an expensive, and in many ways ineffective, blockade at 
Tientsin evaporated.
The German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact
When London finally rejected Japan's demands on 18 
August, ultranationalist criticism of British 'insincerity' 
seemed to be validated. Distrustful of British intentions, 
the Army had been pressuring the government to end the Tokyo 
Conference since the first signs of British reluctance to 
comply with Japanese demands had become apparent. Once 
Britain had finally made its position clear, the question 
facing the Japanese government was how to wind up the Tokyo 
Conference before its existence could be used either to spur 
a resurgence of assassination attempts against "pro-British" 
officials or -- should the Army Minister resign over the 
German alliance question in the next Five Ministers meeting 
—  justify the installation of an ultranationalist successor 
to the Hiranuma Cabinet in which the Army would hold 
complete sway.
The political landscape dramatically changed, however, 
with the unexpected announcement on 23 August that Germany 
and the Soviet Union had signed a non-aggression pact. 
Regarded as a national humiliation, this action hastened the 
downfall of the tottering Hiranuma Cabinet. But by allying 
with Japan's enemy, Germany took the wind out of the sails 
of ultranationalists within and without Army ranks who had 
been responsible for the internal divisions and external
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pressure that had reduced the administration to such a 
weakened state. With the threat of demonstrations and other 
direct action unexpectedly dissipated, those, who had been 
targeted for the most intense public criticism —  i.e. 
"pro-British" advisors close to the Emperor —  were able to 
form a new Cabinet that, while headed by an army general 
(Abe Nobuyuki), was dominated by imperial nominees with few 
links to ultranationalist organizations or the radically 
pro-German or anti-British policies they espoused.1
Giving the Hiranuma Cabinet an unexpected chance to 
mould its successor in its own image, Germany's action also 
helped remove barriers to the resumption of negotiations on 
Tientsin. With the Tokyo Conference officially suspended by 
Japan only a day before, the talks were unlikely to carry on 
in the same format as before. But the high-profile nature of 
the Conference had actually been an obstacle preventing both 
sides from considering any compromise. With a German 
alliance no longer a viable political objective, the need 
for Tokyo to reassure the public of its pro-German leanings 
by showing how unbending it could be towards Britain had 
also disappeared. As a result, the stage was set for a 
reopening of discussions that, unlikely to be subject to the 
intense public scrutiny of the past, promised for the first 
time to allow serious evaluation of alternative proposals.
These developments were accompanied by some markedly 
non-confrontational actions by the United States. Eager to 
ensure that America would not be held responsible for
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British unwillingness to compromise over Tientsin, the US 
Embassy in Tokyo informed its British counterpart that 
Washington was actually "not., much concern.(ed) over the 
problem of the silver reserves" in the British Concession —  
i.e. that the problem could be disposed of as the parties 
wished.2 This was followed by an 25 August meeting in which 
US Charge d'Affaires Eugene Dooman advised Ambassador 
Craigie against "press(ing) the Japanese for a settlement of 
the economic questions arising out of the Tientsin 
situation," or viewing such a settlement as likely to be 
pivotal in "restrain(ing)" Japan from becoming more distant 
from "the democratic nations on the one hand", or moving 
closer to "Germany and Soviet Russia on the other."3
These comments were not meant to discourage a search 
for an agreement to the problems pending over Tientsin. The 
objective was rather to ensure that the issues be 
depoliticized, that negotiations take place far from the 
public eye, that both sides be prepared to engage in patient 
diplomacy and that relations between Japan and "the 
democratic nations" (i.e. non-Axis western powers) not be 
held hostage to how the discussions on Tientsin would turn 
out. In this way, intentional or not, an atmosphere of back­
door dealmaking was fostered that had characterized 
relations between Japan, Britain and the United States prior 
to the Tientsin Incident. Under such conditions, acceptance 
of 'solutions' for China would be conditional largely upon 
the extent to which they could be kept from public view.
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The Situation in North China
On 4 August, Minister Kato mentioned Tokyo's 
"apprehension" that any delay in implementing the police 
agreement could, in "the prevailing tense atmosphere," 
provoke "some incident" that might "jeopardize" the entire 
accord.4 Although Kato was mainly worried at that time about 
the likelihood of an ultranationalist reaction within Japan, 
another potential source of destabilization was radical 
elements within Japanese military ranks in North China. 
According to a despatch from the Japanese Consul-General in 
Tientsin, there was considerable plotting amongst extremist 
middle-level officers within the 27th Division and the North 
China Army General Staff during the early weeks of August. 
On the 5th, two firebrand colonels from the General Staff 
visited Tientsin with the intention of calling a press 
conference to encourage a Chinese-led insurrection and 
invasion of the British Concession.5
Nothing tangible came as a result of these schemes. 
Armed with advance knowledge of the plotters' intentions, 
Lieutenant-General Homma, the Commander of the 27th 
Division, used his control of the local media to ensure they 
did not get press coverage, thereby neutralizing their 
impact. But with the failure of negotiations for a military 
alliance with Germany and the subsequent installation of a 
reputedly 'pro . Anglo-American' Cabinet, concern about the 
subterranean plans of these shadowy elements continued to
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grow. Suspected by mid-September of being in contact with 
radical Special Service and Kwantung Army officers,
as well as with ultranationalists at home, these factions 
were believed to be drawing up invasion plans for the 
British Concession at Tientsin that might lead either to a 
more sustained assault on Britain's Far Eastern position, or 
at least the discrediting of the 'pro-British' orientation 
of the newly-installed Abe Cabinet.6
Because the Tokyo Conference broke down, the police and 
security agreement that had been drawn up at the beginning 
of the month remained in draft form. But on 12 August, a 
memorandum was drawn up by Consuls Herbert and Tanaka laying 
out the ways in which Britain would unofficially carry out 
some of the items of the draft agreement, particularly the 
upkeep of the census, joint-^raids and the procedure for 
dealing with anti-Japanese suspects.7 Increasingly anxious 
about the activities of rogue elements within the Japanese 
military, Japanese and British officials at Tientsin decided 
to implement other items of the unsigned 4 August accord. In 
what was at least partially an attempt to forestall the 
drastic outcome these elements were suspected of plotting, 
Consul Herbert promised General Ohta in a 16 September 
meeting to dismiss Li Han-yuan, reorganize the British 
Municipal Council police and do "all he could" to satisfy 
other Japanese requirements.8 As a result, the actions of 
renegade North China Army officers had the unintended 
consequence of succeeding where the efforts of the British
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and Japanese delegations in Tokyo had failed: i.e. in
ensuring the materialization of an agreement over Tientsin.
The Handover of the Cheng Suspects
An important element of this emerging anti-Chinese 
consensus was the British government's determination not to 
allow anything to obstruct the handover of the Cheng 
suspects. From the beginning of the Tokyo Conference, 
Britain had indicated that it would consider any means of 
accomplishing this objective so long as the government did 
not have to suffer too much loss of face. With Craigie's 
'impartial' review of the evidence against the suspects, 
Whitehall hoped it had been given the excuse it needed to 
proceed.
A potentially serious snag emerged on 11 August, 
however, when a firm of solicitors acting on behalf of the 
internees petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. "A process 
for securing the liberty of the subject by affording an 
effective means of immediate release from unlawful or 
unjustifiable detention,"9 habeas corpus writs were, 
according to a later ruling on the case, applicable to 
anyone —  including "alien friends or alien enemies" —  
"within the realm" who was "under the protection of the 
Crown."10 In order to avoid a pettifogging technical debate 
as to whether it was the Secretary of State in London or the 
British authorities in Tientsin that legally "had the 
bodies" (i.e. power of decision over detention) of the
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suspects, it was decided that writs would be applied for 
both in the Consular Supreme Court in Shanghai and the High 
Court in London.
This action put Britain in a very delicate legal 
situation. Since British authorities -- legally or not —  
were interning these men, it was difficult to say that they 
were not "under the protection of the Crown." Assuming the 
men were under the Crown's "protection," the British 
government had to answer why they had been detained for four 
months without being formally charged, either by Britain or 
by an authority of the diplomatically accredited government 
of China (i.e. Chungking). That the British government had 
during that time been negotiating with an unrecognized 
occupation force (North China Army) about what charge should 
be brought against which suspect, (i.e. complicity in murder 
or membership of a terrorist gang) in order to facilitate 
their handover to the judicial authority of an unaccredited 
regime (de facto government of North China) constituted very 
strong legal grounds for arguing that the suspects had been 
"unjustifiably detained" and should therefore be released.
Attempting to evade this problem, the Foreign Office 
argued that "Tientsin is not a part of the world over which 
the King exercises(d) territorial sovereignty."11 This, 
however, created another legal problem for the British. 
According to the 1858 Treaty of Tientsin under which 
extraterritoriality in China was established, Britain had 
obligated itself to hand over "Chinese offenders" to the
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"Chinese authorities" upon "due requisition."12 As the 
Chinese Ambassador pointed out, it was difficult to view 
"due requisition" as anything other than .accepting the 
procedures of the court or authority that was legally 
recognized by the British government —  i.e. the Chungking 
regime. Chungking had requested that the men be released or 
transferred to Hong Kong to be later put under their 
custody. Having ignored this request, Whitehall had violated 
one of the few legal obligations that Britain had incurred 
when making its own assault on Chinese sovereignty when it 
imposed extra-territoriality on China in the nineteenth 
century.13
Fearful of getting boxed into a corner, the British 
government began to show signs of desperation. The only 
arguments it could muster were 1) that, since Britain had 
been handing over suspects for two years to the courts of 
the de facto authorities, Whitehall "cannot suddenly put up 
a new story and say that we cannot recognize these courts;" 
2) that the Tientsin District Court had been "acting with 
commendable independence" with "no sign of subjection to 
Japanese influence;" and 3) that the reason Britain had 
initially refused to hand over the four suspects was "not 
because we did not recognize the existence of the (de facto 
Tientsin District) Court, but solely because the evidence 
was insufficient" —  implying, of course, that the Craigie 
'verification' process had now turned up the necessary 
'evidence' that was earlier missing from the case.14
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On 17 August, in what was for London a convenient side­
stepping of these issues, the adjudicating judge in Shanghai 
refused to issue a writ of habeas corpus because the 
petitioning lawyers had not received "authority from the 
prisoners themselves for the application to be made."15 On 
27 August, the High Court in London also refused to issue a 
writ, on the spurious grounds that the Foreign Secretary 
"does not hold the prisoners, but acts only in an 'advisory' 
capacity."16 In an attempt to prevent the petitioning 
lawyers in Shanghai from making another application, the 
British authorities at Tientsin utilized the legal loophole 
that the Shanghai judge had provided by refusing to grant 
the lawyers' agents in Tientsin permission to interview the 
suspects.17
By 30 August, the suspects had somehow given their 
lawyers written permission to apply for a new habeas corpus 
writ. In reaction to this new application, the judge in 
Shanghai issued a summons to the British Commander in 
Tientsin to "show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should 
not be issued" and announced that the hearing would take 
place on 4 September.18 Fearing that the chances this time 
of a writ being issued were fairly high, the British 
Concession authorities requested on 31 August that the 
Tientsin District Court send a formal summons for the 
immediate transfer of the suspects.19 According to the 
Commander-in-Chief of the North China Army, British and 
Japanese authorities agreed to hand over the suspects on 2
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September, two days before the judge was to issue his 
ruling.20
Trying to forestall such action, the solicitors acting 
for the prisoners went on record as saying that since "the 
British Government has at all times stated that the question 
of the four Chinese prisoners is a judicial matter," it 
would be "unbelievable" that "the men" would be "hand(ed)
over.... while the matter is still sub judice."21 Possibly
in reaction to this, the agreed-upon 2 September transfer 
did not go through. On the 5th, the prisoners' solicitors in 
London informed the Foreign Office that a writ for habeas 
corpus had been finally issued in Shanghai and asked that 
the four detainees not be handed over to the Tientsin 
District court at least until 11 September, "until when the
case is sub judice."22 But, according to a Domei press
release, the men were handed over on the evening of the day 
that the habeas corpus writ was issued.23
The final denouement came a few days later when, on 11 
September, news came through the wire services that the four 
suspects were to be tried in Peking by a Japanese military 
tribunal. As a senior Far Eastern Department official said, 
Britain's "defence to accusations that these men were being 
handed over to the tender mercies of the Japanese" had 
"always been that they were being surrendered to" the 
"commendably independent" Tientsin District Court, 
supposedly applying Chinese law "without sign of subjection 
to Japanese influence."24 With proof that even this final
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(and very dubious) vestige of 'due process' would be denied 
to the suspects, the last legal justification for what the 
British government had done vanished. As Whitehall well 
knew, the government's flouting of its own laws, procedures 
and regulations had helped send to their probable deaths 
four people who could well have been innocent of the crime 
for which they were being charged. In the end, all that 
could be salvaged from the debacle was one "fortunate" 
silver lining: thanks to the outbreak of the Second World
War, the handover "appears to have passed unnoticed in the 
press.//25
Reopening of economic discussions
About three weeks after the Cheng suspects were handed 
over and a hiatus of about a month since the suspension of 
the Tokyo Conference, economic talks between the two 
countries were reconvened without fanfare and unencumbered 
by the participation —  threatened or otherwise —  of other 
powers. With Whitehall and the British Embassy in Japan 
having been unable to speak with a unified voice, the centre 
of gravity shifted from Tokyo to London. There, in a series 
of meetings in October and early November with Foreign 
Minister Halifax and his deputy, R.A. Butler, the veteran 
Foreign Ministry official and then ambassador in London, 
Shigemitsu Mamoru, crafted the outlines of a settlement that 
was completed in March 1940.
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For two countries to find common ground in just two 
months upon an issue that had divided them so sharply might 
at first sight seem surprising. But from a Japanese
perspective, there was less in this than met the eye. With 
Japan's economic demands unlikely to have a big impact in 
increasing the backing or circulation of puppet currency,
Tokyo had been indicating since at least August that its 
bottom line in coming to an agreement was not economic (i.e. 
financial stability of the Peking regime), but political 
(i.e. curtailment of the Chinese National Government's legal 
authority over the occupied areas). The issue of whether 
Chinese silver would be transferred out of the British 
Concession or not was therefore less important than the
conclusion of arrangements that would dilute or deny the
management rights over such metal of what Britain still 
officially recognized as the legitimate sovereign of the 
whole of China.
Showing qualms about concluding an agreement on this 
basis, Britain at first reiterated its belief that the 
silver legally belonged to the Chinese National Government. 
But on 24 October, Ambassador Shigemitsu bluntly informed 
the Foreign Office that, by "aiding" the Chiang Kai-shek 
regime in this fashion, Whitehall was not reciprocating the 
policy of strict neutrality that Japan had adopted towards 
the war in Europe.26 With Germany allied with the Soviet 
Union and the war's outcome difficult to predict, Japan's 
neutrality decision was in fact based entirely on the
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grounds of self-interest. But it seems that the Ambassador's 
remark was sufficiently disquieting to induce the British 
into pursuing a settlement that would simply keep the assets 
within the Concession and outside the vaults of puppet banks 
—  regardless of whether it might for other reasons be 
opposed by the Chinese government, or constitute even by 
British standards unwarranted interference in Chinese 
affairs.
In the agreement drawn up in March 1940, Britain, in 
addition to preserving the circulation of Chinese fapi 
within the Concession, was able to get Japan to accept that 
most of the silver within the enclave's Chinese banks would 
stay where it was "for the time being." But, while this 
arrangement preserved some appearance of an economic status 
quo, Whitehall in return had to sign away the rights of not 
just the Chinese National Government, but any Chinese 
entity, to control or dispose of the metal by agreeing that 
it would be "put under the joint control of the Hong Kong 
and Shanghai Bank and the Yokohama Specie Bank" and 
"sealed.. with the seals of the British and Japanese Consul- 
Generals in Tientsin." Even more damaging for China was 
Britain's promise that "it would use its influence in 
ensuring that the silver" —  in British legal theory still 
Chinese government property over which no foreign power had 
a right to interfere —  would "not be made in any way the 
security of any loan of the Chungking regime."27
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Another component of the settlement further undermined 
China's control over the assets. Without the foreknowledge 
of any Chinese governing institution, Britain and Japan 
agreed that specie in the Bank of Communications equivalent 
to 100,000 pounds sterling would be set aside to form a 
"fund for the relief of flood-striken Chinese" made homeless 
in the Tientsin area by severe flooding between August and 
October 1939. 28 With hundreds of thousands estimated to have 
been affected, it is unclear whether this amount of money —  
about ten percent of the value of the total silver deposits 
within the Concession (almost one million pounds sterling)29 
-- would be sufficient to alleviate the catastrophe. But 
under the guise of aid to Chinese in distress, an agreement 
was made that sought not simply to control and manage, but 
actually to disburse and spend, Chinese national treasure on 
products of Britain's and Japan's choosing.30 China would 
therefore deplete its reserves to purchase foreign goods 
according to the dictates of foreign powers, without having 
the right to say whether it wanted such 'assistance' or 
not.31
With both the flood-relief and silver proposals 
predicated on Japanese-British rather than just Japanese 
control, the Japanese Foreign Ministry realized that a 
precedent had been set that from Japan's perspective was 
less than satisfactory (Nichi-Ei kyodo shori o.. Shina 
mondai shorijo akarei o tsukuru mono). But as was constantly 
reiterated,32 of less importance to Japan was the fact that
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the British might have some control over China's silver than 
that the Chinese would have none. With the implementation of 
the silver and "humanitarian" flood relief proposals, Tokyo 
sought to break links between London and Chungking 
(Eikokugawa o Sho Kai yori hiki-hanashi) by getting Britain 
to engage in "unfriendly acts" (Eikoku o shite Sho Kai no 
konomazaru tokoro o aete seshime) against a regime that 
Japan intended to replace as the Government of China by a 
puppet entity of its own.33
The implications of this settlement for China were not 
lost upon Ambassador Craigie. In a series of tense meetings 
with the Japanese Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs during 
November and early-December,34 Craigie —  who in July and 
August had been arguing that Britain should compromise with 
Japan and accept Minister Kato's silver-for-fapi proposal —  
questioned the legality of transferring silver to 
institutions outside the British Concession or other banks 
within the enclave (a proposal that originated in the 
Foreign Office) .35 On the basis of the view that "the silver 
was the property of the National Government," Craigie also 
opposed having the assets sealed by the British and Japanese 
consuls-generals, as well as the proposal that part of the 
proceeds be set aside for a "humanitarian" fund.36
Regarding this as akin to an act of betrayal, Foreign 
Ministry officials within the East Asia Bureau accused the 
British envoy of trying to "sabotage" the talks.37 To 
Tokyo's ire, this did not prevent Craigie from making other
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assertions —  such as that Britain might face a court battle 
if the assets were handed over, that British public opinion 
might be up-in-arms about such an action, and .that the prior 
authorization of Third Countries such as the United States 
was necessary before any deal could be made —  that were 
even more out-of-character for a presumed 'friend' of 
Japan.38 But since all these remarks followed closely the 
Foreign Office's instructions of 17 August (nullifying his 
previous efforts to broker an accord), Craigie's revised 
position may have reflected less a changed attitude towards 
Japan than a desire not to get his fingers burnt twice.
The lifting of the blockade
Underlying Craigie's opposition to the economic 
proposals was a dawning realization of the irrelevance of 
all the negotiations concerning Tientsin in which he had 
been involved in bringing about the objective for which they 
were initiated: the lifting of the blockade of the British
and French Concessions. The Japanese government had 
intimated that the blockade would be at least eased once the 
two countries initiated negotiations in Tokyo. But the siege 
of the concessions, a military action imposed and controlled 
by the local field army, was neither ended nor eased until 
June 1940, over ten months after discussions in Tokyo had 
started, nine months after British officials at Tientsin 
agreed unofficially to implement the provisions of the 4
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August draft police accord and three months after the March 
194 0 economic agreements had been drawn up.
In hopes of inducing the Japanese military to end the 
blockade, the British authorities at Tientsin —  having 
quite possibly violated their own laws and regulations in 
handing over the Cheng suspects —  continued throughout 
late-1939 and early-1940 to bend over backwards to
accommodate the Japanese. In September 1939 and January 
1940, there were two co-ordinated police sweeps of suspected
• 3 9guerrilla hideouts m  the British and French Concessions.
In December 1939, as a result of a meeting on the 28th of
that month between Ambassador Craigie and members of the
Foreign Ministry East Asia Bureau, the British also agreed 
to tighten up media regulations and discuss ways of 
inserting a Japanese military police force within the 
enclave. These were some of the most important of the draft 
provisions that had not been covered by the 16 September 
Herbert-Tanaka agreement.40 By getting most of the August 
draft agreement implemented without the document being 
formally signed, Tokyo gained the additional advantage of 
obtaining British collaboration without having to
acknowledge the legitimacy of the British Concession 
authorities in any way.
In terms of improving "security" and "public order," 
these measures were predictably ineffective. The joint^raids 
within the British Concession seem to have generally failed 
in identifying or capturing anti-Japanese ringleaders. In
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the raid that occurred in January 1940, it transpired that 
some of the chief suspects were operating from areas meant 
to be under Japan's 'control.'41 With 'surrounding areas' no 
longer under effective Japanese supervision, it was unlikely 
that 'terrorist outrages' were going to be eliminated or 
even substantially decreased by pursuing a strategy of 
evicting suspected anti-Japanese activists from the 
Concessions. In such a situation, those engaging in anti- 
Japanese acts had little need for a foreign area such as the 
British enclave as a haven from which to plan their 
operations: it could be done virtually in any place they
chose.
As far as the British were concerned, these measures —  
the latest in a line of actions that included the signing of 
the Arita-Craigie accord and the handover of the four people 
detained in connection with the Cheng murder —  were meant 
to appease Tokyo with the hope of a reward for 'good 
behaviour' . But the blockade was not even eased as a result 
of these endeavours. According to British protests lodged at 
the Japanese Foreign Ministry in November 1939, employees in 
British firms were finding it "impossible" to get entry or 
exit permits, and officials were being subjected to waits of 
up to two hours while other foreign nationals "went through 
quickly." Keenly disappointed at Japan's actions, an 
exasperated Craigie declared himself "quite at a loss to 
understand how it is that despite the progressive steps 
taken by the British authorities to ease the situation in
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Tientsin..., there is no sign of any improvement as regards 
discrimination and inconveniences which confront British 
subjects at every turn."42
Nor did Britain's actions have much effect in lessening 
Japanese involvement in the anti-British movement in China. 
According to a January 1940 North China Army General Staff 
paper, the military was as intent as ever to "expel foreign 
business from the concessions" (sokainai ni okeru... 
gaishoken no kuchiku o kitosu) and "plan for the rapid 
reversion of the concessions (to China)" (shikarubeku 
sokuryoku ni sokai kaishu no jotai o sakuisu). The North 
China Army was also determined to "make no undertaking to 
rein in the anti-British movement" (han-Ei undo torishimari 
ni taishi maikaku naru genshitsu o kyoezaru koto), even if 
the blockade were to end.43
From a British perspective, an alleviation of such 
activities was the least to be expected for their efforts to 
placate Japan. In addition to the gradual implementation of 
the draft police accord, these included the first steps in 
the dismantling of its holdings in China, occurring in the 
form of phased troop withdrawals after the war in Europe had 
broken out, with the first troop pullback from Tientsin 
taking place in December 1939. What made the situation even 
more depressing for Britain was the fact that, in contrast 
to the mass protests in Japan, the anti-British movement in 
China was largely synthetic and totally dependent on North 
China Army support. Japanese troops would never have faced
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any difficulty in curtailing such activities had they so 
desired.
The drawing up of the economic agreements, in March 194 0 
evoked scant indication that Japan's behaviour would soon 
moderate. In a meeting with Foreign Secretary Halifax and 
Deputy Secretary Butler in early April 1940, Ambassador 
Shigemitsu refused to give any commitment or hint that the 
blockade would be eased or removed as a result of Britain's 
actions. Nor was he prepared to say that, if lifted, the 
blockade would not be reimposed. In meetings with Deputy 
Minister Tani on 4, 13 and 17 April, Ambassador Craigie
tried to extract similar assurances, as well as an 
undertaking that the anti-British movement in North China 
would cease. His efforts were apparently to no avail.44
The blockade was eventually lifted in June 1940. But in 
a Foreign Ministry statement on the 20th of the month, when 
the police and economic agreements were finally officially 
signed, there was no reference to the blockade, its lifting, 
its possible reimposition or the cessation of anti-British 
activities.45 Nor did any informal or private promises seem 
to have been made in this regard. The Japanese Consul 
General was probably correct in assuming that, to the extent 
that political factors might have been involved, the end of 
the blockade probably had more to do with growing fears of 
reprisals from the United States than any actions taken by 
the British.46 Washington had never wanted to intervene on 
Britain's behalf over Tientsin. But Japan's military
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leadership in China seemed to be having little success 
preventing ultranationalist subordinates from turning an 
anti-British movement into an anti-western agitation 
directed also against Americans.47 With the lapsing of the 
U.S.-Japan Commerce Treaty in January 1940, there were no 
longer any legal impediments preventing the Roosevelt 
administration from imposing economic sanctions upon Japan 
whenever it wished.
The main impetus behind the blockade's lifting,
however, remained local. Since the beginning of the crisis, 
the siege of the Concessions had been classified an
'operational' matter under the purview of the North China 
Army that was supposedly to be imposed, eased or lifted
according to the security needs of Japan's armed forces. As 
a way of catching suspected Chinese 'terrorists', the 
measure had proven itself ineffective —  indeed, Japan's 
demand for joint-raids since early 1939 was in part an 
attempt to find a more effective entrapment device. Although 
the blockade had also been imposed as a way of undermining 
British authority, it had proved to be more costly in human 
and material terms (while not greatly more effective) than 
many of the other anti-British stratagems in which the
Japanese military had also been involved.
The absence of a blockade did not mean that the North 
China Army had ceased, or intended to cease, all other anti- 
British activities. Nor did it mean that such an action 
could not be initiated again sometime in the future. But
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with the siege of the Concessions having lasted a year, and 
with Lieutenant-General Homma's 27th Division split, under 
increasing challenge from Chinese partisans and able only to 
spare a few hundred soldiers to garrison the Concessions at 
any one time, there seemed to have been compelling 
operational reasons for winding down an expensive 
undertaking that was difficult to man and invited the 
possibility of military conflict with non-Japanese foreign 
troops stationed within the Concessions and Special Areas.48 
As had become increasingly apparent, neither the efforts of 
officials in London, Tokyo or Tientsin nor the price China 
was forced to pay for their exertions had any real impact in 
bringing about a decision that seemed in the final analysis 
to be mainly a response to the mundane imperatives of 
cutting costs and redeploying soldiers.
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Conclusion
This study has examined the origin, outbreak, 
escalation and solution of an incident between Japan and 
Britain at a remote outpost of the British Empire in North 
China. The objective has been not simply to examine the 
moves, counter-moves, misunderstandings and stratagems that 
transformed a minor administrative matter into an issue that 
within a few months seemed to be bringing both countries 
closer to war than the activities of the Axis powers in 
Europe. It has been rather to get behind the diplomatic 
cliches of many of the participants in the crisis in order 
to examine this Incident as a case-study of the tragic and 
ultimately catastrophic process of Japanese imperial rule. 
Placing the event within the context of Japan's occupation 
of China, as well as its domestic political and foreign 
policy situation, we have attempted to discover what light 
it can shed upon Japan's imperial predicament and one of its 
subordinate aspects: the nature of Anglo-Japanese relations.
This study argues that the escalation of the Tientsin 
Incident from a minor procedural matter into a full-blown 
international crisis cannot be comprehensively explained in 
terms of what Japanese and British officials described as a 
quest for 'security' and 'order'. China, particularly 
Tientsin, was undoubtedly an insecure place, especially 
dangerous for Japanese soldiers and puppet officials. But to
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say that the Tientsin Incident was caused by an absence of 
security would imply that the British enclave was a centre 
of terrorist activity within a surrounding area that had 
either been thoroughly pacified or would have been pacified 
had it not been for the British Concession's existence.
This was clearly not the case. While the British area 
was not crime-free, Japanese soldiers and puppet officials 
were much more unsafe, and being attacked and killed with 
far greater frequency, in the Japanese 'controlled' areas in 
and around Tientsin than in the British Concession. 
Indigenous opposition to Occupation rule had become so 
intense that, even within the 'lines' and 'points' (towns 
and railways) to which Japanese authority had been limited, 
Chinese partisans were engaging in the planning and 
execution of all forms of anti-Japanese activity and seemed 
to have had little need for foreign areas into which they 
could retreat. To say, therefore, that the Tientsin Incident 
was a consequence of the British or French Concessions being 
'hotbeds' of terrorist activity was not much more than a way 
of denying Japan's responsibility for a situation that the 
Japanese themselves had largely created.
A precipitating factor in bringing about the blockade 
of the British and French concessions was the failure of the 
British authorities to hand over the four individuals 
detained in relation to the murder within the British
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Concession of puppet official, Cheng Lien-shih. But, even 
here, the extent to which Japan's decisions were security- 
driven is questionable. At most only two of the suspects had 
a link to the Cheng murder, and then only as accessories to 
the crime (the assassin was never caught). In addition, the 
British authorities at Tientsin continued to detain rather 
than hand over to the puppet courts other criminal suspects 
who had almost certainly been involved in far worse anti- 
Japanese acts of violence. This was not the first time that 
Britain had refused to hand over anti-Japanese culprits 
according to Japan's wishes. Yet, in allowing other 
detainees to continue to be interned and in some instances 
merely expelled from the Concession, the Japanese military 
were agreeing to terms far more lenient than those they were 
applying to the Cheng suspects.
The reasons for this discrepancy are not entirely 
clear. But in contrast to the detention of other Chinese 
suspects and the disagreements with British and Japanese 
officials that sometimes consequently ensued, with the Cheng 
murder suspects, it had been China, especially the 
intervention of the Chungking government, that had been 
instrumental in holding up their transfer. In other words, 
it can be argued that the precipitating factor in this 
crisis was not the questionable guilt of the suspects, or 
even Britain's equivocation in handing them over. It was
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rather the success of a regime that Japan was determined to 
eradicate in showing that it could still affect (through 
Britain) the affairs of North China —  and the impossibility 
for Japan in any way to acquiesce in or accept such a 
development.
The action of the Chinese government also brought to a 
temporary halt an uneven but intensifying Anglo-Japanese 
collaboration against Chinese 'undesirables' at Tientsin. 
But this setback in no way undermined or weakened either 
country's underlying desire to carry on strengthening this 
process. As the police talks in Tokyo and subsequent 
agreements at Tientsin indicated, Britain was willing to 
implement measures that were furthering the very Japanese 
aggression upon China's sovereignty that, through 
obligations incurred as a signatory of various international 
collective security covenants, British foreign policy was 
meant to oppose. That Japan continued, despite this, to 
brand the British enclave a security threat was not an 
indication that its existence was really a threat. But, if 
only to deflect attention from Japan's failure to quell 
insecurity in their own areas of 'control', its 
representation as such was deemed beneficial.
Another crucial development in expanding the crisis was 
the North China Army's unexpected insistence upon the 
elimination of Chinese government currency and the export of
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local currency reserves from within the British Concession. 
Yet although these demands were classified as essential to 
Japan's military security and therefore non-negotiable, the 
findings of this study suggest that neither eliminating 
Chinese fapi from within the Concession nor transferring the 
reserves or other financial assets from Chinese banks within 
the Concession to Japanese controlled institutions outside 
its perimeter would have had a decisive effect either in 
shoring up the value of the puppet currency or in getting 
rid of f api from other areas of occupied China. As the 
economic agreements of March 1940 suggest, Japan's economic 
agenda was driven less by an urge to consolidate occupation 
control than by the simple political imperative of denying 
the Chinese government any opportunity to exert influence 
over the region at all.
The denial of governing rights to legitimate government 
authorities has been a common feature of many occupations. 
But any aspiration to replace what had previously existed 
with something more lasting had, in the case of Japan's 
occupation of North China, already been seriously blunted by 
an absence of capital for infrastructure development and 
massive Chinese resistance to Japanese rule. With North 
China by 1939 already a trade-deficit region and a serious 
financial burden on Japan, the negotiation of agreements 
acknowledging Japan's 'special requirements' for public
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order and security in China during the Tokyo Conference was 
taking place at a time when Japanese occupation authorities 
were involved in short-term, money-spinning stratagems such 
as currency manipulation, smuggling, the destruction of 
China's textile industry and narcotics promotion that were 
rendering such 'special requirements' meaningless.
All this cast the activities of Japanese and British 
negotiators at Tokyo in a questionable light. With the North 
China Army pursuing an anti-British campaign that included, 
by its own admission, efforts to cause upheaval within the 
British Concession, any impetus to consolidate occupation 
control had been eclipsed by actions that —  whether they be 
smuggling, currency, exchange controls or narcotics -- were 
designed simply to loot China and degrade or destroy its 
people in the process. From this perspective, it could be 
argued that Japan's real objectives with regard to the 
Tientsin Incident were: 1) to make sure that any agreement
would not get in the way of these other activities (as could 
be concluded from the rejection of the British suggestion to 
increase the fine for possession of narcotics as part of a 
package to improve public order); and 2) by forcing Britain 
publicly to comply with Japanese demands, to show China and 
its inhabitants that they could expect nothing in the way of 
British support.
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Getting other countries to cooperate in the destruction 
of China as a sovereign territorial, political and legal 
entity had been a Japanese foreign policy-objective from at 
least the Kwantung Army's 1931 invasion of Manchuria. But 
with the invasion of the rest of China in 1937 and 1938, 
Tokyo mounted a broader-based, more intensive effort in this 
direction. Particularly with the proclamation of a New Order 
in East Asia in 1938, Japan was embarking on a course that 
sought unequivocally to undermine and make irrelevant 
collective security covenants (particularly the 1922 Nine 
Power Treaty) that supported the notion that China or its 
constituent parts could not be the exclusive preserve of any 
one external power. While not prepared to renounce formally 
such interwar treaties, London had turned a blind eye to 
Japanese incursions into China from as early as 1933. This 
pattern of low-key acquiescence culminated in January 1939 
with the announcement, in response to Japan's New Order 
declaration three months earlier, that the interwar treaties 
were not "immutable."
Getting Britain to transform such general statements 
into meaningful action was an important Japanese foreign 
policy objective that played a key role in the 
transmogrification of the Tientsin 'incident' into a 
'crisis' . With the decision to move talks from Tientsin to 
Tokyo and negotiate an agreement-of-'principles' first, the
377
solution of problems sui generis to the situation at 
Tientsin rapidly became subordinated to a well-honed 
political urge to treat the Incident as a "test case" of the 
"sincerity" of British intent to change its "attitudes" and 
"policies" towards China. As far as Japan was concerned, the 
negotiations leading up to the signing of the Arita-Craigie 
accord of 22 July were of importance less as a stepping- 
stone to facilitate settlement of Anglo-Japanese differences 
at Tientsin or elsewhere in China, than as an opportunity to 
nudge London away from any lingering adherence to the 
interwar treaties and towards a fuller acceptance of the New 
Order in East Asia and all that that entailed.
The politicization of the Tientsin Incident was, 
however, a process more complicated than the subordination 
of a minor dispute to the furtherance of a wider political 
agenda. As suggested by the July 1939 easing of legal 
restraints on anti-British, but no other, public 
demonstrations, building up the Tientsin Incident as an 
unsolved problem could act as a kind of lightning rod to 
keep alive the issue of one-and-a-half centuries of 
imperialistic British behaviour in Asia. This was almost 
certainly linked to the growing impact of the 'China 
Incident' on Japan and the escalating political price to be 
paid for the government's failure to 'solve' it.
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The dimensions of this problem were by Japanese 
standards unprecedented. Just by the end of 1938, over a 
million troops had been committed to China in a campaign
that was over fourteen times as expensive as any other
foreign military enterprise that Japan had ever undertaken. 
By the end of 1939, the cost of the undertaking amounted to 
over 200,000 Japanese fatalities1 (about four times the U.S. 
casualty rate for the whole of the Vietnam War) and a 
domestic economy that, already reeling from prolonged
agricultural depression, poverty, depressed demand and 
overcrowding, registered between 1937 and 1940 a 20 percent 
drop in real wages to "what was in effect a starvation 
level."2 With an insecure ruling elite that, under an
absolute monarch, had taken advantage of war conditions to 
embrace a comprehensive form of "fascism from above," the 
political system in which these developments were occurring 
was geared simply to the resolute suppression of any type of 
discontent from below.
Controlling popular discontent by eliminating the 
possibility of its expression was a short-term expedient for 
the management of longer-term problems that appeared to be 
insoluble. A s  one of these problems, the China Incident had 
already escalated way beyond initial Japanese expectations, 
and public support could no longer be taken for granted. 
From as early as 1938, ultranationalist groups had
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increasingly blamed Britain —  particularly its meagre 
financial and economic 'aid' to the Chungking regime —  (and 
sometimes even to a greater extent than the 'contamination' 
of the Chinese psyche by the 'propagation' of Soviet- 
inspired 'communism') for the Japanese military's failure to 
pacify areas supposedly under its control. To preserve a 
flagging popular commitment to a burdensome war, Japan's 
fragile ruling coalition took up this issue and injected it 
into the economic discussions in Tokyo. In other words, the 
Tientsin Incident was being utilized to ensure that Britain 
remained a viable scapegoat for Japan's self-inflicted woes. 
Viewed in this light, it is easier to understand the 
unwillingness to compromise, the obsession in portraying the 
British Concession as a security threat and the introduction 
of demands London clearly would not meet that characterized 
much of Japan's posturing from the beginning to the end of 
this Incident.
The utilization of foreign countries as scapegoats for 
foreign adventures having gone drastically wrong was a 
relatively minor aspect of a strategy that sought to 
eliminate dissent without addressing its underlying cause. 
Of far greater importance was the capacity of Japan's ruling 
elite, "a closely-knit oligarchy... of the armed services, 
business, bureaucracy, and court," (to quote E.H. Norman) to 
continue preventing conflicts between them from "caus(ing) a
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breach" in its "basic unity."3 In terms of supporting 
Japan's advance into China and the creation of a Japan- 
controlled New Order in East Asia, both- rulers and ruled 
seemed to be marching in the same direction. But the 
Tientsin Incident occurred during a time when Japan's rulers 
were having difficulty preserving a consensus on foreign 
policy issues concerning the means by which Japanese foreign 
aggrandizement should be executed, in particular the terms 
under which a military alliance with Germany should be 
concluded. With the Emperor's advisors divided and his 
government approaching a state of near-paralysis on this 
question, a vacuum was created at the centre of Japanese 
politics, creating opportunities for others to inject 
themselves into the political process by posing as the true 
interpreters of the Imperial Will.
Lasting from 4 June (the day Germany rejected the 
Japanese Cabinet's proposal for a military alliance directed 
simply against the Soviet Union) to 22 August 1939 (the date 
of the publication of the German-Soviet non-aggression 
pact), this vacuum was filled by a popularly supported 
movement united by its distrust of Britain and, in most 
cases, desire for closer ties with Germany. Permeated with 
ultranationalist sentiment and peopled by elements of the 
"petty bourgeois stratum" (small factory owners, building 
contractors, carpenters, retail shop owners, petty
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landlords, school teachers, low-level village employees, 
Buddhist and Shinto priests etc) that Maruyama Masao 
identified to be the social core of earlier groups 
initiating fascism "from below,"4 the anti-British movement 
shared with its predecessors a reactionary, virulently anti­
western philosophy in which Britain and its activities in 
Asia —  including at Tientsin —  had become a metaphor for 
everything that was corrupt, evil, un-Asian and anti- 
Japanese .
Like its predecessors, elements within this movement 
had a predilection for the use of violence. As was the case 
in earlier times, it was also suspected of being utilized, 
financed and surreptitiously encouraged in various other 
ways by discordant factions (particularly middle-level Army 
officers) from within the government seeking to promote 
their own ends. But unlike earlier right-wing movements, the 
1939 anti-British campaigns were legalized, large-scale 
forms of mass-action (demonstrations could exceed 100,000), 
which expanded dramatically with' the unfolding of the 
Tientsin Incident and the government's continuing failure to 
conclude a military alliance with Germany. By virtue of its 
own strength, the government's weakness and the absence of 
institutional mechanisms to mediate organized expressions of 
the popular will, the anti-British movement gained an 
autonomy and power that was never replicated by the anti-
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British campaigns in North China —  which remained small- 
scale and entirely dependent upon the benediction of the 
Japanese Army —  and which the Japanese government ignored 
at its peril.
The anti-British movement was responsible for bringing 
about a clear hardening of Japan's position over Tientsin. 
Whatever 'moderation' certain government ministers might 
have felt towards Britain tended rapidly to disappear"as it 
became evident that they might become targets of 
ultranationalist assassins. But in addition, the Tientsin 
Incident served as the vehicle by which those involved in 
anti-British activity were able to establish their political 
legitimacy. As the Incident was utilized by those in 
government to implement a longer-standing agenda seeking to 
get Britain to change its policies in Asia, so it was used 
by those outside government to further an agenda of their 
own.
In the summer of 1939, this agenda was expressed in 
terms of a military alliance with Germany. But the 
aspiration to become more closely tied to the leader of 
world fascism was part of a broader-based effort of 
'national renewal' (kokka isshin) that could be traced back 
to the attempted overthrow of the government on 2 6 February 
1936, the 'national purification' (kokutai meicho) campaigns 
of 1934-35, the eradication of 'impure' thoughts about the
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Emperor being a mere 'organ of state', the undermining of 
'incorrigibly' corrupt party politics that such thinking 
supposedly spawned, the assassination attempts upon selected 
members of established and monied political-industrial 
interests between 1931 and 1933 and the attacks on nascent 
labour and tenancy movements as well as all expressions of 
liberal, socialist and Marxist thinking going back at least 
to the Peace Preservation Laws of 1925 and 1928. As the 
Tientsin Incident provided an opportunity to bring Britain 
closer to an acceptance of the New Order in East Asia, so it 
helped provide a chance for fringe elements of super­
patriots and other groups of subterranean desperadoes to 
make a final effort to fulfil their own long-standing 
ambitions: in particular, to 'cleanse the national polity'
by 'restoring the Emperor' and eliminating those considered 
responsible for perverting his true intentions.
Very little of this had anything to do with the issues 
that had propelled the Tientsin situation into the political 
limelight. Essentially hijacked by the powerful currents and 
eddies swirling through the maelstrom of Japanese pre-war 
politics, the Tientsin Incident would probably have had a 
better chance of solution had Japan been able to conclude a 
military alliance with Germany before its outbreak. There 
would then have been none of the pressure to interpret 
Japanese compromise proposals as surreptitious efforts by
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'pro-British' officials to thwart closer ties with Germany 
and 'subvert' the nation's destiny. Because an alliance with 
Germany was not achieved, however, a level of political 
tension was maintained that made progress on solving 
problems at Tientsin impossible. It was only when the wind 
was taken out of the ultra-nationalists' sails by the 
unexpected signing of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact 
that the depoliticization of the Tientsin Incident could 
occur. With the subsequent dissipation of the anti-British 
movement, the ground was set for a closing of ranks among 
Japan's ruling elite that would enable them to treat the 
Tientsin Incident finally on its own terms.
Within such a political environment, attempting to 
rebuild Anglo-Japanese relations through what the British 
Ambassador termed the 'incremental solution' of bilateral 
problems was unlikely to succeed. As Sir George Sansom 
pointed out, long-standing disagreements of 'principle' 
going back to Japan's exclusion from Anglo-American 
controlled markets and the unwillingness of Western 
countries to accept that Japan could build up its own Empire 
in East Asia instead meant that any effort to solve 
bilateral problems as discrete administrative matters devoid 
of policy content would for Japan institutionalize a 
political status quo that was one-sided and to Japan's 
disadvantage. With no takers even amongst so-called 'Anglo-
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American' faction members for this approach, there was 
always likely to be more involved and a higher price to pay 
for Japan's co-operation than British officials were 
prepared to acknowledge.
As a war-avoidance strategy, Britain had no choice but 
to work for a negotiated solution to the Tientsin problem. 
But the question was whether a conference in Tokyo was the 
best way of achieving such an objective. With Japanese 
domestic anti-British feeling so frenzied, having high- 
profile discussions in the capital ran the risk of being 
regarded as an act of political provocation. With so many 
groups interested in utilizing the Incident for their own 
ends -- be they Britain's 'scapegoating' for the unresolved 
'China Incident, a British recognition of the New Order in 
East Asia or even the promotion of a 'Showa Restoration' 
(Showa Isshin) —  officials in Japan and the public that 
were scrutinizing them were always more likely to treat the 
Incident as an opportunity to raise other issues than to 
approach it merely as an administrative problem resolvable 
on its own merits.
With the exception of Sir George Sansom, this seemed to 
be scantily recognized by British officials, particularly in 
Tokyo. Nor has it been clearly accepted in recent western 
historiography, which has been more concerned about the 
under-appreciated 'realism' of the British Ambassador.5 But
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what was an eminently realistic desire, shared not just by 
Craigie but by British officials across the board, to avoid 
war over Tientsin did not mean that a conference in Tokyo 
was a 'realistic' way of going about it. If, as the 
ambassador believed, there was anyone more 'moderate' in 
Tokyo than in Tientsin, the possibility of ad hominem verbal 
and physical abuse by anti-British demonstrators was soon to 
cure them of such dangerous and 'unrealistic' notions. It is 
no doubt necessary to reassess the contribution of those who 
have been unfairly tarred with the brush of appeasement. But 
if Craigie's reputation is to be restored in a lasting way, 
this study suggests that he is likely to be remembered less 
as a political strategist than as an extremely hardworking 
official whose capacity to comprehend the details and 
intricacies of such highly complex issues as Chinese 
currency was as impressive as his grasp of Japanese 
political realities was flawed.
Whatever history's verdict will be on Ambassador 
Craigie, it is unclear whether there was anything that he or 
anyone else could have done that would have prevented the 
Tientsin Incident from turning into a major international 
crisis. And it is for its international implications that 
the Incident must ultimately be assessed. It was clear to 
many that Japan was marching towards an abyss. But what does 
a study such as this indicate about the turmoil in Asia? How
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deep was the underlying conflict of interests between Japan 
and the Anglo-American powers? Was it inevitable that such a 
conflict would lead to war? What were the levels of inter­
imperial collaboration and conflict that characterized these 
relationships? What were their implications for China —  or 
other nations in Asia that were concurrently or subsequently 
to undergo periods of anti-colonial struggle in their 
efforts to cast off the yoke of imperial rule?
While far from comprehensive, the insights this 
Incident can provide upon these issues are both sobering and 
complex. On the one hand, there was much that occurred 
during the Tientsin Incident that could be used to justify 
the interpretation that it was a joint-effort by Britain and 
Japan to accord legitimacy to an occupation that China's 
resistance had already severely undermined. On the other, 
the Incident has been viewed as a catalyst in sharpening 
economic differences between Japan and the western powers 
that were destined in 1941 to end in war. With the United 
States declaration of intent to abrogate its trade treaty on 
26 July 1939, according to this line of thinking, British 
efforts to induce a more forceful U.S. intervention in 
defence of western interests —  and, according to some 
Japanese historians, the interests of their 'client' regime 
in China (the Kuomintang)6 —  finally bore fruit, thereby 
easing the pressure on more vulnerable countries such as
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Britain from having to make 'concessions' with Japan, either 
at Tientsin or anywhere else.
The findings of this study suggest that such an 
explanation oversimplifies a trend that was in reality much 
more complex. Like Britain, the United States recognized the 
Chungking government, supported its currency and was opposed 
to the setting up of a puppet currency in the occupied 
areas. But this did not mean, as Japanese officials 
sometimes asserted, that such actions were intended 
primarily to keep Chinese resistance to Japan alive. As a 
large economic stake holder in Japan's military expansion, 
the United States remained unwilling to support either the 
treaty rights and privileges of other powers in China or the 
obligations Washington had incurred to support a unified and 
sovereign Chinese state from the threat of Japanese 
dismemberment. This attitude was in no fundamental sense 
altered during the course of events at Tientsin.
With the commerce treaty abrogation notice, many 
expected the United States finally to adopt more common 
strategies with powers such as Britain to reign in Japan. 
Their hopes were short-lived. The decision to abrogate the 
trade treaty was an internal U.S. matter having more to do 
with empowering the Executive over the Legislature in its 
dealings with Japan than the result of U.S. disapproval of 
any particular Japanese action in Asia. Because in a treaty-
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less situation the U.S. administration would be able to 
impose restrictions on Japanese goods without having to get 
Congressional approval (in the form • of amending or 
overturning the trade treaty), this action was eventually to 
prepare the way for a more forceful United States stand 
against Japan in the future. But much to British and Chinese 
disappointment, there was no immediate movement towards the 
imposition of an Anglo-American economic embargo upon Japan. 
The United States also continued to remain aloof from the 
Tokyo Conference, even encouraging Britain and Japan at the 
end of August to seek common ground over currency.
It is difficult, therefore, to see the escalation of 
the Tientsin Incident or the failure of the Tokyo Conference 
as being caused by —  or even having a marked effect in 
causing —  a closure of ranks against Japan by the United 
States and Britain. With the diplomatic situation so fluid, 
it is unlikely that such a development would have occurred 
even had Japan concluded a military alliance with Germany. 
Instead, Japan's relations with its rivals remained coloured 
by uncertainty and flux, as well as levels of conflict and 
collaboration that were far more complex than their official 
foreign policies ever admitted. With these countries' 
actions sometimes characterized merely in terms of 'support 
for free trade', 'recognition of the Open Door', 'opposition 
to Japanese aggression' or 'co-operation with the New Order
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in East Asia' , there was a tendency to promote the over­
simplified impression that there was more polarization than 
there really was, and that there was therefore no longer 
anything upon which they all could agree, or anyone against 
whom they all could act.
This was not the case. In perhaps one of its
potentially most enduring lessons for posterity, the 
Tientsin Incident offers an opportunity of appreciating how 
the contradictions characterizing the relations between the 
imperial powers were accompanied by a strengthening common 
desire to acquiesce in the process of withdrawing from China 
and its people any international recognition of their legal 
and diplomatically guaranteed right to exist as an
independent state and nation. It is safe to say that none of 
the major Powers' actions over Tientsin were dominated by 
respect or concern for Chinese sovereignty. There were even 
blatant violations of the extra-territorial provisions that 
first undermined the integrity of China by creating the 
legal framework in which the foreign areas could exist. In 
this sense, the Tientsin Incident can be viewed as a 
harbinger for the conflicts and tragedies that would bedevil 
the efforts of post-war Asian liberation movements in their
quest for a greater control over their own national
destinies.
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Chapter One: The Origins of the Tientsin Incident
1 According to a 27 August 1939 High Court (King's Bench) ruling,
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justice to British subjects." Public Records Office (hereafter cited as 
FO), Kew, London, F9316.
2 Quoted in Francis C. Jones, Shanghai and Tientsin, Institute of
Pacific Relations, New York, 1941.
3 There were about 1,400 British nationals within the British 
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Jones, 1941; Japan Advertiser, 1 August 1939. Quoted in\^archives of 
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter cited \ as JMFA),
S.1.1.1.0-54, Vol. 8, p. 22.
//v o
4 See/affidavit of Sir John Brennan, 29 August 1939: "The territory of
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part. FO, F9734.
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7 See Boeicho Boei Kenkyusho Senshi Shitsu (War Room of the Defence
Institute of the (Japanese) Self-Defence Agency), Hokushi no Chian Sen - 
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Tokyo, 1968, p. 3; For figures on troop strength, see Japan Monographs, 
no. 178, pp. 202, 213. United States National Archives (hereafter cited 
as USNA), Washington D.C. Fory divisional strength of the North China 
Army, see Hokushi Homengun Shjreikan Jidai, pp. 87-88.
yU
8 See Field Operations Reports Nos. 1157 and 1165, written by US
Military Attaches Maxwell Taylor and Elmer Court, for February and March 
1939. USNA, War Department, 2657-H-439/1157, 2657-H-439/1161. Quote from 
U.S. Department of the Army, Japan Monograph No. 17 8, p. 204.
9 In response to an explosion of guerrilla activity in the summer of
1938, the Japanese had to bring in 60, 000 troops from elsewhere to
combat guerrillas in East Hopei, "the district longest under Japanese 
influence and weakest in guerrilla activity." See George E. Taylor, 
Japanese-Sponsored Regime in North China, Institute of Pacific 
Relations, 1939, pp. 29-35.
10 See especially report of US Naval Attache, Peking, 22 December 1938. 
USNA, Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) ONI/728. By the end of 1938, 
according to this report, Communist Armies held 12 districts in Hopei. 
The report went on to say that "the greater part of Hopei between the 
Peiping-Hankow and the Tientsin-Pukow (railway) lines as far as the 
Yellow River is., in Chinese hands."
fj Iot- <C / f~e. ,
11 See Joirit^  Special Services and Military Police Report No. 594 of 
June 1939,/entitled, "Chuo Konichi Tekketsu Satsu Kandan" (Main Anti- 
Japanese/ Assassination Group), in Gendaishi Shiryo 13, Nicchu Senso 5 
(hereafter cited as Gendaishi Shiryo 13-5), Misuzu Shobo, Tokyo, 1978, 
pp. 192-200.
12 Israel Epstein, The Peoples War, Gollancz, London, 1939; US Naval 
Attache, Peking, report of 22 December 1938. USNA, ONI/728.
13‘ Joint Special Services and Military Police Report No. 594 from
Tientsin, 16 June 1939, (Shi Ten Ken-To Dai 594 Go) on the "Agre-»fc=-e-f the
Kuomintang Anti-Japanese Blood and Iron Assassination Group" (Chuo Ko- 
Nichi Teiketsu Satsukan Dan). Gendaishi Shiryo 13-5, pp. 192-200.
14‘ According to the Japanese military police, the Concessions were being 
used to send messages by unauthorized radio signals about Japanese troop 
movements to the Kuomintang via Hong Kong and also as a depository for 
Comintern funds to finance Communist groups. See 21 June 1939 military
police report from Tientsin in Gendaishi Shiryo 13-5, p. 185-192, in
particular, p. 186.
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15‘ In a meeting on 27 July, Consul Tanaka and Major Ohta informed Consul 
Herbert that the most senior Chinese officer within the British 
Concession's Municipal Police Force was probably receiving $500 a month 
from Chungking, attending joint-KMT/CCP meetings, under the guise of 
controlling dissent "actually taking the lead in anti-Japanese activities 
within the Concession" and ensuring that prominent anti-Japanese 
activists were not handed over to the District Court by investigating 
them inadequately and then persuading them to withdraw confessions they 
subsequently made to the Japanese. Nine other Chinese officers within the 
Force were also suspected of being "anti-Japanese." JMFA S.1.1.1.0-55, 
Vol. 2, pp. 240-45.
16 See, for example, 8 December 1938 report of General Joseph 
Stillwell, "Notes on Guerrilla Activity," USNA, Record Group (RG) 165, 
Stil/well Reports, 2657-H-439/1044,1055.
17 See remarks of Consul Herbert and Police Chief Dennis on 26 and 31
July 1939. JMFA S.1.1.1.0-55, Vol. 2, pp. 215-226, 315-322.
18 Craigie-Halifax, 5 August 1939. In Sir Ernest Llewellyn Woodward and
others (ed), Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, Series 
Three, Volume Nine (hereafter cited as DBFP 3-9), Her Majesty's 
Stationary Office, London, 1955, p. 400.
19 JMFA, S.1.1.1... 0-55, Vol. 2, pp. 215-216.
20 JMFA, S.1.1.1... 0-55, Vol. 2, pp. 315-322.
21 According to Ambassador Craigie, almost everything that was viewed 
in the Concession had "already been shown in the International 
Settlement in Shanghai where a strict censorship is enforced (in which 
the Japanese participated) and that, in any event, lists had to be 
provided in advance to the British Municipal Police, who could arrange a 
preview if they wanted." Craigie-Halifax, 5 August 1939, DBFP 3-9, p. 
402.
22 See especially April 1940 report on terrorist activities in Tientsin 
since 1938 by Japanese Consulate, Tientsin. JMFA, S.1.1.1.0-54, Vol. 9, 
pp. 425-650 (especially pp. 425-446).
23 According to Consul Herbert, the schools within the British
Concession had been using textbooks approved by the Japanese and the
Provisional .Government since February 1939. JMFA S.1.1.1..0-55, Vol. 2, 
p. 216; Craigie-Halifax, 28 July 1939, DBFP 3-9, p. 344.
24 Craigie-Halifax, 5 August 1939. DBFP 3-9, p. 404.
25 Since the outbreak of hostilities in July 1937, "no anti-Japanese 
outrage has occurred in the British Concession." Letter from Ambassador 
Craigie to Foreign Minister Arita, 3 March 1939. JMFA S.1.1.1..0-54, 
Vol. 1/ p. 218.
cX
26 This was even to^ large extent admitted by the Japanese. See, for 
example, 22 June 1939 memorandum of First Office of East Asia Bureau, 
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, JMFA S.1.1.1.0-54, Vol. 3, pp. 
395-397, 442-455.
27 See, for instance, 23 April 1940 report by Japanese Consulate, 
Tientsin, on the History of Terrorist Activities in Tientsin from 
January 1938 Onwards. JMFA S.1.1.1.0-54, Vol. 9, pp. 425-446.
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For more detailed discussion of procedures, see Consul-General 
Jamieson-British Embassy (Shanghai), 11 and 21 April 1939. DBFP 3-9, pp. 
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30 See Jamieson-British Embassy (Shanghai), 11 April 1939: "I said that 
information as to where organizations existed need not be given to
B.M.C. (British Municipal Council) Police. Instead, Japanese gendarmerie 
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31 In a 13 October 1938 telegram to the British Embassy at Shanghai, 
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that "I should naturally communicate privately to my Japanese colleague 
when and where the exit would be." The use of the word "naturally" 
suggests that the practice of "tipping off" the Japanese in advance had 
been occurring for some time. See DBFP 3-8, p. 554. An indication of 
such practice in French Concession occurred on 8 February 1939, with the 
"enticement" and "arrest" of two Chinese suspects at the exit of the 
French Concession into the Japanese Concession. See Gendaishi Shiryo 13- 
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32 In a 12 August 1939 memorandum to the British Foreign Office, the 
Chinese Government used these arguments to support its contention that 
the handing over of Chinese subjects to the puppet regime was contrary 
to Article 21 of the 1858 Treaty of Tientsin and therefore illegal. See 
FO, F8856.
33 See Ambassador Craigie-Foreign Minister Halifax, 4 and 11 October 
.1938. DBFP 3-8, pp. 551, 553.
34 See Ambassador Clexk^Kerr-Halifax, 4 October 1938. DBFP 3-8, p. 552.
35 Jamieson-British Embassy, Shanghai, 13 October 1938, FO 
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36 See DBFP, 3-8, pp. 114-15.
37 See Craigie-Halifax, 11 October 1938, DBFP, 3-8, p. 553.
38 Sir Edward Hertslet, Treaties Between Great Britain and China, 
Homson, London, 1896, Vol. One, p. 23.
39 See, for example, Jamieson-Halifax, 6 June 1939: "arrest warrants 
(for ordinary criminal suspects) have been executed for the past 22 
months." FO, F5380/1/10.
40 English translation of 22 July 1939 Foreign Ministry memorandum. 
JMFA S.1.1.1.0-55, Vol. 2, p. 80.
41 See Jamieson despatches nos. 100,141,144,153 and 159. DBFP 3-8, pp. 
314-315,.323, 335, 557-558. See also 22 June 1939 report of First Office 
of Foreign Ministry's East Asia Bureau and 23 April 1940 report of 
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night that there might be attempts during the next few- days on the part 
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5.1.1.1.0-54, Vol. 1, p. 255.
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DBFP 3-9, See also Jamieson-Halifax, 8 February 1939, DBFP 3-81- gpe?
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44 Quote from 22 June 1939 report of First Office of the Foreign 
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Chapter Eight: The Tokyo Conference (2): Police and Security
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Shiryo 13-5, pp. 216-17 and 13 June Order of the North China Army, JMFA
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also Jamieson-Halifax, 28 January 1939. FO, F1983.
70 See especially minutes of 22nd (May-June 1937) and 24th Session of
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1935 was produced in the Japanese Concession at Tientsin. In 15 months, 
650 kilos of the drug was exported —  enough to maintain 10,000 addicts 
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83- Comments of Peter J. Lawless, inspector of police in Tientsin British
Concession, in Court Record for the IMTFE, pp. 2,676-77. Microfilm, 
Library of Congress, Washington D.C.
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Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and other Dangerous Drugs, meeting
8 July 1939. USNA, RG 238, IMTFE Court Exhibit No. 388.
86‘ JMFA S.1.1.1...0-55, Vol. 2, p. 234.
87 For text of communique, see Showa 14 Nen, 1941, p. 145.
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DBFP 3-9, pp. 409-10.
"• Comment of General Muto in meeting with British delegation in Tokyo on 
26 July 1939. JMFA S.1.1.1..0-55, Vol. 2, p. 216.
90 See item 2) in Craigie-Halifax, 5 August 1945. DBFP 3-9, p. 403.
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93 Craigie-Halifax, tel no. 949, 5 August 1939. DBFP 3-9, pp. 306-8.
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Chapter Nine: The Tokyo Conference (3): The Talks Break Down
1 These consisted of a group of Foreign Ministry officials in Tokyo and
diplomatic and military representatives from North China under the 
leadership of Minister-at-Large Kato Sotomatsu and General Muto Akira 
from the North China Army General Staff.
2 As will be discussed in more detail later, the only efforts to 
generate a serious negotiation was the setting up a subcommittee at the 
end of July to look into the currency and silver problems under
consideration and a request by Ambassador Craigie to Whitehall in early 
August to be more flexible over Japan's silver demands.
3 Comments of U.S. Military Attache McHugh in conversation with British 
Ambassador to China, Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr, 26 July 1939. See Sir
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Stationery Office, 1955, p. 341.
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Ambassador to London, 6 July 1939. Public Record Office, Kew, London 
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1963, p. 440.
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July 6, DBFP 3-9, pp. 248-249.
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1939, Vol. 3, U.S. Department of State, Washington D.C., pp. 558-559. 
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United States National Archives (hereafter cited as USNA), Washington 
D.C.
11 In his memoirs, Secretary of State Cordell Hull stated that, in a 
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Japan for allowing Americans and other westerners to be divested "of all 
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for recognition of 'special rights, special interests and special 
requirements' in China." Memoirs of Cordell Hull, New York, Macmillan, 
1948, 2 Volumes, pp 631-633, 635.
12 See, for instance, FRUS, 1939, Vol. 4, p. 356-357, Secretary of 
State-Charge d'Affaires Dooman: the "increasingly violent and widespread 
agitation directed nominally against British nationals and interests" 
was "a deliberate effort to arouse anti-foreign feeling among Chinese" 
that was "working injury upon American interests", 25 July 1939; p. 361, 
State Department Press Conference, 2 August 1939; p. 366, Acting
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concern."
13 See, for instance, 31 July edition of Chicago Daily News, which 
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that "should have been done when Japan broke the Nine Power Treaty For a 
second time by invading China (in 1937)." USNA, State Department 
711.942/202B
14 According to an economic report submitted in December 1939 to the 
British Foreign Office, the value of U.S. trade with China fell by over 
50% between 1937 and- 1938, with hardly any increase being forecast for 
1939. U.S. percentage of total foreign trade also fell from 28% to 11% 
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months of 1939. Total tonnage of U.S. ships entering and leaving Chinese 
ports by 1938 had declined to about 1/10 of its 1936 figure. See "Some 
Effects of Japanese Action in China upon Western Influence and 
Commercial Interests," FO, F371/23487.
15Quote from Far Eastern Department memorandum, dated 11 March 1939, on 
effects of exchange controls on trade in China. In subsequent memorandum 
of 3 April 1939, it was admitted that these measures had made the U.S.- 
Japan commerce treaty "obsolete." USNA, State Department, 
711.942/1701/2.
16 Estimate from William Langer, The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1941, 
Harper, New York, 1952, p. 152. According to another source, "Over 40% 
of Japanese exports and more than half her imports were with the United 
States", with "the trend over the first two and a half years of the 
China Incident" for "Japanese exports to fall sharply while imports from 
the United States continued to rise." Peter Calvocoressi, Guy Wint and 
John Pritchard, Total War: The Causes and Courses of the Second World 
War. Volume II: The Greater East Asia and Pacific Conflict. Penguin 
Books, London, 1989.
17 Quotes from 11 May 1939 memorandum from Welles to Hull about need to 
renegotiate the 1911 U.S.-Japan Commerce Treaty. USNA, State Department, 
711.942/1707/2.
18 Congressional Record, Vol. 84, pat. 9, p. 9341. Resolution introduced 
by Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, 18 July 1939.
19 The motive of "better safeguarding and promoting American interests" 
was given as the official reason for the treaty termination 
proclamation, prompting Vandenberg and a number of others to assume that 
a new treaty would be negotiated that contained better MFN provisions. 
See description of press conference held by Secretary of State on 31 
July 1939 in Hull-Dooman, 31 July 1939. FRUS, 1939, Vol. 3, pp. 563-564.
20 Quote from speech by President Roosevelt to Congress, January 1939. 
Public Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1939, pp. 1-12. Quoted in 
Langer, 1952, p. 47.
21Quote from Thomas A. Bisson in 4 August 1939 edition of Foreign Policy 
Bulletin. USNA, State Department 711.942/243.
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August article for Foreign Policy Bulletin. USNA, State Department 
711.942/245.
23 Statement of the Foreign Office Spokesman Concerning the American 
Notification of Abrogation of the Japanese-American Treaty of Commerce 
and Navigation, 27 July 1939. Documents on American Foreign Relations 
1939-1940, World Peace Foundation, 194 0. See also USNA, Department of 
State files 711.942/180.
24 Radio broadcast by Yoshizawa Seijiro, Director of the American 
Affairs Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. USNA, Department of 
State, 711.942/275.
25 Quotes from Hata, entry For 1 August 1939, p. 134-136.
26 Although the Japanese Foreign Ministry did initially say (27 July 
1939) that the timing of Washington's treaty abrogation proclamation 
might have had something to do with Washington's displeasure over the 
course of Anglo-Japanese conversations on Tientsin (see Documents on 
American Foreign Relations 1939-1940, p. 245), the move was subsequently 
interpreted either as a political gesture having more to do with power 
politics in Washington than American policy in Asia or as an "effort" to 
"settle the question of its rights and interests in China" in a more 
favorable way to the United States (see Dooman-Hull, 4 August 1939, 
FRUS, 1939, Vol. 3, p. 565). That this might have heralded a more 
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apparently rapidly discounted. See also Kato Sotomatsu's remarks to
Craigie on 9 August about abrogation notice being an "internal matter" 
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S.1.1.1...0-55, Vol. 3, p. 226.
27 Quotes in this paragraph taken from 29 July 1939 statement from
Chinese Foreign Minister and reported comments of Chiang Kai-shek in a 
31 July meeting with U.S. Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson. See Johnson- 
Hull, 31 July 1939 (711.942/195) and Johnson-Hull, 31 July 1939
(711.942/196) in FRUS, 1939, Vol. 3, pp. 562-563.
28 Quote from minute by Ronald of the Far Eastern Department in Cabinet 
conclusions for 2 August 1939. FO, F8393.
29 FO, F8151, Clark-Kerr-Foreign Office, 30 July 1939.
30 Statement by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, 31 July 
1939. FO, F84 04.
31 Cabinet conclusions 40(39), 2 August 1939. FO, F8393.
32 Message conveyed by Charge d'Affaires Dooman to Vice Minister for
Foreign Affairs Sawada on 3 August 1939. See Dooman-Hull, 3 August 1939. 
FRUS, 1939, Vol. 4, p. 230.
33 See previous note.
34 As was pointed out by the British, the reason fapi was circulating 
elsewhere was not because of its circulation within the British 
Concession but because it had much greater backing and international 
recognition than its FRB rival. For account of 27 July meeting, JMFA 
S.1.1.1.0-55, Vol. 2, pp. 258-275 (esp. pp. 260-261).
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were circulating in North China by late-July 1939. JFMA S.1.1.1..0-55, 
Vol. 2, p. 262.
36 On 28 July, in reply Kato's claim that fapi had been eliminated five 
months previously, Commercial Counselor Macrae provided evidence that 
Chinese currency was still circulating in Chintow and other extra­
territorial areas "to a considerable extent". JFMA, S.1.1.1..0-55, Vol.
2, pp. 258-260, 285.
37 The Japanese argued that, as a result of fapi use in the British
Concession, illegal trade between northern and central China was
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encouraging the flight of capital from North China etc. Kato Sotomatsu, 
27 July 1939. JFMA, S.1.1.1..0-55, Vol 2, p. 260.
38 For account of the implementation of currency exchange controls in 
North China, see Kuwano Hiroshi, Senji Tsuka Kosaku Shi Ron, Hosei 
Daigaku Shuppankyoku, 1965, pp. 41-59.
39 After trading at a discount with fapi since its inception in March 
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Renqin Chosa in Kuwano, p. 43.
40 According to the report of the Japanese and British joint 
subcommittee on economic affairs on 1 August 1939, there were only about 
14 million Chinese silver dollars in the British Concession, probably 
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in the Legation Quarter in Peking. JMFA S. 1.1.1. . 0-55, Vol. 3, pp. 28- 
34. As percentage of total backing For Chinese fapi, which was estimated 
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2%. Estimate from Young, 1963, pp. 7, 30 and 63.
41 For description of 1935 currency reform, see "Notes by Sir F. Leith 
Ross on his mission to China" in Documents on British Foreign Policy, 
Second Series, Vol. 20, publisher, date, p. 1003-1033. For impact on 
North China, see memorandum from British Foreign Office to Japanese
Foreign Ministry, 21 November 1939, JFMA S.1.1.1..0-54, Vol. 7, pp. 60- 
63. See also 1 August report of economic subcommittee, JMFA S.1.1.1..0- 
55, Vol. 3, pp. 28-34.
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historical synopsis of events 1935-1939 based on this view, see 
memorandum by Yoshida Seiji, 10 October 1939, JMFA S.1.1.1...0-54, Vol. 
6, pp. 315-323 (especially pp. 316-317).
« for synopsis of British position, see Craigie's explanation in 
meeting with Japanese negotiators on 28 July 1939. JMFA S.1.1.1..0-55, 
Vol. 2, pp. 285-287.
44 This point was stressed by Kato in his reply to Craigie in the 28 
July meeting, in JMFA S.1.1.1.. 0-55, Vol. 2, pp. 288-289, and also by
Japanese members of the economic subcommittee in a "points of 
difference" section in its report of 1 August 1939. See JMFA,
S.1.1.1..0-55, Vol. 3, pp. 28-34.
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other than British or other Foreign nationals. When Britain agreed to 
hand over criminal suspects to the local authorities, it was, as Japan 
argued, "beyond dispute that the Chinese government in the Tientsin area 
has the right to exercise judicial and administrative powers over the 
Chinese residing in the British Concession." That meant control over 
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handover of the suspects). JFMA S.1.1.1.0-55, Vol. 2, p. 80.
46 Craigie-Halifax, 1 August 1939. DBFP 3-9, pp. 379-380.
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grounds." Craigie-Halifax, 12 August 1939, DBFP, 3-9, p. 459.
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8381/6457/10. See DBFP 3-9, pp. 392-393.
49 These were on 20 July and 4 August. See "Instances of Anti-British 
Agitation in China. June 15-August 15," FO F371/23486/84407. See also 
"Instances of Anti-British Activities in China. September-October 1939," 
FO, FO 371/23487/84407. See also 1 November 1939 memorandum by A. Scott 
(FO 371/23486/11525). Throughout this period, there seemed to be less 
Chinese discontent with Britain in North China than in the unoccupied 
South. But concentrated largely upon Britain's failure to uphold China's 
rights under the Versailles and Washington Treaties as an independent 
state, this discontent was also directed against the perceived 
intrusions of a number of foreign powers (especially Japan), with only 
certain right-wing members of the Chinese elite, some of whom were 
involved in suppressing anti-British agitation from the 1920s, warning 
that failure by Britain to act as a reliable "big brother" to China 
might actually offer the Japanese an opportunity to "fill the breach" in 
this regard. See memorandum initialled by G.F.A. on Chinese reactions to 
Arita-Craigie formula (FO 371/23531/84596) and editorial of Shun Pao, 
Shanghai for 16 August, translated as "A Word to the British on the 
Anglo-Japanese Negotiations." FO F371/23533/84610.
50 Kido Koichi Kankei Bunsho (Documents Concerning Kido Koichi) 
(hereafter cited as KKKB), Kido Nikki Kenkyukai (ed), Tokyo Daigaku 
Shuppankai, 1966, pp. 460-62.
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51 Sir Robert Craigie, Behind the Mask, Hutchison, London, 194 6, 
pp. 7 6-77.
52 Figures from the Internal Security Division of the Home Ministry 
Police Bureau (Naimusho Keibokyoku Hoanka), as well as the Osaka and 
Tokyo publications of the daily newspaper, the Asahi Shimbun. See Nagai 
Kazua&i, "1939 Nen no Hai-Ei Undo," in Nenpyo, Kindai Nihon Kenkyu - 5, 
Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1983, p. 227.
53 Quoted from "Showa 12 Nen yori 20 Nen Shigatsu Shigatsu Jimuseki," in 
Kyurikukaigun Kankei Bunsho, p. 1527. Nagai, p. 243, 253.
54 All the quotes in this paragraph come from a July 24 statement of 
Seinento Osakafuren (Eikoku seiryoku o zenmenteki ni Shina zendo yori 
kuchiku suru wa Toa shinchitsujo kensetsu no kiso nari. Waganin wa Tokyo 
Kaidan ni okeru Eikokugawa ichibu no joho ni manzoku suru koto naku migi
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Political Situation) (hereafter cited as Harada), 9 Vols., Iwanami 
Shoten, Tokyo, 1950-1951 and 1956, Vol. 8, p. 39.
56 Hata, p. 133. Also note that, as late as 22 July, the Emperor was 
saying that "the question of an anti-communist military alliance with 
Germany was not a particularly pressing matter" (bokyo kyotei mo betsu 
ni isogu koto naku). Hata, p. 128.
57 For full text, see Ohata Tokushiro in James Morley (ed), Deterrent 
Diplomacy, Columbia University Press, 1976, pp. 104-105.
58 On May 28, a Japanese cavalry regiment was annihilated by Outer 
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General Staff orders that explicitly forbade raids outside the disputed 
border area. From 1-11 July, the 23rd Division and other Kwantung Army 
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one battle on July 3 alone (G.N. Sevost'janov, in Voprosi Istorii, No. 
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offensive on July 23. Hata Ikuhiko in Taiheiyo Senso E no Michi, 
translated in Morley, Deterrent Diplomacy, pp. 163-167; Larry Moses, 
"Soviet-Japanese Confrontation in Outer Mongolia: The Battle of
Nomonhan-Khalkin Gol", in Journal of Asian Studies, 1967, Vol. 1.
59 Translation of "Ima ni natte gosho kaigi ni kaketatte.. yaru toki 
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naika?" Harada, Vol. 8, p. 85.
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sukoburu konnan nari". Hata, p. 133. See also Young, p. 95: "The foreign 
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61 In the Soviet-Mongolian offensive of 20-31 August, Japanese forces 
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(about 11,000) and with the prospect of an entire army (Sixth Army) 
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Ikuhiko in Morley (ed), Deterrent Diplomacy, p. 170, 175. In an official 
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Revolution, p. 89) . Japanese Army sources (Kwantung Army's 6th Army 
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Against Russia 1939. pp. 915-919, 2 vols., Stanford University Press, 
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